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Public finance economics is often concerned with the “unintended conse-
quences” of government policies, as an evaluation of these unintended effects
is required to obtain a complete picture of the efficacy of a given policy. In
my dissertation, I study three government policies, along with their potential
unintended effects. I find that, in general, the potential unintended effects
that I study are economically small. These findings suggest that policymakers
in these areas can focus relatively more on the direct, intended effects of these
policies when evaluating their costs and benefits.
In the first chapter, I study an expansion of Medicaid which occurred in
2014 as part of the Affordable Care Act. Because this expansion was only
taken up by approximately half of all U.S. states, migration across state lines
is a potential unintended consequence of these reforms. I analyze data from
the American Community Survey and find that this migration response was
not large: I estimate that migration could have increased Medicaid rolls in
expansion states by no more than 2 percent.
In the second chapter, Chris Boone, Arindrajit Dube, Ethan Kaplan, and
I study extensions of unemployment insurance (UI) in the U.S. during the
Great Recession. The “moral hazard” effect of UI on individual search effort
has been well-studied. In this chapter, we broaden these potential unintended
effects to include all potential effects (positive and negative) on aggregate
employment at the county level. Again, we find little effect: we can rule out
negative effects of the extensions in excess of -0.3 percentage points of the
employment-to-population ratio.
Finally, in the third chapter, I use administrative tax data to study a tax
reform in the state of Kansas which was designed to provide tax relief to busi-
nesses. This reform also increased an incentive for owners of a subset of these
businesses to reclassify wage income as the profits of the firm – potentially re-
ducing tax revenue. I again find that the effect was small. I show theoretically
why this increase in incentive may not have caused a large response, even if
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Preface
In my dissertation, I write three essays that study the effects of a different
government policy – along a dimension which is not the explicit goal of that
policy. Each of the policies and effects are distinct, making each chapter fairly
independent of each other chapter. However, these chapters are united by the
goal of constructing a credible identification strategy in order to estimate a
parameter than can be connected to economic theory and government policy.
They also happen to be united in their findings of null effects.
In the first chapter, I estimate the migration effects of the Medicaid expan-
sions that occurred in some states in 2014, in connection with the Affordable
Care Act. While there is a deep literature studying the migration responses to
means-tested welfare benefits in general, this natural experiment is unique in
that it creates larger than usual variation across state lines, with panel vari-
ation. I use the American Community Survey and find that migration from
non-expansion states to expansion states did not increase in 2014, relative to
migration in the opposite direction. This finding has a key implication for
the fiscal federalism of Medicaid: it suggests that migration will not cause a
“race to the bottom.” This chapter was previously published in the Journal of
Policy Analysis and Management (Goodman (2017)).
In the second chapter, Arindrajit Dube, Chris Boone, Ethan Kaplan, and
I study the employment effects of the substantial extension in unemployment
insurance (UI) during the Great Recession, with maximum benefit eligibility
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increasing generally from 26 weeks to up to 99 weeks. This extension could
potentially reduce search effort of recipients – an effect that is well-studied
in this literature – reducing aggregate employment. On the other hand, UI
extensions can also act as a fiscal stabilizer, increasing aggregate demand in
slack periods. The total effect is ambiguous. We exploit panel variation and
find a null effect: in our most precise specifications, we can rule out effects
more negative than 0.3 percentage points of the employment-to-population
ratio. Based on these estimates, we conclude that it is either the case that
search effects are small during a slack labor market (as predicted by Michaillat
(2012), among others) or the fiscal multiplier is large.
In the third chapter, I use administrative tax data to study a tax reform
in the state of Kansas, known as HB 2117. Under pre-reform law, owners of
certain businesses known as S corporations faced a tax incentive to reduce the
wages they pay themselves – policed by an IRS requirement to pay themselves
“reasonable compensation.” HB 2117 enhanced this incentive. I empirically
analyze this reform and find that S corporation shareholders did in fact reduce
the wages that they paid themselves – but only by about 3 percent. This effect
is much less than the very large effects in the literature (e.g., Auten, Splinter
& Nelson (2016)) which studies the introduction of this tax incentive. I use
standard theories of tax evasion (with a small modification) to show that there
are several theoretical “forces” which could cause the magnitude of the effect
to fall when a tax incentive already exists in the baseline.
Each paper faces their own empirical difficulties. The empirical setting in
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the first chapter is perhaps the most straightforward, but nevertheless requires
a careful consideration of the different migration flows that could be affected.
The main specification is effectively a difference-in-differences: it estimates the
increase in migration from non-expansion states to expansion states relative
to migration in the opposite direction. Importantly, this specification captures
the sum of two potential effects: the “attractive” effect (the increase in migra-
tion from non-expansion to expansion states) and the “retentive” effect (the
decrease in migration from expansion to non-expansion states). Both of these
effects push in the same direction. If I had estimated a nonzero regression
result, I would have not have been able to separate the two effects. However,
given that I estimate a null effect, I can say with a reasonable amount of
confidence that both effects are zero.
In the second chapter, the central empirical challenge is the mechanical
endogeneity of the treatment variable – the UI extensions. By law, the benefit
length was set at the state-week level to be a function of the state-level un-
employment rate. Thus, employment rates would tend to covary with benefit
lengths even in the absence of any causal effect of benefit effects on employ-
ment. Our empirical strategy tries to address this endogeneity by studying
county pairs that straddle state borders. We show that this mitigates, but
does not eliminate, the endogeneity problem. We then restrict our sample of
pairs to those that appear to have a good match prior to treatment, and show
suggestive evidence that this strategy reduces endogeneity even more.
In the third chapter, obtaining the point estimate is more straightforward,
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though still not without its complications. The reform happened in a given
state in a given year, meaning that difference-in-differences methods are an
attractive strategy. In the paper, I try to mitigate some of the standard threats
to the parallel trend assumption at the heart of the difference-in-differences
strategy by making the treatment and control samples look similar based on
observable covariates, and by using the synthetic control method. The bigger
challenge in this paper – especially given that I estimate a robust null result –
is estimating the proper confidence intervals. I show why confidence intervals
constructed using analytical standard errors are likely to miss a substantial
share of the uncertainty. I use a randomization inference method to compare
the estimated effect in the treatment state (Kansas) relative to the estimated
effect in each other state which we know not to have been treated. I show
empirically that estimators that are more effective at creating matches between
treatment and control are also more precise when uncertainty is measured
using this method.
Furthermore, there have been developments (either policy changes or data
availability) that affect both the first and third chapter. A substantial short-
coming in the first chapter (which is a published paper in the Journal of Policy
Analysis and Management) is data availability: at the time, I was able to ac-
cess the relevant data through 2014 only – the first year of “treatment.” Thus,
I might have been missing longer term effects. In this dissertation, I have left
the text of the original published article unchanged (with very few exceptions
– e.g., to update a reference to a more recent version of the same paper), and
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have instead added an addendum. In this addendum, I estimate models which
make use of two additional years of data (and which account for additional
states that have taken up the Medicaid expansion). These additional data
confirm the original result: that the migration effect was small, if anything.
With respect to the third chapter, there has additionally been a major
policy development: the passage of the bill colloquially referred to as the Tax
Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) in late December 2017.1 The TCJA introduced
Section 199A to the Internal Revenue Code; under Section 199A, taxpayers
may generally claim a 20 percent deduction for “qualified business income,”
subject to various restrictions. This provision reduces the effective tax rate
on that type of income; this further has the effect of increasing the wedge
between wages and profits for owners of S corporations, which is the margin
that I study in this chapter. In other words, the TCJA made this chapter
substantially more policy-relevant. In this chapter, I describe at a high level
the potential implications of my results for what we might expect in response
to the TCJA. However, there are some key differences between the variation
that I study and the variation created by TCJA. For instance, this deduction
under the TCJA will not be available for certain firms, depending on (among
other things) the income earned by their owners. Given time constraints (and
constraints related to avoiding political controversy), I have not adjusted the
empirical strategy to more directly attempt to estimate the expected effects
1For procedural reasons, the official name of this bill (Public Law 115-97) was changed to
“An act to provide for reconciliation pursuant to titles II and V of the concurrent resolution
on the budget for fiscal year 2018.”
vi
of the TCJA. This might be a fruitful area for future work.
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Chapter 1
The Effect of the Affordable
Care Act Medicaid Expansion
on Migration
1.1 Introduction
Fiscal federalism, through which some social programs are run and funded by
states and lower levels of government, is a key element of the Affordable Care
Act. With the help of federal funds, the ACA asks states to operate health
insurance marketplaces, as well as to expand Medicaid for a large number
of non-disabled adults. As a general matter, fiscal federalism allows local
programs to align more closely with local preferences. At the same time,
fiscal federalism can lead to suboptimal levels of public services if states do
not internalize the effect of their policy on other states. In particular, if state
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policymakers believe that a decrease in means-tested benefits such as Medicaid
will lead to out-migration of program recipients — increasing net expenditures
in other states — states will tend to provide benefits that are too low relative
to the social optimum.1 In equilibrium, such underprovision is more severe
if the migration responsiveness of potential beneficiaries is larger. Yet, the
empirical extent of migration in response to means-tested benefits remains
very much an open question.
This paper studies the migration effects of the 2014 Medicaid expansion
brought about by the ACA, as “amended” by the Supreme Court. This policy
environment generally provides for stark differences in Medicaid eligibility be-
tween 2013 and 2014 for some states (“expansion states”), but not for others
(“non-expansion states”). The potential gain to migrants from non-expansion
states could potentially be quite large. The Department of Health and Human
Services (2014) estimates that per-beneficiary Medicaid expenditures were ap-
proximately $5,500 for the newly-eligible in 2014. As a comparison, 138% of
the federal poverty level was equal to $27,310 for a family of three in 2014.
Despite these large potential gains, this paper estimates that the migra-
tion effect of Medicaid is very close to zero. Furthermore, in the primary
specification, the statistical precision is sufficient to rule out (at 95% confi-
dence) migration effects that would have a meaningful effect on the size of the
Medicaid-eligible population in other states. This suggests that any fiscal ex-
1Seminal contributions to the study of fiscal federalism and competition between juris-
dictions include Brown & Oates (1987), Wildasin (1991), Oates (1999), Brueckner (2000),
Saavedra (2000), and Baicker (2005).
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ternality (through Medicaid expenditures or expenditures on other programs)
from the Medicaid expansion decision is quite small. Additionally, this paper
finds no evidence of a migration effect even in subgroups one might expect a
priori to be more responsive, including those in worse health and those living
closer to a border between an expansion state and a non-expansion state.
There are several reasons why it is important to study the migration effects
of these Medicaid expansions. First, these particular Medicaid expansions are
of first-order policy relevance. The Congressional Budget Office (2016) esti-
mates that the average stock of newly eligible enrollees was 6.1 million in 2014
and 9.6 million in 2015. Furthermore, state policymakers continue to debate
whether they should expand Medicaid (or undo their previous expansion),
perhaps taking migration considerations into account. The magnitude of the
migration response is relevant to these decisions. Second, this policy variation
provides a unique setting to study migration induced by means-tested benefits
more generally. I contribute to this literature by studying policy variation
which is large and varies across time and space. Third, there is a lack of
rigorous evidence on the effect of means-tested health benefits on migration
(Schwartz & Sommers (2014) being a notable exception). Fourth, the migra-
tion effects of Medicaid are relevant to a large literature that exploits variation
in Medicaid eligibility across states over time, since this literature implicitly
assumes that migration effects are small (e.g., Currie & Gruber (1996a, 1996b),
Gross & Notowidigdo (2011), Cohodes, et al. (2016), Cutler & Gruber (1996),
Lo Sasso & Buchmueller (2004), and Gruber & Simon (2008)).
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To study the effect of Medicaid expansion on migration, this paper uses
public use microdata from the American Community Survey (ACS). The ACS
asks respondants about their current residential location as well as their loca-
tion 12 months prior to interview, which I observe at a relatively coarse level
discussed below. Ultimately, this paper finds that the Medicaid expansion did
not appear to affect individuals’ migration decisions to an extent that would
be economically meaningful. In the baseline specification, the point estimate is
very close to zero; the upper bound of the associated 95% confidence interval
corresponds to an increase in the migration rate from non-expansion to ex-
pansion states of less than 0.18 percentage points from a base of 1.06%. Such
a migration response would have only a trivial effect on the Medicaid-eligible
population of expansion states, suggesting that migration concerns should not
play a large role in policymakers’ expansion decisions. Analysis of state-year
variation in Medicaid eligibility more generally, including variation in the years
prior to the 2014 expansions, is consistent with the possibility that individuals
motivated to migrate to obtain Medicaid benefits had already done so prior to
2014. However, these results are not statistically significant.
To my knowledge, there is only one other paper, Schwartz & Sommers
(2014), which examines the migration response to public health care expan-
sions. They look at expansions that took place in Arizona, Maine, and New
York in the early 2000s, as well as the rollout of health reform in Massachusetts
in 2006/2007. Using the (March) Current Population Survey, they use a
difference-in-differences approach, examining inflows into and outflows from
4
these states, relative to a set of one or two control states for each treatment
state. They find results that are insignificantly different than zero, and in fact
of the opposite sign that would be expected if public health care expansions
led to increased in-migration and decreased out-migration. The research envi-
ronment studied in this paper improves on that of Schwartz & Sommers (2014)
in that the ACA Medicaid expansion is much more widespread: the Medicaid
expansion in 2014 took place in just over half of the 51 states (including the
District of Columbia), rather than four in the setting of Schwartz & Sommers
(2014). This policy environment allows for a “region-based” analysis which
Schwartz & Sommers (2014) could not have performed. Furthermore, the ACS
which I use has a substantially larger sample size than the March CPS that
Schwartz & Sommers (2014) use.2 As a result, while none of the specifications
of this paper are perfectly analogous to the main specification of Schwartz &
Sommers (2014), the standard errors of this paper (when translated appropri-
ately) are roughly 30% smaller than those of Schwartz & Sommers (2014).3
More generally, this paper fits into the deeper literature on welfare-induced
migration. One subset of this literature studies across-state variation in the
generosity of cash welfare payments, mostly Aid for Families with Dependent
2Schwartz & Sommers (2014) could not have used the ACS to study (most of) their
variation, as the ACS has existed in its current form only since 2005.
3Furthermore, while the standard errors of this paper and those of Schwartz & Sommers
(2014) are both calculated via the standard “cluster-robust” formula (clustering at the state
level), this paper generally uses 51 clusters while Schwartz & Sommers (2014) uses only 10
clusters. As discussed by Cameron & Miller (2015), the cluster-robust formula estimates
the standard error with a downward bias which is exacerbated when the number of clusters
is “few.” While there is no “magic number” defining what it means to be “few,” Cameron
& Miller (2015) discuss simulation evidence that the cluster-robust formula leads to much
less over-rejection with 50 clusters than with 10.
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Children (AFDC), often using microdata from the Decennial Censuses in 1980
and/or 1990; see Meyer (2000) for a detailed review of this early literature.
More recently, Gelbach (2004) finds suggestive evidence that never-married
high school dropouts who move interstate tend to move to states with higher
welfare benefits, relative to various control groups. Bailey (2005), using a rich
discrete choice conditional logit model, finds somewhat larger effects of welfare
generosity on migration. McKinnish (2005) and McKinnish (2007) find that
AFDC expenditures are more highly concentrated just on the high side of the
border between a high-benefit and a low-benefit state, relative to the rest of
the high-benefit state, suggesting that welfare beneficiaries are migrating as
short a distance as possible in order to obtain higher welfare benefits. Borjas
(1999) finds that immigrants to the United States tend to locate in states with
more generous cash welfare systems.
There are also two other papers more closely related to the present paper in
that they exploit a policy change. Kaestner, Kaushal & Van Ryzin (2003) ex-
amine the effect of state-specific welfare reforms in the 1990s (in the run-up to
nationwide major welfare reforms in 1996) which generally subjected cash as-
sistance to various restrictions. They find that intrastate migration increases in
response to welfare reform (likely reflecting increased job search) but interstate
migration falls slightly, which is the opposite sign one might expect if individ-
uals were migrating to take up more generous welfare benefits. Fiva (2009)
studies a national welfare reform in Norway in 2001 which made local welfare
policies more uniform, causing larger increases in generosity in localities which
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were previously less generous. Using a difference-in-differences instrumental
variables design, he finds a substantial migration response to the change in
benefits among low skill unmarried men — enough that a 10% increase in
benefits would lead to a 4% increase in the welfare-receiving population.
Results from the literature on welfare-induced migration need not describe
the migration effects of Medicaid expansions under the ACA, however. It
is possible that the potential gain from acquiring Medicaid coverage is large
enough to overcome adjustment costs, in contrast to relatively smaller differ-
ences in AFDC generosity, making migration effects larger. On the other hand,
migration effects from the Medicaid expansion could be smaller if individuals
do not place a high value Medicaid coverage (as suggested by Finkelstein,
Hendren, & Luttmer (2015)), if Medicaid is valued only by a small number of
sicker individuals, or if residents of non-expansion states are unaware of the
expanded eligibility in expansion states. This paper, by contrast, will provide
direct evidence on the effect of Medicaid expansions on migration.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes
the policy environment. Section III describes the data source, the American
Community Survey. Section IV describes the empirical strategy and presents
the results. Section V performs sensitivity analyses. Section VI concludes.
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1.2 Medicaid Expansions in the ACA
In March 2010, President Barack Obama signed two pieces of legislation which
together are known colloquially as the Affordable Care Act, hereafter the ACA.
Among other legislative goals, the ACA was designed to increase health insur-
ance coverage in two main ways, most of which took effect in the year 2014.
First, it created insurance marketplaces complete with the “three-legged stool”
of guaranteed issue (i.e., no denial of coverage due to pre-existing conditions,
combined with community rating of premiums), an individual mandate to pur-
chase health insurance, and subsidies to help low-income individuals purchase
insurance. Second, it provided substantial funding for states to expand their
Medicaid program to cover all individuals up to 138% of the federal poverty
guidelines. The federal government would provide 90% of the incremental
funding for this Medicaid expansion, with states covering the remaining 10%.4
In the original text of the ACA, the federal government further incentivized
states to take up the Medicaid expansion by conditioning existing Medicaid
payments on the expansion. In the Supreme Court case National Federation
of Independent Business (NFIB) v. Sebelius, the Court ruled inter alia that
this type of “coersion” of state governments by the federal government was
unconstitutional. To remedy this constitutional deficiency, the Court ruled
that federal government could not take away existing Medicaid funding if that
state elected not to adopt the Medicaid expansion. As of early 2014, 24 states
4For the years 2014-2016, the federal government provides 100% of the incremental fund-
ing; this match amount decreases gradually to 90% in 2020.
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chose not to adopt the Medicaid expansion. These states are shown in Figure
1.1.5 The decision to expand Medicaid or not seems most closely related to the
political beliefs held by the voters and the governor of each state; of the 24 non-
expansion states, 17 voted for Senator John McCain in the 2008 presidential
election and 21 were headed by Republican governors when NFIB was decided.
The idiosyncratic role of governors means that expansion status is not a neat
divide between states that are traditionally liberal and conservative. Governor
Steve Beshear (D, Kentucky) helped push through the Medicaid expansion in
his otherwise conservative state, while Governors Paul LePage (R, Maine) and
Tom Corbett (R, Pennsylvania) were able to prevent the Medicaid expansions
in their more left-leaning states (at least temporarily, in Corbett’s case).
In non-expansion states, individuals between 100% and 138% of the federal
poverty guidelines—who would be eligible for Medicaid had the state expanded
Medicaid—are eligible for premium subsidies in the insurance marketplaces.
These are somewhat less generous than Medicaid because net premiums paid
by the beneficiary are still positive (2% of income for a benchmark plan) and
these plans include some element of cost-sharing, such as copays or coinsur-
ance.6 Individuals earning less than 100% of the federal poverty guidelines are
not eligible for premium subsidies, since Congress expected that these individ-
uals would be covered by Medicaid. As a result, this group falls into what has
5In 2015 and 2016, several additional states chose to adopt the Medicaid expansion.
This paper defines expansion status as it existed in early 2014 because the data describe
migration behavior through 2014 only.
6Most of these individuals would be eligible for cost-sharing subsidies which reduce, but
do not eliminate, copays and coinsurance.
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been dubbed the “Medicaid gap.” Such individuals were exempted from the
individual mandate. Furthermore, the set of expansion states is geographically
dispersed. Of all of the non-expansion states, only five states in the southeast
— North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, and Alabama — do not
share a border with an expansion state. Similarly, of all of the expansion
states, only California, Rhode Island, and Vermont do not share a border with
a non-expansion state. Of the 831 Metropolitan Statistical Areas defined by
the Office of Management and Budget, 25 straddle the border between an ex-
pansion state and a non-expansion state (Office of Management and Budget
(2013)).7 Additionally, states are not permitted to condition Medicaid eligi-
bility on length of residence; similar laws in the context of AFDC were found
unconstitutional in the Supreme Court case Saenz v. Roe.
Complicating matters somewhat, five expansion states (California, Con-
necticut, Minnesota, New Jersey, andWashington) and the District of Columbia
initiated some elements of the Medicaid expansion prior to 2014. Massachusetts
also implemented a health care reform in 2006 whereby (inter alia) individu-
als up to 150% of the poverty guidelines were offered fully subsidized health
insurance. This suggests that treating these states as implementing the ACA
Medicaid expansion in 2014 could lead to attenuation bias. However, as shown
in Frean, Gruber, and Sommers (2017), the Medicaid expansion led to large in-
creases in coverage in 2014 even among previously-eligible individuals, suggest-
7Examples of such MSAs include New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Washington, St.
Louis, Memphis, and Louisville.
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ing a large salience or marketing effect of the 2014 expansions. Furthermore, of
these six states and D.C., only D.C. and Massachusetts offered universal cov-
erage throughout the state to virtually the entire population under 138% of
poverty prior to 2014 (Kaiser Family Foundation (2016a, 2016b, and 2016c)).
For these reasons, these six states and D.C. are treated in the same manner
as all other expansion states – i.e., beginning “treatment” in 2014 – in the
baseline analysis. However, in sensitivity analyses, the main specifications are
re-estimated after dropping these states, with little effect on the results.
1.3 Data
This paper uses public use microdata from the American Community Survey
(ACS) conducted in years 2005 through 2014, accessed via the Integrated
Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) (Flood, et al. (2015)). The survey
is a random sample of roughly 1% of all households in the United States in
each year, with interviews taking place on a rolling basis throughout the year.
Most importantly for the research question at hand, the ACS questionnaire
asks about the residential location of each individual one year prior to interview
as well as the location of current residence. To prevent disclosure of personal
information, this location is reported in the public use samples at the “public
use microdata area” (PUMA) level. A PUMA is a region constructed by the
Census Bureau fully nested within states, with a population of at least 100,000.
The location of prior residence — if the individual migrated — is aggregated
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at a slightly different level, known as a “PUMA of migration.”
The analysis is performed at the individual level, although some variables
are defined at the household or family level. A “family” is a set of persons
constructed by IPUMS which is a subset of a given household.8 This is a non-
trivial specification choice: among families with at least one migrant, one-third
had only certain members of the family migrate. A common example is an
adult child moving back in with his or her parents. Another common example
is an aging parent moving in with his or her adult children.
The rolling nature of the interviews presents two challenges. First, since
the mean (and median) 2014 interview was conducted in June 2014, analysis
of the 2014 interviews generally picks up only the very short-run effects, rather
than migration effects that occur in the longer-run (e.g., after learning takes
place). Second, 2014 interviews will pick up many moves that happen during
calendar year 2013. I argue that these moves are rightfully considered part
of the treatment effect, since individuals might move in anticipation of the
expansion — especially those individuals living in very conservative or liberal
states whose expansion decision was not in doubt. An implication of such
anticipatory moves is that moves reported in the 2013 survey could also be
part of the treatment effect, since the potential migration period overlaps
with the 2014 survey. For this reason, observations from the 2013 survey are
dropped in all regression analyses of the 2014 Medicaid expansion.
8Importantly, a cohabitating (non-married) partner will generally be assigned to a sep-
arate family unit within the household, which is consistent with Medicaid eligibility, which
uses the tax unit as its household concept.
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1.3.1 Selection of analysis sample
The analysis sample is selected in order to restrict attention to individuals
who could potentially be affected by the Medicaid expansion if they lived in
an expansion state. In the baseline specification, the analysis sample is chosen
using an income-based selection criterion. In particular, individuals are in-
cluded in the sample if their reported family income over the prior 12 months
would have placed them below 138% of the federal poverty level, based on their
family size.9 One substantial concern about selecting the sample in this way
is that income could be causally affected by state of residence. Meyer (2000)
showed that this can be very problematic when analyzing cross-sectional mi-
gration flow. In particular, because the ACS asks about income received over
the prior 12 months, the econometrician observes only some convex combina-
tion of a migrant’s origin income and destination income. When looking at
migration from a high-wage state (which may be correlated with being an ex-
pansion state), the econometrician would then tend to see outgoing migrants
as having lower income than individuals who remained in the high-wage state.
In other words, an individual who lived in a high-wage state 12 months prior
9While this measure is a reasonable proxy for (potential) Medicaid eligibility, it is not
perfect, for several reasons. First, the family concept used for Medicaid eligibility is the tax
unit — including the filer and anyone else (including a spouse) for whom he or she claims
as a personal exemption. The family concept in the ACS is similar for most households, in
that it considers all members who are related to each other as part of the same “family,”
but there is not enough information to know whether, e.g., an adult child can be claimed
as a dependent. Second, Medicaid eligibility is based on monthly income, not annual.
Furthermore, in practice, eligibility decisions are usually made with “projected income,”
which can presumably be manipulated to some degree. It is possible that manipulation of
income could substitute for migration, but this is highly unlikely among childless couples,
for whom the eligibility thresholds are very low or non-existent in non-expansion states.
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to interview would be more likely to be in the analysis sample if he or she mi-
grated to a low-wage state. This could bias upward the estimated migration
flow from this high-wage state among the analysis sample and, by an analo-
gous argument, bias downward the estimated migration flow from a low-wage
state.
Fortunately, as discussed in more detail below, the empirical strategies of
this paper have the spirit of a difference-in-differences. Thus, for the causal
effect of residence on income to bias these results, these causal effects must be
time-varying within a given state. In Section 1.4.3, I consider several possible
channels of time-varying bias and present evidence that these channels do not
appear to be playing a large role. Ultimately, though, this is an assumption
that I must make. Furthermore, Section 1.5 will explore specifications that
select the sample on the basis of education level rather than income, which
mitigates this source of potential bias, at the cost of making the sample less
well targeted.
Additional sample restrictions are made in order to drop individuals who
are mostly unaffected by the Medicaid expansion. First, all families in which
all members are over the age of 65 are excluded, as such families would gen-
erally be covered by Medicare.10 For a similar reason, the small number of
families in which all members are 17 years of age or younger are also excluded.
Furthermore, lawfully present immigrants are generally ineligible for Medi-
10While some “dual-eligible” Medicare beneficiaries are also covered by Medicaid, these
beneficiaries were not affected by the expansions.
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caid until five years after they receive permanent resident status (i.e., a green
card); undocumented immigrants are permantly ineligible (except for some
emergency services). However, neither the legal status of immigrants, nor the
date of permanent resident status, is observable in the data. Thus, I proxy for
ineligibility due to immigrant status by dropping all immigrants who arrived
to the U.S. within five years of interview.11
To target the analysis to groups that might be most likely to respond to
the Medicaid expansion, some specifications will restrict attention further to
individuals in families without children. Children are generally not part of
newly eligible population, because children in families with income less than
138% of poverty would typically be eligibile for Medicaid or CHIP even in
non-expansion states. Yet, the presence of children (or an increase in family
size, more generally) can substantially increase the costs of migration. Thus,
it is plausible that any migration effects of the Medicaid expansions would be
concentrated in the group of childless adults.
Table 1.1 presents summary statistics for the analysis sample, separately
in expansion and non-expansion states (based on reported residence 12 months
prior to interview). Characteristics are fairly well matched between the expan-
sion and non-expansion states, except that expansion-state adults are slightly
more likely to be male, have a bachelor’s degree, be hispanic, or be an immi-
11Borjas (2017), following Passel and Cohn (2014), has developed a mechanism that at-
tempts to identify undocumented immigrants in data sources such as the ACS. However,
implementing such a procedure in this context would require selecting on certain observables,
including Medicaid receipt, that could introduce compositional issues with implications that
are not straightforward. For this reason, I do not implement this procedure here.
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grant (although the difference is not statistically significant for the latter two).
Furthermore, the sample is almost evenly split between those who live in an
expansion state and those who live in a non-expansion state 12 months prior
to interview.
To understand broad patterns of migration in the analysis sample, Fig-
ure 1.2 plots the mean interstate migration rate of this sample as well as a
sample of middle-income individuals (with earnings between 250% and 400%
of poverty). The upper graph uses all observations from these two groups.
Immediately, we see that the analysis sample has a higher migration rate than
the higher-income sample, by a factor of about 50%. This is not explained by
family structure, since this level difference exists in the childless sample (in
the lower graph) as well.12
1.3.2 Medicaid eligibility thresholds
In most specifications, a state’s Medicaid expansion status is treated as bi-
nary. Some specifications, however, use eligibility thresholds (expressed as a
percentage of the federal poverty level) collected by Kaiser Family Foundation
(2016a, 2016b, and 2016c). This data collection performed by Kaiser is no
small task: eligibility limits — which also often varied by the working sta-
12This relationship between income and migration stands in contrast to literature which
finds that individuals with higher education (and presumably higher permanent income) are
more likely to migrate (Bound & Holzer (2000), Molloy, Smith, & Wozniak (2011)). One
speculative explanation would be that negative income shocks, such as a job separation,
tend to lead causally to migration. This channel would lead to larger estimates of the
baseline migration rate, relative to an ideal sample which conditioned on permanent income.
However, this bias is harmless to the empirical strategy unless the magnitude of this causal
effect changes in 2014, differently in expansion and non-expansion states.
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tus of the beneficiary — were not reported in a standardized manner. Thus,
these thresholds cannot perfectly summarize the eligibility rules for all house-
holds. Furthermore, while Kaiser have collected eligibility limits for parents
since 2002 (and children since 2000), they have collected eligibility limits for
childless adults only since 2011.
1.4 Empirical Strategy and Baseline Results
In a standard setting in which migration is studied, one might estimate the
effect of the treatment in question on inflows into and outflows from affected
states. In the literature on welfare-induced migration, versions of this approach
are undertaken by Fiva (2009), Gelbach (2004), Kaestner, et al. (2003), and
Schwartz & Sommers (2014). In the context of the present paper, such an
analysis would estimate whether inflows into expansion states increased, and
outflows from expansion states decreased, in 2014 relative to inflows to and
outflows from non-expansion states in 2014. However, two advantageous fea-
tures of the 2014 Medicaid expansions allow for a refinement of this approach.
First, the 2014 Medicaid expansion took place in roughly half of all states. Sec-
ond, it is reasonable to model the Medicaid expansion as a uniform treatment
in expansion states implemented all at once in those states.13
In particular, given this policy environment, it is possible to isolate the
migration flows most plausibly affected by the Medicaid expansion: migration
13Sensitivity analyses will examine some relaxations of this specification choice, including
dropping the six so-called “early expanders.”
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from the set of non-expansion states to the set of expansion states, as well as
migration in the opposite direction.14 In particular, the expansion of Medicaid
could induce some individuals to move from non-expansion states to expansion
states in 2014. The expansion could also reduce migration from expansion
states to non-expansion states; i.e., some individuals who would have moved
from an expansion state to a non-expansion state in the counterfactual of a
uniform Medicaid expansion could be induced not to move, or induced to move
to some other expansion state. The empirical strategy of this paper aims to
test whether either of these effects exist.
To implement this empirical strategy, all 50 states and the District of
Columbia are assigned in a time-invariant manner to two “regions,” as illus-
trated in Figure 1.1: the set of expansion states and the set of non-expansion
states. The dependent variable yirt, measured at the individual level, is de-
fined equal to one if the individual moved from one region to the other — that
is, “inter-regionally” — in the 12 months prior to interview in year t. The
individual’s origin state is indexed by r. The variable nonexpr is a dummy
for having an origin state in the non-expansion region. I.e., nonexpr equals
one for the following types of individuals: (1) an individual who migrates
from a non-expansion state to an expansion state, (2) an individual who lives
in a non-expansion state and does not migrate (or migrates intrastate), and
(3) an individual who migrates from one non-expansion state to another non-
14Meyer (2000) also examines inter-regional migration in the cross-section, where regions
are defined relative to the median AFDC generosity.
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expansion state. The variable postt is a dummy for 2014. Given these variable
definitions, the following linear probability model is estimated:15
yirt = λt + µr + β × nonexprpostt + εrt (1.1)
The coefficient β captures the extent to which non-expansion-to-expansion
migration increased in 2014, relative to the increase in expansion-to-non-
expansion migration in 2014. This regression has the spirit of a difference-
in-differences regression, with a subtle caveat. In a typical difference-in-
differences, one group is “treated” and another group is “untreated” (or “con-
trol”). In equation (1.1), non-expansion states are playing the role of “treated”
and expansion states are playing the role of “untreated.” However, the Med-
icaid expansion plausibly “treats” the migration from both expansion states
and non-expansion states — but in opposite directions. Thus, β measures the
sum of both effects: the increase in non-expansion-to-expansion migration and
the decrease in expansion-to-non-expansion migration.
Because this regression is isomorphic to a difference-in-differences regres-
sion, a causal interpretation of this coefficient requires a standard parallel
trend assumption. In particular, in the counterfactual of a uniform Medicaid
expansion applying to all states, the assumption requires that non-expansion-
to-expansion migration would have followed a trend parallel to expansion-to-
15The regressions are weighted by the ACS sample weights. As discussed above, obser-
vations from interview year 2013 are dropped. Standard errors are clustered at the level of
the origin state. Note that this regression could equivalently be run at the origin state-year
level if appropriately weighted.
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non-expansion migration. This could be violated if, for instance, expansion
states experienced greater economic growth in 2014, causing them to be a
more attractive residential location. Further threats to this assumption are
considered in Section 1.4.3.
Some specifications add control variables to the regression. The first set of
control variables are for demographic characteristics of individuals: dummies
for being male, non-Hispanic white, Hispanic, and the interaction between
male and white, and male and Hispanic; a dummy for being an immigrant; a
quadratic in age; dummies for being married; dummies for having 1, 2, 3, or
4 or more children; dummies for having an 8th grade education or less, being
a high school dropout, and being a high school graduate (exactly); income
as a proportion of poverty; and the log of the distance from the individual’s
PUMA (or PUMA of migration) to the nearest border between an expansion
state and a non-expansion state. Although these demographic variables are
roughly orthogonal to nonexprpostt, conditional on the state and time fixed
effects, these controls can improve precision and potentially mitigate any ef-
fects from changes in the composition of the sample over time. Second, two
unemployment rate controls are added: (1) the own-state unemployment rate
and (2) the minimum state unemployment rate in the opposite region within
500 kilometers of the origin state.16 To the extent that the unemployment rate
accurately captures local economic conditions relevant to low-income individu-
16In the case of Alaska and Hawaii, this latter variable is set equal to the unemployment
rate of the closest state in the opposite region (which is further than 500 kilometers).
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als, these variables can control for true causal effects of time-varying economic
conditions, and they can also control for any time-varying bias in measuring
migration rates, as discussed above. Third, some specifications include state-
specific trends to control for other forms of time-varying state heterogeneity.
1.4.1 Investigation of pre-existing differences and trends
Figure 1.3 provides a visual summary both of the pre-existing trends in
inter-regional migration, as well as the main result of this paper. The Fig-
ure shows the mean inter-region migration rates of the analysis sample, where
the dashed line and hollow circles represent expansion-to-non-expansion mi-
gration (i.e., the mean value of yirt for individuals reporting an origin state
in the expansion region in a given interview year) and the solid line and solid
circles represent non-expansion-to-expansion migration (i.e., the mean value
of yirt for individuals with an origin state in the non-expansion region in a
given interview year). The top graph, which reports the yearly means for all
individuals in the analysis sample, shows that the trends looked different from
each other prior to 2008, with a general decline from expansion states and a
general increase from non-expansion states prior to 2008. After 2008, however,
the trends look fairly parallel. Furthermore, the difference in means in 2014
looks roughly similar to the difference in means in previous years. The pattern
among childless individuals (bottom graph) is qualitatively similar. Visually,
there appears to be little evidence that Medicaid expansions caused increased
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migration from non-expansion to expansion states (or reduced migration in
the opposite direction).
More formally, to analyze pre-existing trends, an event study regression of
the following form is estimated on data from 2005 through 2012:17
yirt = λt + µr +
∑
s 6=2012
βsnonexpr ∗ 1(yeart = s) + εrt (1.2)
Each βs coefficient estimates the difference between non-expansion-to-expansion
migration and migration in the opposite direction, relative to that difference
as it existed in 2012. If the two sets of states were following parallel trends
prior to treatment, the βs terms would be estimated to be close to zero.
Column 1 of Table 1.2 reports results from this regression for all indi-
viduals; column 4 reports analogous results for the sample of childless adults.
Both columns confirm the visual evidence of Figure 1.3. In both columns,
the coefficient estimates for 2008 through 2011 are close to zero, while the
estimates for 2005 through 2007 are negative and (in most cases) significant.
Indeed, in both columns, an F test does not reject that the 2008 through 2011
terms are jointly equal to zero. However, the F test does reject that coeffi-
cients 2005 through 2011 are equal to zero (or comes close to rejecting, in the
case of the sample of childless individuals). Columns 2 and 3, and 5 and 6, add
demographic controls and unemployment rate controls, which have essentially
17Recall that observations from 2013 are dropped when estimating Equation (1.1) since
2012 is the final interview year which is assumed to be completely untreated.
22
no effect.18
Given the results of the event study, the remainder of this paper focuses
attention to the results which start the sample in 2008. Effectively, when
the regression includes data from 2005 to 2007, the implicit counterfactual
assumes that the difference between the expansion-to-non-expansion migration
rate and the non-expansion-to-expansion migration rate would have grown in
magnitude 2014 (toward the size of that difference as it existed from 2005 to
2007). There is little reason to have expected this to occur; thus, excluding
these three years of data provides for a more plausible counterfactual.
1.4.2 Baseline results
Table 1.3 reports the estimates from Equation (1.1), which I consider to be
the main results of this paper. The model is estimated on the analysis sam-
ple as described in Section 1.3.1, dropping observations from interview-year
2013. The first column shows the results without any controls; the second
column adds demographic controls, the third adds unemployment rate con-
trols, and the fourth adds state-specific trends.19 In brief, the point estimates
are quite close to zero and are estimated with sufficient precision to rule out
large migration effects. The point estimate in the first column for all individ-
18Table 1.9 reports estimates from a regression of the form yirt = λt + µr + βnonexpr ∗
yeart + εrt, which estimates the difference in pre-existing trends of inter-region migration
from non-expansion states relative to expansion states. The results tell the same story: the
difference in pre-existing trends is substantial when starting the sample in 2005 and much
smaller when the sample starts in 2008.
19Table 1.3 reports only the coefficient on nonexprpostt. Table 1.10 shows the estimates
for the control variables as well.
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uals is -0.005 – that is, -0.005 percentage points — from a baseline mean of
1.058%. The top of the 95% confidence interval is 0.174 percentage points.
For childless adults, the point estimate in the first column is 0.012 percentage
points from a mean of 1.716%; the top of the 95% confidence interval is 0.271
percentage points. Including demographic controls and unemployment rate
controls makes virtually no difference; adding state-specific trends has little
effect for childless adults and makes the estimate somewhat more negative for
the estimate using all individuals.20
A back-of-the-envelope calculation shows that the fiscal externality of state
expanding Medicaid is trivial, even at the largest upper bound reported in this
table. In particular, let tnat denote the Medicaid take-up rate of native eligible
individuals. Let tmig denote the analogous take-up rate of those individuals
induced to migrate to an expansion state (or induced not to migrate from
an expansion state) by the Medicaid expansion. Let α denote the number of
induced migrants as a fraction of the population of non-expansion states, which
corresponds to β from equation (1.1). I will let α = 0.0030 (i.e., 0.30 percentage
points), since 0.0030 is the largest top of the 95% confidence interval reported
in Table 1.3. Let PE and PN denote the population of eligible individuals
in expansion and non-expansion states respectively. The total increase in
20A triple difference specification, using a control sample (e.g., those with earnings between
250% and 400% of poverty), would be feasible in principle. However, these specifications are
poisoned by large differential pre-existing trends. For both childless families and all families,
the difference (analysis sample minus control sample) in the difference in pre-existing trends
(between non-expansion-to-expansion migration and migration in the opposite direction) is
larger in magnitude than the single difference in pre-existing trends in the analysis sample,
invalidating the use of the triple difference strategy for these specifications.
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the number of Medicaid beneficiaries in expansion states is approximately
αtmigP
N . The number of native Medicaid beneficiaries in the expansion states
is tnatPE. Thus, making the additional approximation that PE ≈ PN (see
Table 1.1), the relative increase in Medicaid beneficiaries due to migration
is α tmig
tnat
. So, even if migrants took up Medicaid at a rate six times that of
native eligibles (so that tmig
tnat
= 6), migration would increase Medicaid rolls by
no more than 2% in the short-run.21
1.4.3 Threats to the parallel trend assumption
As mentioned above, a causal interpretation to coefficient estimates from Equa-
tion (1.1) requires a parallel trend assumption: in the absence of the Medi-
caid expansion, expansion-to-non-expansion migration would have followed the
same trend as non-expansion-to-expansion migration between the pre-period
and the post-period. The most straightforward threat to this assumption is
the possibility that economic conditions changed in 2014 in expansion states
relative to the analogous change in non-expansion states. For expositional pur-
poses, suppose that expansion states experienced a relative boom. This could
potentially bias the results in either direction. On the one hand, the causal ef-
fect of economic conditions (better conditions lead to more in-migration) could
lead to an increase in migration to expansion states. On the other hand, the
21Equation (1.1) could instead be estimated at the origin-state/year level, using the log of
the inter-region migration rate as the dependent variable. Without any additional control
variables, such a regression yields a coefficient estimate of -.0376 with a standard error of
0.0840. The top of the 95% confidence interval would imply an effect of 12.7 log points, or
about 0.14 percentage points from the baseline of 1.07%.
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mismeasurement effect discussed in Section 1.3.1 could lead to an increase
in measured migration from expansion states: individuals with origin in ex-
pansion states might have income low enough to be in the analysis sample if
they move away, but not if they remain a resident of an expansion state. In
any case, however, the economic improvement between the pre-period (2008
to 2012) and the post-period (2014) appears fairly similar in expansion and
non-expansion states as measured by the unemployment rate. In expansion
states, the mean unemployment rate (weighted by the appropriate sum of the
sample weights in the analysis sample) in expansion states fell from 9.0% to
6.6% between the pre-period and the post-period; the analagous change in
non-expansion states was from 8.1% to 5.9%. Thus, changes in economic con-
ditions does not appear a likely candidate to cause a violation of the parallel
trend assumpion.22
Another threat to the parallel trend assumption is the possibility that Med-
icaid itself causally affects income, and thus selection into the analysis sample,
by reducing labor supply (Garthwaite, Gross, and Notowidigdo (2014)). Such
a causal effect would tend to cause individuals with a non-expansion origin
state in 2014 to have lower potential earnings if they migrate to expansion
states than if they do not. By the mechanism discussed above, this would in-
crease estimated migration, but not true migration, from non-expansion states
22The employment-to-population ratio (using employment derived from the Quarterly
Census of Employment and Wages) does suggest a slightly better improvement in expansion
states. This ratio increased from 51.9 to 52.3 percent in non-expansion states and from 52.5
to 53.3 percent in expansion states. However, the difference between these differences is not
statistically significant.
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to expansion states in 2014 among the analysis sample, biasing the coefficient
estimate from Equation (1.1) upward. An upward bias to the coefficient esti-
mate would indicate that the estimates discussed above (finding a zero effect
of Medicaid on migration) are in fact upper bounds.
Finally, despite the fact that observations from interview-year 2013 are
dropped, anticipation effects in 2013 remain a threat to the parallel trend
assumption. In particular, such anticipation effects would lead to a large
increase in non-expansion-to-expansion migration in 2013. These new migrants
would appear in the 2014 sample as residents of expansion states, but their
rate of inter-region migration in 2014 (that is, back to the region of non-
expansion states) might be very low. This would have the effect of reducing
the measured expansion-to-non-expansion migration rate in 2014. However,
as in the previous paragraph, this would tend to bias the coefficient estimate
of Equation (1.1) upward — meaning that such an effect would not threaten
the validity of the coefficient estimates as upper bounds of the true migration
effect of Medicaid.
1.4.4 Subsample analyses
While estimates using the entire analysis sample find no migration effects from
the Medicaid expansion, it is possible that migration effects are concentrated in
certain subgroups. First, the Medicaid expansion might be sufficient to induce
migration over a short distance but not a long distance. Second, the expansion
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might induce migration only among those with relatively poor health.
To examine the first possibility, Table 1.4 estimates versions of Equa-
tion (1.1) on subsamples of the analysis sample with origin close to a border
between an expansion state and a non-expansion state.23 The first row re-
stricts the analysis sample to individuals in Commuting Zones that straddle
the expansion/non-expansion border.24 Of the 709 commuting zones, 61 strad-
dle a border between an expansion state and a non-expansion state.25 In this
row, the regression includes fixed effects for the state/Commuting Zone com-
bination (rather than just the state), and the standard errors are clustered
twoway at the state and Commuting Zone level. The estimates are generally
large and economically meaningful, but the statistical precision drops substan-
tially. For instance, among all individuals in Commuting Zones that straddle
the boundary, the coefficient estimate with no state trends is 0.101 percent-
age points (from, unsurprisingly, a higher baseline interregion migration rate
of 1.449%) with a standard error of 0.210. This standard error is more than
double than the analogous standard error from estimating Equation (1.1) on
the unrestricted analysis sample.
23Only the estimates with demographic and unemployment rate controls are reported. The
addition of these controls makes essentially no difference; results available upon request.
24A Commuting Zone is a set of counties constructed by the United States Department
of Agriculture such that commuting ties are strong within each Commuting Zone but weak
between different Commuting Zones. Commuting Zones form a partition of the United
States.
25A given PUMA or PUMA of migration might not map cleanly into a commuting zone.
In these cases, individuals are assigned probabilistically to each commuting zone in which
their PUMA or PUMA of migration lies. For instance, if an individual’s origin is in a
PUMA whose population is 75% within Commuting Zone A and 25% within Commuting
Zone B, this individual is placed with 0.75 weight in Commuting Zone A and 0.25 weight
in Commuting Zone B.
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In order to improve power, the remaining rows restrict the analysis sample
somewhat less stringently. In particular, the regressions in these rows keep all
individuals who live in a PUMA (or PUMA of migration, as the case may be)
whose population centroid lies within a certain distance of an expansion/non-
expansion border.26 The results tell a similar story as the sample in straddling
Commuting Zone: while the coefficient estimate is sometimes large, the stan-
dard errors are even larger.27 In sum, the advantage of restricting the sam-
ple to individuals living near an expansion/non-expansion border — isolating
those individuals most likely to respond — appears outweighed by the loss of
statistical precision.
Table 1.5 considers the possibility that only individuals in relatively poor
health migrate in response to the Medicaid expansions. Two proxies for poor
health are considered. In the first row of each panel, the sample is restricted
to individuals age 46 or older, as health expenditures (aside from those related
to childbirth) tend to increase with age.28 In the second row, the sample
is restricted to a sample of individuals who report a disability.29 While one
estimate in Table 1.5— the estimate for childless adults reporting a disability,
26One concern about this strategy is the fact that PUMA (and PUMA of migration) bor-
ders were revised in 2012. It is thus possible that the composition of individuals in PUMAs
(or PUMAs of migration) within a certain distance of an expansion/non-expansion bor-
der could have changed substantially between 2011 and 2012. However, in results available
upon request, there does not appear to be a break in any series of education, race, or income
variables between 2011 and 2012 among this restricted sample.
27Note, however, that three of the four coefficients estimated on the sample restricted to
being within 75km of the boundary are estimated to be negative.
28Note that prior to the ACA, the lowest eligibility threshold in any state for Medicaid
coverage for pregnant women was 133% of the federal poverty level; these coverage levels
were not substantially affected by the ACA.
29Specifically, this restricted sample contains individuals who report a hearing, vision,
cognitive, ambulatory, self-care, or independent-living difficulty.
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in the specification including state-specific trends — is economically large, all
estimates are insignificant and six of the eight are negative. These results are
consistent with a null effect of Medicaid on migration, even among relatively
sicker populations, though the decline in power means that one cannot rule
out modest-sized effects.
1.5 Robustness to sensitivity analyses
A concern with the empirical strategy, as discussed above, is the endogeneity of
income with respect to place of residence. For this reason, Equation (1.1) is re-
estimated using a sample selected on the basis of education levels. Specifically,
all individuals in this revised sample are part of families with (1) at least one
individual with less than a high school education and (2) no member with more
than a high school education. This ameliorates the endogeneity-of-sampling
issue, though it also create attenuation bias, since only 47% of this sample
has family income less than 138% of the poverty level. The first row of Table
1.6 repeats the result from Table 1.3, i.e., using the usual income-based
sample. The second row reports results using the education-selected sample.
The third row restricts the sample to individuals who would qualify for both
the income-based and education-based sample. First, the results show that
baseline migration rate is lower in the education-selected sample (see Column
3), perhaps because this sample excludes many individuals who have transitory
low-income which may be correlated with migration decisions, as discussed in
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Section 1.3.1. Second, the regression results without state trends are all
approximately zero. The specifications with state trends exhibit somewhat
more variance, but all estimates are insignificant and half are positive and half
are negative, consistent with a null effect.
Next, I analyze the robustness of the results to alternative specification
choices regarding certain states for whom either the timing of the expansion,
or the assignment to regions, is somewhat tenuous. First, I consider alterna-
tive specification choices regarding the seven states (including D.C.) that had
expanded health coverage to non-disabled adults prior to 2014. The first two
rows of each panel of Table 1.7 re-estimate the baseline results after drop-
ping these seven states or a subset thereof. The first row drops Massachusetts
and the District of Columbia since each jurisdiction expanded coverage to vir-
tually the entire newly-eligible population prior to 2014. Specifically, in this
row, (1) individuals with those locations as origin are dropped and (2) the
dependent variable yirt is redefined to equal zero for moves into those two lo-
cations. The second row drops five more states (CA, CT, MN, NJ, and WA)
which implemented more limited elements of the Medicaid expansion prior to
2014. Neither specification yields results that are meaningfully different than
the baseline specification.
Additionally, for some states who expanded Medicaid in early 2014, but
after January 1, assignment to the set of expansion states or the set of non-
expansion states is somewhat arbitrary. For instance, Michigan is assigned to
the “expansion” set, since it implemented its expansion decision in April 2014
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— later than the implementation date in most other expansion states, but
plausibly early enough to affect migration decisions in 2014. But, if individu-
als were surprised by the implementation, and if most migration decisions in
the data were made prior to learning about the implementation, then outmi-
gration from Michigan would be misattributed as coming from an expansion
state, while in fact individuals were acting as if Michigan was a non-expansion
state. Similarly, some clairvoyant residents in the states of Alaska, Indiana,
Louisiana, Pennsylvania, and Montana — states which are assigned to the
non-expansion set — could have foreseen that their states would eventually
choose to expand Medicaid.
To address this concern, rows 3, 4, and 5 of Table 1.7 re-estimate the
main results in three ways. First, Indiana and Pennsylvania are re-assigned to
the “expansion” set. Both of these states expanded in late 2014 or early 2015.
Second, New Hampshire and Michigan, which expanded Medicaid in early
2014, are re-assigned to the non-expansion set. Arkansas is also re-assigned to
the non-expansion set in this specification; Arkansas implemented a version
of the Medicaid expansion which more closely resembled private insurance
exchanges and thus may not have been as salient. Third, all five of these
states are dropped. None of these changes materially affect the results.
32
1.5.1 Treating Medicaid thresholds as a continuous vari-
able
It is possible that definition of the Medicaid expansion as a binary variable is
too coarse and that a finer classification of Medicaid eligibility would reveal
migration effects. In particular, using Medicaid eligibility as a continuous vari-
able exploits the fact that the Medicaid expansion had a bigger eligibility effect
in expanding states which had lower prior eligibility thresholds. Furthermore,
many states expanded or contracted eligibility prior to the 2014 expansions
under the ACA. In the data from Kaiser Family Foundation (2016a, 2016b,
and 2016c) used in this section, there are 203 pre-2014 instances of (mostly
small) changes to the parent threshold and seven pre-2014 instances of (some-
what larger) changes to the childless adult threshold. Of course, such a finer
classification has several costs. First, the interpretation of the results changes
somewhat; the results no longer estimate the migration effect of solely the
ACA Medicaid expansions, rather than some other Medicaid expansion. Sec-
ond, using more general variation across states over time makes a region-based
analysis impossible, as discussed above. Third, it is difficult to summarize
Medicaid eligibility with one eligibility threshold.
To explore the effect of Medicaid eligibility more generally, Table 1.8
reports estimates of the following two-way fixed effects model run at the state-
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year (st) level using data derived from the analysis sample.
yst = λt + µs + β1eligst + β2childeligst + x′stγ + εst (1.3)
In this equation, yst is either the inflow rate from or the outflow rate into
a given state among the analysis sample. The inflow rate is the weighted
number of newly-arrived migrants in state s at time t divided by the weighted
total of observations in the analysis sample living in state s at time t.30 The
outflow rate is the weighted number of migrants who report having left state
s in the prior 12 months when interviewed at time t, divided by the weighted
total of observations that reported living in state s 12 months before being
interviewed at time t. The key explanatory variable is eligst: the state-year
specific Medicaid eligibility threshold for adults (childless adults or parents,
depending on the specification) as a proportion of the poverty level (i.e., so
that a value of one corresponds to 100% of the poverty level). If Medicaid were
influencing migration decisions of families, the coefficient would be expected
to be positive in the inflow equation and negative in the outflow equation.
The model also includes childeligst, the state-year specific eligibility thresh-
old for children, since families likely also have preferences over the health cov-
erage for their children, and the child eligibility threshold is correlated with the
adult eligibility threshold.31 However, these eligibility thresholds are generally
30This weighted total is computed using the ACS sample weights. Furthermore, Equation
(1.3) is run at the state-year level, weighted by the sum of the ACS sample weights in that
state in that year.
31childeligjt is typically the CHIP threshold.
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substantially higher (200 to 300% of poverty) in all states, such that variation
in children’s eligibility may not be binding for individuals in this sample. This
regression is run separately for families with and without children because
eligst is available for childless adults only since 2011. In the regression using
childless adults, the childeligst variable is not included.
This estimation strategy relies on a parallel trend assumption. In partic-
ular, within-state changes in Medicaid eligibility cannot be correlated with
state-time specific factors that affect migration. This assumption would be
violated if states expand (contract) Medicaid precisely when the state budget
finances are in better (worse) shape, since state budget finances may be cor-
related with economic factors that affect how attractive a state is to potential
migrants. While the identification assumption cannot be tested directly, it is
addressed by including (in some specifications) state-specific linear trends and
the state unemployment rate in xst.
The first two columns of Table 1.8 present these estimates for parents.
The model includes both the parents’ eligibility threshold (as a proportion of
poverty) as well as the eligibility threshold for the children. In brief, they
show weakly suggestive evidence in favor of Medicaid influencing migration
decisions, but these findings are not robust. Consider first the upper panel.
In both specifications, the top row suggests that a 100 percentage-point in-
crease in the eligibility threshold for parents would increase the inflow rate of
individuals earning less than 138% of poverty by about 0.22 percentage points
relative to a base of 1.810%, although these estimates are not significantly
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different than zero. The first row of the bottom panel estimates an outflow
effect of about -0.05 percentage points.
Interestingly, three out of the four estimates find a wrong-signed effect of
the children’s threshold: a negative effect on inflows and a positive effect on
outflows. This could be a sign that the within-state variation in the children’s
threshold is more endogenous, which makes sense since the ACA Medicaid
expansion — a plausibly exogenous national policy shock — affected the par-
ents’ threshold to a far greater degree than the children’s threshold. Indeed,
the within-state standard deviation of parents’ eligibility (after partialling out
time fixed effects) falls by 40% when observations from 2014 are excluded. By
contrast, 2014 changes explain very little variation in children’s eligibility: the
within-state standard deviation is 0.141 using all years and 0.136 excluding
2014.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 1.8 report the estimates for a similar model for
childless adults using data since 2011, the earliest year for which the childless
adult threshold was collected by Kaiser. The specifications without linear
trends show small and insignificant effects in the expected direction. Using
the estimates from models without state-specific trends, the top of the 95%
confidence interval for the inflow rate would be about 0.31 percentage points
from a base of 4.15%, while the bottom of the 95% confidence interval for
the outflow estimates would yield a reduction of about 0.29 percentage points.
The specifications with linear trends make both specifications more positive,
though with only four years of data, one should be concerned that a model
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with linear trends is overfit.
Ultimately, these results show that it is possible that Medicaid eligibility
changes — including but not limited to those changes brought about by the
ACA — could have increased inflows to and reduced outflows from states
with more generous Medicaid eligibility thresholds. On the other hand, most
estimates are not statistically distinguishable from zero, and the results for
the children’s threshold provoke some concern regarding policy endogeneity.
1.6 Conclusion
Using various specifications, this paper finds little evidence that the Affordable
Care Act’s expansion of Medicaid in 2014 affected migration. In the baseline
specification, one can rule out (at 95% confidence) an effect on the inter-region
migration rate of 0.18 percentage points from a base of 1.06%, or an effect of
0.30 percentage points from a base of 1.72% among childless individuals —
exerting a neglible (at best) fiscal externality from expanding Medicaid. This
leaves open the question of why the expansions do not appear to lead to mi-
gration, given that the average newly eligible Medicaid beneficiary received
medical care that cost $5,500 to provide on average. First, the cost of moving
(including the cost of destroying the idiosyncratic match between the indi-
vidual and the place of origin) might be very large relative to the value of
Medicaid benefits — perhaps because beneficiaries might value Medicaid at
far less than cost (Finkelstein, Hendren, and Luttmer (2015)) or because the
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distribution of anticipated health expenditures is highly skewed. Second, in-
dividuals in non-expansion states might have chosen to remain in their origin
state, anticipating that the state will choose to expand Medicaid in the near
future. Residents of Indiana, Montana, Pennsylvania, Louisiana, and Alaska
would have been correct. Although robustness checks show that the null result
holds even when excluding those states which expanded Medicaid in late 2014
or early 2015, the same “delaying” effect could be present in other states as
well. Third, it is possible that migration effects would not become visibile
until 2015, either because it takes time to learn about the Medicaid benefits
available in other states, or because the certainty in each state’s expansion or
non-expansion decision increases over time. The present research design can-
not distinguish between these hypotheses. Fourth, it is possible that potential
Medicaid beneficiaries had already sorted themselves into high-benefit states
prior to the 2014 expansions, in line with some of the suggestive evidence using
all within-state variation in Medicaid eligibility thresholds.
This project leaves room for future research. Most simply, data from an
additional year of the ACS would be able to uncover any longer-run effects
that are not visible in the short term. Additionally, one could use aggregate
statistics released by the Statistics of Income (SOI) division of the Internal
Revenue Service. Among other aggregate statistics, the SOI releases infor-
mation on the total (interstate) outflow and inflow from a given county in
a given year. Among the set of counties in non-expansion states, one could
test whether (1) poorer counties and (2) counties closer to a border with an
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expansion state see a larger outflow in 2014, which would be consistent with
a migration response to Medicaid. The relevant data would measure moves
between tax season 2014 and tax season 2015; such data are expected to be
released approximately December 2016. Until then, the 2014 ACS remains the
best data source with which to analyze migration effects of the ACA Medicaid
expansion.
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1.7 Tables and Figures
Table 1.1: Summary stats
Expansion states Non-expansion states Differences
Age 40.496 40.894 -0.398
(adults) (19.989) (20.335) (0.298)
Male 0.457 0.449 0.007**
(all individuals) (0.498) (0.497) (0.004)
White, non-Hispanic 0.488 0.510 -0.021
(all individuals) (0.500) (0.500) (0.086)
Hispanic 0.281 0.196 0.085
(all individuals) (0.449) (0.397) (0.104)
Immigrant 0.152 0.090 0.062
(all individuals) (0.359) (0.287) (0.044)
Real family income 11813.29 12049.14 -235.85
(families) (9514.01) (9365.11) (297.49)
Married 0.321 0.332 -0.012
(adults) (0.467) (0.471) (0.017)
Family size 2.210 2.246 -0.037
(families) (1.654) (1.610) (0.081)
High school degree 0.430 0.450 -0.020
(adults) (0.495) (0.498) (0.019)
Some college 0.228 0.216 0.012
(adults) (0.419) (0.412) (0.007)
Bachelor’s or more 0.082 0.069 0.013***
(adults) (0.274) (0.253) (0.005)
Share of observations 0.505 0.495
(all individuals) (0.500) (0.500)
Obs. (all individuals) 2398360 2349949
Notes: Each cell reports the sample mean of the variable indicated, among individuals
in the analysis sample with origin state in expansion states (Column 1) or non-expansion
states (Column 2). The assignment of a state to “expansion” or “non-expansion” is time-
invariant, based on the 2014 Medicaid expansion, as defined in the text. Column 3 reports
the difference in means and the standard error thereof (calculated allowing correlation among
observations in the same origin state). The mean for male, white, hispanic, and immigrant
is taken over all individuals. The means for education outcomes, marriage, and age are
taken over all adults age 18 or older. The mean of family size and real family income is
taken over all families. Standard deviations are in parentheses. The analysis sample includes
individuals in families with income less than 138% of the federal poverty guidelines. See
text for further details of sample selection. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 1.2: Event study for all individuals
All individuals Individuals without children
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No controls Demographics Unemp. rate No controls Demographics Unemp. rate
treatXyr2005 -0.205∗∗ -0.209∗∗ -0.212∗∗ -0.0544 -0.0504 -0.0710
(0.0883) (0.0876) (0.0984) (0.175) (0.174) (0.187)
treatXyr2006 -0.301∗∗∗ -0.299∗∗∗ -0.306∗∗∗ -0.468∗∗ -0.435∗∗ -0.452∗∗
(0.103) (0.105) (0.112) (0.191) (0.199) (0.205)
treatXyr2007 -0.195∗∗ -0.194∗∗ -0.200∗∗ -0.181 -0.178 -0.189
(0.0916) (0.0904) (0.0906) (0.120) (0.120) (0.127)
treatXyr2008 -0.0398 -0.0336 -0.0342 0.0545 0.0749 0.0673
(0.0931) (0.0932) (0.0972) (0.150) (0.152) (0.157)
treatXyr2009 -0.0575 -0.0626 -0.0549 -0.114 -0.140 -0.141
(0.0937) (0.0946) (0.0991) (0.144) (0.143) (0.144)
treatXyr2010 0.0318 0.0298 0.0394 0.00179 -0.00178 -0.00103
(0.0627) (0.0627) (0.0711) (0.0875) (0.0887) (0.101)
treatXyr2011 -0.00667 -0.00676 -0.00401 -0.129 -0.125 -0.128
(0.0848) (0.0842) (0.0887) (0.126) (0.128) (0.131)
P-value: 2005-2011 equal zero 0.010 0.010 0.008 0.083 0.106 0.124
P-value: 2008-2011 equal zero 0.900 0.895 0.870 0.617 0.543 0.536
Non-exp. outmig. rate (2012) 1.058 1.058 1.058 1.716 1.716 1.716
Observations 3707149 3707149 3707149 1319817 1319817 1319817
Clusters 51 51 51 51 51 51
State fixed effects X X X X X X
Time fixed effects X X X X X X
Demographic controls X X X X
U-rate controls X X
State-specific trends
Notes: This table reports coefficients on the set of nonexpr ∗1(yeart = s) variables from a regresion of the form yirt = λt+µr+
∑
s 6=2012 βsnonexpr ∗1(yeart = s)+x
′
irtγ+ εrt
estimated at the individual level on the analysis sample using data from 2005 through 2012, wherewhere nonexpr is a dummy for being a non-expansion state and yirt is a
dummy variable that equals one for individuals that report having moved from the set of expansion states to the set of non-expansion states, or vice versa, in the 12 months
prior to interview in year t. Each column corresponds to a separate regression. Columns 4-6 restrict attention to childless adults. In Columns 1 and 4, xirt is empty. Columns
2 and 5 add demographic variables to xirt. Columns 3 and 6 add the unemployment rate controls to xirt; see text for details. Regressions are weighted by ACS sample weights.
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the origin-state level. The analysis sample includes individuals in families with earnings less than 138% of the federal poverty
guidelines. See text for further details of sample selection. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 1.3: Main results: Changes in inter-regional migration rates from non-expansion states relative to expansion states.
No controls Demographics Unemp. rate State trends
All Individuals -0.005 -0.004 -0.014 -0.053
(0.091) (0.089) (0.087) (0.109)
[-0.184,0.174] [-0.179,0.171] [-0.184,0.156] [-0.268,0.161]
Non-exp. outmig. rate (2012) 1.058 1.058 1.058 1.058
Observations 2985490 2985490 2985490 2985490
Clusters 51 51 51 51
Childless Individuals 0.012 0.006 -0.012 0.010
(0.132) (0.130) (0.125) (0.146)
[-0.247,0.271] [-0.249,0.262] [-0.258,0.234] [-0.277,0.296]
Non-exp. outmig. rate (2012) 1.716 1.716 1.716 1.716
Observations 1085956 1085956 1085956 1085956
Clusters 51 51 51 51
State fixed effects X X X X
Time fixed effects X X X X
Demographic controls X X X
U-rate controls X X
State-specific trends X
Notes: Each cell reports the coefficient on nonexpr ∗ postt from a regression of the following form, estimated at the individual level on data from the
analysis sample, from 2008 to 2014, dropping 2013: yirt) = µr + λt + β ∗ nonexpr ∗ postt + x′rtγ + εrt, where nonexpr is a dummy for residing in a
non-expansion state 12 months prior to interview in year t, postt is a dummy for 2014, yirt is a dummy variable that equals one for individuals that
report having moved from the set of expansion states to the set of non-expansion states, or vice versa, in the 12 months prior to interview. In the first
column, xirt is empty. The second column adds demographic controls, the third column adds unemployment rate controls, and the fourth column
adds state-specific linear trends; see text for details. The bottom panel restricts the sample to childless individuals. Regressions are weighted by ACS
sample weights. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the origin-state level; numbers in bracket indicate the bounds of the associated 95%
confidence interval. The analysis sample includes individuals in families with earnings less than 138% of the federal poverty guidelines. See text for
further details of sample selection. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 1.4: Changes in inter-regional migration rates from non-expansion states
relative to expansion states for individuals with origin near expansion/non-
expansion border.
Coefficient Estimates Summary Stats
No state trends State trends Baseline mean Fraction in sample
All Individuals
Commuting Zones that straddle 0.101 0.348 1.449 0.124
(0.210) (0.352) [533060]
Less than 75km from border -0.022 -0.195 1.459 0.230
(0.191) (0.320) [683668]
Less than 150km from border 0.150 0.111 1.276 0.431
(0.138) (0.213) [1281839]
Less than 250km from border 0.090 0.087 1.183 0.575
(0.108) (0.168) [1721566]
Childless Individuals
Commuting Zones that straddle 0.257 0.467 2.616 0.127
(0.347) (0.562) [198355]
Less than 75km from border 0.054 -0.074 2.392 0.240
(0.256) (0.410) [258187]
Less than 150km from border 0.216 0.170 2.069 0.454
(0.197) (0.271) [486033]
Less than 250km from border 0.095 0.146 1.888 0.597
(0.168) (0.225) [646143]
Place fixed effects X X
Time fixed effects X X
Demographic controls X X
U-rate controls X X
State-specific trends X
Notes: Each cell reports the coefficient on nonexpr ∗postt from a regression of the following
form, estimated at the individual level on data from subsets of the analysis sample, from
2008 to 2014, dropping 2013: yirt) = µr+λt+β∗nonexpr ∗postt+x′rtγ+εrt, where nonexpr
is a dummy for residing in a non-expansion state 12 months prior to interview in year t,
postt is a dummy for 2014, yirt is a dummy variable that equals one for individuals that
report having moved from the set of expansion states to the set of non-expansion states,
or vice versa, in the 12 months prior to interview in year t. In the first row, r indexes the
Commuting Zone / state combination; in other rows, it indexes the state. In the first column,
xirt includes demographic controls and unemployment rate controls, and the second column
adds state-specific linear trends; see text for details. The third column reports the baseline
mean migration rate in the relevant sample from non-expansion states in 2012. The fourth
column reports the number of observations (in brackets) as well as the size of the restricted
sample as a fraction of the unrestricted analysis sample. The bottom panel restricts the
sample to childless individuals. Regressions are weighted by ACS sample weights. Standard
errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the origin-state level, except for the first row which
is clustered twoway at the state / Commuting Zone level. The number of clusters along
the minimum dimension in row 1 (of each panel) is 36. Row 2 has 33 clusters. Row 3 has
42 clusters. Row 4 has 47 clusters. The analysis sample includes individuals in families
with earnings less than 138% of the federal poverty guidelines. See text for further details
of sample selection and additional restrictions for this table. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01
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Table 1.5: Changes in inter-regional migration rates from non-expansion states
relative to expansion states for individuals with higher expected health expen-
diture.
Coefficient Estimates Baseline mean
No state trends State trends
All Individuals
Age 46 and older -0.077 -0.114 0.701
(0.080) (0.134) [756624]
Reporting a disability -0.084 0.017 0.800
(0.100) (0.172) [505586]
Childless Individuals
Age 46 and older -0.082 -0.174 0.815
(0.102) (0.165) [563850]
Reporting a disability -0.080 0.329 0.867
(0.137) (0.212) [308225]
Clusters 51 51
State fixed effects X X
Time fixed effects X X
Demographic controls X X
U-rate controls X X
State-specific trends X
Notes: Each cell reports the coefficient on nonexpr ∗postt from a regression of the following
form, estimated at the individual level on data from subsets of the analysis sample, from
2008 to 2014, dropping 2013: yirt) = µr+λt+β∗nonexpr ∗postt+x′rtγ+εrt, where nonexpr
is a dummy for residing in a non-expansion state 12 months prior to interview in year t, postt
is a dummy for 2014, yirt is a dummy variable that equals one for individuals that report
having moved from the set of expansion states to the set of non-expansion states, or vice
versa, in the 12 months prior to interview. In the first column, xirt includes demographic
controls and unemployment rate controls, and the second column adds state-specific linear
trends; see text for details. The third column reports the baseline mean migration rate in
the relevant sample from non-expansion states in 2012 as well as the number of observations
(in brackets). The bottom panel restricts the sample to childless individuals. Regressions
are weighted by ACS sample weights. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the
origin-state level. The analysis sample includes individuals in families with earnings less
than 138% of the federal poverty guidelines. See text for further details of sample selection
and additional restrictions for this table. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 1.6: Changes in inter-regional migration rates from non-expansion states
relative to expansion states under alternative sample restrictions.
Coefficient Estimates Baseline mean
No state trends State trends
All Individuals
In baseline income sample -0.014 -0.053 1.058
(0.087) (0.109) [2985490]
In education sample -0.005 -0.158 0.570
(0.061) (0.136) [1702135]
In both samples -0.036 -0.161 0.634
(0.104) (0.194) [791914]
Childless Individuals
In baseline income sample -0.012 0.010 1.716
(0.125) (0.146) [1085956]
In education sample 0.001 0.023 0.587
(0.084) (0.124) [689352]
In both samples 0.007 0.121 0.711
(0.114) (0.213) [236895]
Clusters 51 51
State fixed effects X X
Time fixed effects X X
Demographic controls X X
U-rate controls X X
State-specific trends X
Notes: Each cell reports the coefficient on nonexpr ∗postt from a regression of the following
form, estimated at the individual level on data from different samples, from 2008 to 2014,
dropping 2013: yirt) = µr+λt+β∗nonexpr∗postt+x′rtγ+εrt, where nonexpr is a dummy for
residing in a non-expansion state 12 months prior to interview in year t, postt is a dummy for
2014, yirt is a dummy variable that equals one for individuals that report having moved from
the set of expansion states to the set of non-expansion states, or vice versa, in the 12 months
prior to interview. The first row of each panel repeats the results from Columns 3 and 4 of
Table 1.3, i.e., using the income-based analysis sample. In the second row of each panel,
the sample is selected based on education: specifically, the sample includes families in which
(1) at least one adult member has not received a high school diploma and (2) no member
has attended college. The third row uses a sample that would be selected either under the
income or education-based criterion. In the first column, xirt includes demographic controls
and unemployment rate controls, and the second column adds state-specific linear trends;
see text for details. The third column reports the baseline mean migration rate in the
relevant sample from non-expansion states in 2012 as well as the number of observations
(in brackets). The bottom panel restricts the sample to childless individuals. Regressions
are weighted by ACS sample weights. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the
origin-state level. The analysis sample includes individuals in families with earnings less
than 138% of the federal poverty guidelines. See text for further details of sample selection.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 1.7: Changes in inter-regional migration rates from non-expansion states
relative to expansion states: Robustness to alternative classifications of states.
Coefficient Estimates Baseline Mean
No state trends State trends
All Individuals
Drop DC and MA -0.005 -0.064 1.015
(0.082) (0.107) [2939532]
Drop MA and early expanders 0.019 -0.119 0.737
(0.094) (0.141) [2396708]
Drop states with marginal expansion date -0.041 0.010 0.982
(0.086) (0.111) [2745842]
Assign to expansion -0.036 0.095 1.133
(0.076) (0.090) [2985490]
Assign to non-expansion -0.009 -0.062 1.058
(0.083) (0.114) [2985490]
Childless Individuals
Drop DC and MA -0.044 -0.057 1.651
(0.117) (0.136) [1065485]
Drop MA and early expanders 0.015 -0.030 1.196
(0.123) (0.187) [880343]
Drop states with marginal expansion date -0.034 0.106 1.562
(0.124) (0.144) [994931]
Assign to expansion -0.041 0.225 1.808
(0.124) (0.157) [1085956]
Assign to non-expansion -0.001 0.015 1.716
(0.121) (0.147) [1085956]
Place fixed effects X X
Time fixed effects X X
Demographic controls X X
U-rate controls X X
State-specific trends X
Notes: Each cell reports the coefficient on nonexpr ∗postt from a regression of the following form, estimated
at the individual level on data the analysis sample, from 2008 to 2014, dropping 2013: yirt) = µr +λt + β ∗
nonexpr∗postt+x′rtγ+εrt, where nonexpr is a dummy for residing in a non-expansion state 12 months prior
to interview in year t, postt is a dummy for 2014, yirt is a dummy variable that equals one for individuals
that report having moved from the set of expansion states to the set of non-expansion states, or vice versa,
in the 12 months prior to interview in year t. In the first row of each panel, Massachusetts and the District
of Columbia are dropped (see text for details). In the second row of each panel, CA, CT, DC, MA, MN, NJ,
and WA are dropped. In the third row of each panel, AR, IN, MI, NH, and PA are dropped. In the fourth
row of each panel, PA and IN (usually assigned to non-expansion) are assigned to expansion. In the fifth
row of each panel, AR, MI, and NH (usually assigned to expansion) are assigned to non-expansion. In the
first column, xirt includes demographic controls and unemployment rate controls, and the second column
adds state-specific linear trends; see text for details. The third column reports the baseline mean migration
rate in the relevant sample from non-expansion states in 2012 as well as the number of observations (in
brackets). The bottom panel restricts the sample to childless individuals. Regressions are weighted by ACS
sample weights. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the origin-state level. The first row in
each panel has 49 clusters. The second row has 44 clusters. The third row has 46 clusters. The fourth and
fifth rows have 51 clusters.The analysis sample includes individuals in families with earnings less than 138%
of the federal poverty guidelines. See text for further details of sample selection and additional restrictions
for this table. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 1.8: Using all variation in Medicaid eligibility thresholds
Individuals with children Individuals without children
No state trends State trends No state trends State trends
Inflow rate
Parents’ threshold 0.220 0.238
(0.137) (0.180)
Children’s threshold -0.169 0.153
(0.163) (0.252)
Childless adult threshold 0.0916 0.253
(0.108) (0.181)
Mean migration rate 1.810 1.810 4.151 4.151
Observations 357 357 204 204
Clusters 51 51 51 51
Outflow rate
Parents’ threshold -0.0460 -0.0547
(0.0944) (0.139)
Children’s threshold 0.122 0.177
(0.115) (0.175)
Childless adult threshold -0.0396 0.0586
(0.125) (0.187)
Mean migration rate 1.810 1.810 4.151 4.151
Observations 357 357 204 204
Clusters 51 51 51 51
Notes: Each column of each panel reports the coefficients on eligst and childeligst from
a regression of the following form, estimated at the state-year level on data from families
with children from the analysis sample, from 2008 to 2014: ln(yrt) = λt + µs + β1eligst +
β2childeligst + x′stγ + εst, where yrt represents the year-state specific inflow or outflow
migration rate (see text for details), eligst is the eligibility threshold for parents, as a
proportion of the poverty level, and childeligst is the eligibilty threshold for children (the
maximum of the relevant Medicaid or CHIP threshold). See text for details on sample
selection. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state level. * p < 0.10, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Figures
Figure 1.1: Expansion and non-expansion states, as of early 2014
Expansion States
Non−Expansion States
Note: Alaska is an non−expansion state; Hawaii is an expansion state
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Notes: Each point represents the average interstate migration rate (the ratio of interstate
outmigrants to total observations) of the group indicated, scaled as a percentage. The
analysis sample includes individuals in families with earnings up to 138% of the federal
poverty guidelines. The control sample includes individuals in families with earnings between
250% and 400% of the federal poverty guidelines. See text for further details of sample
selection. The brackets indicate 95% confidence intervals, robust to clustering at the origin-
state level.
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Figure 1.3: Summary of main results: Inter-regional migration rates among
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2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
year
From non−expansion  states
From expansion  states
1713531 observations
Childless Individuals
Notes: Each point represents the average inter-region migration rate (the ratio of inter-
region outmigrants to total observations) of the analysis sample, from the region indicated,
scaled as a percentage. The two regions are the set of expansion states and the set of non-
expansion states. The analysis sample includes individuals in families with earnings up to
138% of the federal poverty guidelines. See text for further details of sample selection. The
brackets indicate 95% confidence intervals, robust to clustering at the origin-state level.
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1.8 Appendix
Table 1.9: Pretrends in inter-regional migration rates from non-expansion
states relative to expansion states.
No controls Demographics Unemp. rate
All Individuals
Starting 2005 0.416*** 0.415*** 0.430***
(0.114) (0.114) (0.122)
[0.192,0.641] [0.192,0.638] [0.191,0.669]
Starting 2008 0.124 0.119 0.102
(0.212) (0.213) (0.223)
[-0.291,0.538] [-0.299,0.537] [-0.335,0.539]
Non-exp. outmig. rate (2012) 1.058 1.058 1.058
Observations (2008 row) 2471449 2471449 2471449
Clusters 51 51 51
Childless Individuals
Starting 2005 0.282 0.256 0.286
(0.206) (0.206) (0.218)
[-0.121,0.685] [-0.148,0.659] [-0.142,0.713]
Starting 2008 -0.100 -0.104 -0.094
(0.306) (0.308) (0.329)
[-0.701,0.500] [-0.708,0.500] [-0.739,0.551]
Non-exp. outmig. rate (2012) 1.716 1.716 1.716
Observations (2008 row) 888895 888895 888895
Clusters 51 51 51
State fixed effects X X X
Time fixed effects X X X
Demographic controls X X
U-rate controls X
State-specific trends
Notes: Each cell reports the coefficient on nonexpr ∗postt from a regression of the following
form, estimated at the individual level on data from the analysis sample, from 2008 to 2014,
dropping 2013: yirt) = µr+λt+β ∗nonexpr ∗yeart+x′rtγ+ εrt, where nonexpr is a dummy
for residing in a non-expansion state 12 months prior to interview in year t, yeart is the
calendar year (divided by 10), yirt is a dummy variable that equals one for individuals that
report having moved from the set of expansion states to the set of non-expansion states,
or vice versa, in the 12 months prior to interview. xirt includes demographic controls and
unemployment rate controls; see text for details. The bottom panel restricts the sample to
childless individuals. Regressions are weighted by ACS sample weights. Standard errors (in
parentheses) are clustered at the origin-state level; numbers in bracket indicate the bounds of
the associated 95% confidence interval. The analysis sample includes individuals in families
with earnings less than 138% of the federal poverty guidelines. See text for further details
of sample selection. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Figure 1.4: Inter-regional migration rates among analysis sample in commuting
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year
From non−expansion  states
From expansion  states
313557 observations
Childless Individuals
Notes: Each point represents the average inter-region migration rate (the ratio of inter-
region outmigrants to total observations) from the region indicated of the analysis sample
restricted to Commuting Zones that straddle a border between an expansion state and a
non-expansion state. The analysis sample includes individuals in families with earnings up
to 138% of the federal poverty guidelines. See text for further details of sample selection
and assignment of individuals to Commuting Zones. The brackets indicate 95% confidence
intervals, robust to clustering twoway at the origin-state and Commuting Zone level.
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Table 1.10: Main regression results including all covariates.
(1) (2)
All Individuals Childless Individuals
nonexp X post -0.0534 0.00990
(0.109) (0.146)








Hispanic male 0.0213 0.212∗∗
(0.0451) (0.107)


















Log(distance to border) -0.320∗∗∗ -0.475∗∗∗
(0.0485) (0.0839)
8th grade educ or less -1.106∗∗∗ -0.795∗∗∗
(0.160) (0.154)
High school dropout -0.997∗∗∗ -1.098∗∗∗
(0.115) (0.121)
Exactly high school -0.587∗∗∗ -0.668∗∗∗
(0.0915) (0.120)
Own-state unemp. rate 0.0489∗ 0.132∗∗∗
(0.0263) (0.0418)
Min. nearby unemp. rate 0.0671∗∗ 0.0525
(0.0315) (0.0481)
Non-exp. outmig. rate (2012) 1.058 1.716
Observations 2985490 1085956
Clusters 51 51
State fixed effects X X
Time fixed effects X X
Demographic controls X X
U-rate controls X X
State-specific trends X X
Notes: Each column reports the full results (aside from the fixed effects and the state-specific trends) from
a regression of the following form, estimated at the individual level on data from the analysis sample, from
2008 to 2014, dropping 2013: yirt) = µr +λt +β ∗nonexpr ∗ postt +x′rtγ+ εrt, where nonexpr is a dummy
for residing in a non-expansion state 12 months prior to interview in year t, postt is a dummy for 2014, xirt
icludes demographic controls and unemployment rate controls (see text for details), and yirt is a dummy
variable that equals one for individuals that report having moved from the set of expansion states to the
set of non-expansion states, or vice versa, in the 12 months prior to interview. The bottom panel restricts
the sample to childless individuals. Regressions are weighted by ACS sample weights. Standard errors (in
parentheses) are clustered at the origin-state level; numbers in bracket indicate the bounds of the associated
95% confidence interval. The analysis sample includes individuals in families with earnings less than 138%
of the federal poverty guidelines. See text for further details of sample selection. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01
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Figure 1.5: Inter-regional migration rates among main sample from expansion
and non-expansion states, among sample with origin in PUMA or PUMA of
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410173 observations
Childless Individuals
Notes: Each point represents the average inter-region migration rate (the ratio of inter-
region outmigrants to total observations, using sample weights) of the analysis sample, from
the region indicated. The two regions are the set of expansion states and the set of non-
expansion states. The analysis sample includes individuals in families with earnings up to
138% of the federal poverty guidelines. See text for further details of sample selection. The
brackets indicate 95% confidence intervals, robust to clustering at the origin-state level.
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Figure 1.6: Inter-regional migration rates among education-selected sample,
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year
From non−expansion  states
From expansion  states
1164638 observations
Childless Individuals
Notes: Each point represents the average inter-region migration rate (the ratio of inter-
region outmigrants to total observations) of a sample selected on the basis of education (see
text for details), from the region indicated. The two regions are the set of expansion states
and the set of non-expansion states. The brackets indicate 95% confidence intervals, robust
to clustering at the origin-state level.
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Figure 1.7: Inter-regional migration rates, from expansion and non-expansion
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year
From non−expansion  states
From expansion  states
1391009 observations
Childless Individuals
Notes: Each point represents the average inter-region migration rate (the ratio of inter-
region outmigrants to total observations) of the analysis sample from the region indicated,
dropping D.C. and the following six states: CA, CT, MA, MN, NJ, and WA (see text for
details). The two regions are the set of expansion states and the set of non-expansion states.
The brackets indicate 95% confidence intervals, robust to clustering at the origin-state level.
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1.9 Addendum
The material in this chapter is a reproduction of material previously published
in the Journal of Public Analysis and Management, first published online in
November 2016 (Goodman (2017)). At the time of writing (and publication),
2014 was the latest year of American Community Survey (ACS) data avail-
ability.32 For the sake of posterity, I have not amended the text of the prior
sections of this chapter (except for updating references in cases when working
papers have since been published or revised). In this section, I consider some
additional specifications which make use of two additional years of data (2015
and 2016) which have since become available.
These extra years of data address a serious limitation of the original study.
In the original study, I would have estimated a non-null result only if the mi-
gration response was evident in the 2014 ACS.33 Yet there are a variety of
reasons why we might expect a different result over more years of data. In
particular, the migration response might be delayed if it takes time for indi-
viduals in non-expansion states to learn about the expansion taking place in
expansion states. More simply, even if plans for migration change immediately,
it might take time to actually implement those plans (e.g., to find housing,
employment, etc.). Lastly, the addition of several years increases statistical
32In general, the ACS for year t becomes available on IPUMS in November or December
of year t+ 1.
33This is exacerbated by the rolling interview structure of the ACS, in which individuals
are interviewed on a rolling basis throughout the year. The date of interview is not observed
in the public data which I use.
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power by reducing sampling variation.34
However, one cannot simply repeat the baseline analysis (e.g., using Equa-
tion (1.1)) adding the extra years of data, as five states have switched from
being non-expansion states to becoming expansion states. Applying Equation
(1.1) literally, one would find that interregion migration from non-expansion
states did in fact increase in 2015 and 2016 – but only because the region of
expansion states increased in size. I adapt the empirical strategy in two ways.
First, I follow the strategy of Section 1.5, where I “drop” the five states whose
expansion status changed. Specifically, I drop observations whose origin is in
one of those five states; among observations with origins in any other state, I
recode yit equal to zero for all individuals whose destination was one of those
five states. This is analogous to the strategy used in parts of Table 1.7, which
considers sensitivity analyses with respect to states whose expansion timing
was marginal, or which engaged in a partial Medicaid expansion prior to the
ACA.
The top panel of Figure 1.8 illustrates the results of this first strategy,
analogous to Figure 1.3. Through 2014, this figure tells the same qualitative
story as Figure 1.3: the trend in non-expansion-to-expansion migration is
relatively parallel to the trend in migration in the reverse direction from 2008
onward, with little apparent effect in 2014. In 2015, there is (if anything)
a wrong-signed effect: interregion migration from non-expansion states fell
34The additional power will be limited to the degree that state-specific shocks are corre-
lated, since standard errors are clustered to take account of those correlations.
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somewhat relative to interregion migration from expansion states. In 2016,
this effect diminishes, but remains consistent with a null effect. The figure in
the bottom panel, which restricts the sample to childless individuals, tells the
same qualitative story.
Table 1.11 shows the regression results of Equation (1.1) after dropping
states whose expansion status changed. Using data through 2014 (but still
dropping states whose expansion states change), I find that migration from
non-expansion states to expansion states fell by a statistically insignificant
0.049 percentage points relative to migration in the reverse direction (i.e., an
effect of -0.049), compared to an effect of -0.005 in the baseline specification.
This suggests that dropping states whose expansion status changed has only a
modest effect on the results. When data from 2016 is added, the magnitude of
the drop increases to 0.086; this wrong-signed effect remains insignificant. In
the sample of childless individuals in the bottom panel, the estimates are -0.081
(through 2014) and -0.091, which are both insignificant, compared to 0.012 in
the baseline specification. Thus, incorporating two extra years of migration
data does not uncover a longer-term effect that is qualitatively different than
the null effect found in the paper using data only through 2014.
This first strategy is most similar to the baseline strategy in the original
study, but it requires dropping a non-trivial share of states. So, I also consider
a second strategy which allows Medicaid expansion status to be evolving. In
this strategy, I organize the data at the origin state (r), destination state (d),
year (t) level. Define nrdt to be the raw number of migrants (multiplied by the
59
sample weight divided by 100) from origin r to destination d at time t (dropping
the r = d observations that correspond to not migrating interstate).35 Further,
define mdt and mrt as the binary expansion status of the origin or destination
state at time t.36 I then estimate the following regression, weighted by the
mean value of nrdt + 1 during the 2005 to 2007 period:37
ln(nrdt + 1) = λrd + θt + γtmrt + β1mdt(1−mrt) + β2mrt(1−mdt) + εrdt (1.4)
In this expression, the two regressors of interest are mdt(1 − mrt) and
mrt(1−mdt). The former will equal one if and only if d is an expansion state
and r is a non-expansion state (and zero otherwise). The latter will equal one
in the opposite case: when d is a non-expansion state and r is an expansion
state. Thus, β1 represents the implied (relative) effect on non-expansion-to-
expansion migration and β2 represents the implied (relative) effect on non-
expansion-to-expansion migration. The attractive force would imply β1 > 0
35Recall that the ACS is approximately a 1 percent random sample of households. The
median sample weight in the data is 89 and the mean is 117.5, so dividing the sample
weight by 100 means that each individual’s adjusted sample weight will be one, to an order
of magnitude.
36All states are classified as having m = 0 prior to 2014 (for simplicity, I ignore partial
early expansions in places such as Massachusetts). I classify all expansion states in Figure
1.1 to havem = 1 in 2014 and thereafter. Additionally, I classify Pennsylvania, Indiana, and
Alaska as having m = 1 in 2015 and thereafter; expansions in these states became effective
January 1, February 1, and September 1 of 2015, respectively (Kaiser Family Foundation
(2018)). I classify Montana and Louisiana to have m = 1 in 2016 only; Montana’s expansion
went into effect on January 1, 2016, and Louisiana’s went into effect on July 1, 2016 (Kaiser
Family Foundation (2018)).
37It is necessary to add some constant to this weight, and to the argument of the logarithm
in Equation (1.4) so that the logarithm is defined in the frequent case when there are zero
migrants in the data from a given origin to a given destination in a given year. Adding a
number other than one (or using the inverse hyperbolic sine) does not change the results
qualitatively, though it does affect the standard errors.
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and the retentive force would imply β2 < 0. In the baseline specification of
Equation (1.1), these two effects are not separately identified; in Equation
(1.4), these effects are separately identified at the cost of imposing some ad-
ditional assumptions.
To see what this regression equation is estimating, let’s consider a simple
case with two periods, t = 0 and t = 1; at t = 1, region E expands Medicaid
and region N does not. Take the difference between t = 1 and t = 0 and






There are four parameters to estimate in this regression: (θ1− θ0), γ1, β1, and
β2. Additionally, there are four moments in the data: µNE, µEN , µNN , and
µEE, where µNE is the mean value of ∆ ln(nrd + 1) for r ∈ N and d ∈ E, and
the rest are defined analogously. Thus, similar to a standard difference-in-
differences, these parameters each correspond to simple functions of the four
µ values.
Consider Table 1.12. This table shows the four cells: from N or E, to N
or E. Each entry corresponds to the implied conditional mean from Equation
(1.5). Looking across the top row, we see that β1 is equal to µNE−µNN , which
is the increase in non-expansion-to-expansion migration relative to the increase
in interstate migration within non-expansion states. Likewise, looking at the
bottom row, β2 is equal to µEN − µEE, which is the increase in expansion-to-
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non-expansion migration relative to the increase in interstate migration within
expansion states.
Equation (1.4) generalizes Equation (1.5) by allowing more than one pre-
and post-period, and allowing the N and E regions to evolve. But the in-
tuition remains: the counterfactual is assumed to be given by the change in
interstate migration that does not cross “regional” boundaries. This strat-
egy thus requires that such interstate, intraregional migration is unaffected by
treatment. There are several threats to this assumption, all of which will tend
to bias the regression toward finding a spurious effect. First, suppose treat-
ment increases µEE relative to the counterfactual of no Medicaid expansion
anywhere. This could be the case if the Medicaid expansion reduces job lock
(Garthwaite, Gross, and Notowidigdo (2014), Farooq and Kugler (2016)) and
leads to increased mobility more generally. It could also be the case if the
expansion induces some interstate migrants from expansion state s to change
their destination state from some state in N to some state in E (e.g., an
individual from Massachusetts deciding to move to the District of Columbia
rather than Virginia). Such an increase in µEE would cause µEN − µEE to
fall, biasing β2 downward. Since β2 < 0 would be consistent with a retentive
effect, this would bias the regression towards finding a spurious retentive ef-
fect. Similarly, suppose µNN falls due to the same destination-switching effect
(e.g., individuals from Florida decide to migrate to the District of Columbia
rather than Virginia); by the same argument, this will tend to bias β1 upward,
toward finding a spurious attractive force.
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The top panel of Table 1.13 reports these regression coefficients for the
full sample.38 Using data through 2014 (in the first column), I estimate that
β1 = −0.060, meaning that interregional migration from non-expansion states
is estimated to have fallen by 6 percent (not percentage points) relative to
interstate migration within the set of expansion states. Similarly, I estimate
that β2 = 0.022, which can be interpreted similarly as β1, but applying to
interregional migration from expansion states instead. Both of these effects
are wrong-signed and insignificant. In the second column, I report estimates
adding the two years of data through 2016. These results, -0.075 for β1 and
0.032 for β2, are quite similar to those in column 1. This echoes the findings
in Table 1.11 that adding two extra years of data does not uncover an effect
that was not present in 2014.
Furthermore, while a point estimate of a 6 or 7.5 percent effect may appear
substantial (even if wrong-signed), these cannot be directly compared to the
estimates in Table 1.3. In the bottom panel, I translate the coefficients β1
and β2 into the same scale as Table 1.3: the implied increase in interregional
migration in 2014 from non-expansion states, relative to the increase in inter-
regional migration from expansion states. For the sake of this rescaling, I con-
sider the effect when the set of expansion and non-expansion states are defined
by their 2014 status, which allows me to treat the regions as time-invariant. As
above, let µNE denote the mean interregion migration rate from non-expansion
38This strategy yields similar, though slightly more negative (i.e., wrong-signed), results
when restricted to the set of childless individuals. These results are available upon request
from the author.
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states, and let µEN denote the mean interregion migration rate from expan-
sion states. Both of these have two potential outcomes: when the expansion
occurs (D = 1) and when it does not (D = 0). The coefficient estimated in
Equation (1.1) estimates (µNE(1)−µNE(0))−(µEN(1)−µEN(0)). By contrast,
the coefficient β1 in Equation (1.5) estimates approximately nrdt(1)−nrdt(0)nrdt(0) for
r ∈ N and d ∈ E. The coefficient β2 estimates a similar object for r ∈ E and
d ∈ N . Because of linearity, the implied effect on µNE (i.e., µNE(1)−µNE(0))
is equal to β1µNE(0) and the implied effect on µEN is equal to β2µEN(0). I use
the observed 2008 to 2012 values as a proxy for µNE(0) and µEN(0). These
baseline interregional migration rates are also shown in the bottom panel.
After this rescaling, I find that these coefficients imply that non-expansion-
to-expansion migration fell by 0.090 percentage points relative to migration in
the opposite direction using data through 2014, and 0.117 percentage points us-
ing data through 2016. These are wrong-signed effects, which is guaranteed by
the result that β1 < 0 and β2 > 0 are each wrong-signed. Furthermore, these
two estimates are more negative than the -0.005 effect estimated in Table 1.3;
however, both of the estimates in this table are insignificantly different than
zero, and -0.090 and -0.117 are well within the confidence intervals of the
baseline specification.
In sum, analyzing ACS data through 2016 yields results that are largely
consistent with the previous analysis of data through 2014 only. The null effect
of the Medicaid expansion on migration continues to hold in a specification
quite similar to the specification in the original paper, as well as in a separate
64
specification that is designed to exploit further changes in Medicaid availabil-
ity. If anything, the result becomes more negative (wrong-signed): falling from
-0.005 percentage points in the baseline analysis to -0.086 or -0.117 percentage
points, depending on the specification. Thus, the addition of two extra years of
data does not overturn the result of the original paper: that the 2014 Medicaid
expansions did not appear to induce a substantial migration response.
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Table 1.11: Baseline result adding 2015 and 2016 data years, dropping states
that expanded in 2015 and 2016
(1) (2)
Through 2014 Through 2016
All individuals -0.049 -0.086
(0.102) (0.086)
N 2,593,708 3,415,084
Childless individuals -0.081 -0.091
(0.140) (0.139)
N 875,409 1,174,302
Notes: Each cell reports the coefficient on nonexpr ∗postt from a regression of the following
form, estimated at the individual level on data from the analysis sample, beginning in
2008 and ending in 2014 (first column) or 2016 (second column), dropping 2013: yirt) =
µr + λt + β ∗ nonexpr ∗ postt + x′rtγ + εrt, where nonexpr is a dummy for residing in a non-
expansion state 12 months prior to interview in year t, postt is a dummy for 2014 or later, yirt
is a dummy variable that equals one for individuals that report having moved from the set of
expansion states to the set of non-expansion states, or vice versa, in the 12 months prior to
interview. States that expanded in 2015 or 2016 (Alaska, Indiana, Louisiana, Montana, and
Pennsylvania) are dropped from the sample, and moves into these states are disregarded.
Regressions are weighted by ACS sample weights. Standard errors (in parentheses) are
clustered at the origin-state level. The analysis sample includes individuals in families with
earnings less than 138% of the federal poverty guidelines. See text for further details of
sample selection * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 1.12: Correspondence of sample means to regression parameters in sim-
ple model
To N To E
From N (θ1 − θ0) (θ1 − θ0) + β1
From E (θ1 − θ0) + γ1 + β2 (θ1 − θ0) + γ1
Notes: This table displays the correspondance of sample means in a simplified, two-period
model to the parameters of Equation (1.5). “N” and “E” refer to the set of non-expansion
and expansion states, respectively. For instance, the sample mean of interstate migration
from “N” states to other “N” states will correspond to the regression parameter θ1−θ0. See
the text for further discussion.
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Table 1.13: Estimated attractive and retentive forces, and implied effect on
change in interregional migration: All individuals
(1) (2)
Through 2014 Through 2016
β1 (Attractive force) -0.060 -0.075
(0.057) (0.052)
β2 (Retentive force) 0.022 0.032
(0.048) (0.021)
Base mig. rate from N to E 1.025 1.025
Base mig. rate from E to N 1.247 1.247
Rescaled effect (in p.p.) -0.090 -0.117
(0.087) (0.076)
N 17,850 21,801
Notes: The top panel of this table reports estimates and standard errors from the following regression
equation, estimated on data collapsed to the origin/destination level from 2008 to 2014 (Column 1) and
2008 to 2016 (Column 2), where mrt and mdt are dummies for a Medicaid expansion being in effect in
origin r or destination d at time t, and nrdt is the number of migrants from origin r to destination d at
time t: ln(nrdt + 1) = λrd + θt + γtmrt + β1mdt(1−mrt) + β2mrt(1−mdt) + εrdt Observations with r = d
are dropped. The regression is weighted by the average value of nrdt + 1 in 2005-2007. The coefficient β1
represents the implied relative increase in migration from non-expansion states to expansion states when
the expansion takes effect. The coefficient β2 represents the implied increase in migration from expansion to
non-expansion states when the expansion takes effect. β1 > 0 would be consistent with the “attractive force”
and β2 < 0 would be consistent with the “retentive force.” The bottom panel shows the base migration
rate (from 2008 to 2012) from non-expansion states N to expansion states E, and vice versa, as defined by
their 2014 status. Additionally, the bottom panel shows a rescaled estimate comparable to the estimates
in Table 1.3. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered twoway at the origin and destination levels.
The analysis sample includes individuals in families with earnings less than 138% of the federal poverty
guidelines. See text for further details of this specification, how the estimates are rescaled, and other sample
selection restrictions. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Figure 1.8: Inter-regional migration rates among main sample, from expansion














From non−expansion  states











From non−expansion  states
From expansion  states
Childless individuals
Notes: Each point represents the average inter-region migration rate (the ratio of inter-
region outmigrants to total observations, using sample weights) of the analysis sample, from
the region indicated. The two regions are the set of expansion states and the set of non-
expansion states. The analysis sample includes individuals in families with earnings up to
138% of the federal poverty guidelines. This graph drops states that expanded in 2015 or
2016 (Alaska, Indiana, Louisiana, Montana, and Pennsylvania). See text for further details








During the Great Recession, existing law and new acts of Congress led to the
most dramatic expansion in the generosity of unemployment insurance (UI)
benefits in U.S. history1. In most states, eligible job losers saw their maximum
benefit duration rise from the usual 26 weeks to 99 weeks. Continuously from
November 2009 through March 2012, the maximum benefit duration exceeded
90 weeks when averaged across states, except for a few small lapses. In com-
1The second largest increase provided a temporary increase in unemployment duration
of 65 weeks in 1975 following the passage of the Special Unemployment Insurance Extension
Act.
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parison, during a previous spell of extended benefits in response to the 2001
recession, this average rarely exceeded 40 (Farber & Valletta (2015)).
This unprecedented UI expansion—and its variation across states in mag-
nitude and timing—provides a unique opportunity to study the aggregate em-
ployment effects of UI benefit duration. In this paper, we examine the effect
of UI duration on aggregate employment during the Great Recession using
state-level expansions and contractions in UI generosity. We use county-level
monthly employment data from late 2007 until the end of 2014. We pro-
vide transparent evidence on employment dynamics around sharp and durable
changes in UI benefits across counties that were otherwise very similar, and
provide a reconciliation of the differences in findings across existing papers.
While a large body of research has studied the effect of UI duration on
the labor supply and job search behavior of individuals, the effects of the
benefit extension on aggregate employment may be quite different from the
micro-based estimates. Keynesian theory predicts a positive employment effect
of UI provision during recessions via stimulating aggregated demand (Sum-
mers (2010), Congressional Budget Office (2012)). In contrast, search-and-
matching models suggest that extensions could raise reservation wages and
lead to lower vacancies and employment (Mitman and Rabinovich (2014)).
Finally, if jobs are rationed, the decreased search from increased UI generosity
during downturns may have only limited effects on aggregate employment due
to increased labor market tightness (the “rat race” phenomenon)—implying
a smaller macro effect than micro effect (Michaillat (2012); Landais et al.
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(2015); Lalive et al. (2015)). Unfortunately, a small set of recent empirical
papers has delivered a mixed verdict on the size of the macro effect of the
policy (Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis (2016); Coglianese (2015); Hage-
dorn, Manovskii, & Mitman (2016); Hagedorn, et al (2016); Johnston & Mas
(2016)).
We begin by showing that the structure of UI extensions that occurred dur-
ing the Great Recession makes our task quite difficult: federal policy expanded
a state’s UI duration automatically when unemployment in that state was high,
leading to reverse causality. To address this mechanical endogeneity, we com-
pare neighboring counties located on opposite sides of state boundaries.2 We
show that this border-county-pair (hereafter BCP) strategy substantially re-
duces the endogeneity problem, mitigating negative pre-existing employment
trends in counties that subsequently experienced greater expansions in max-
imum benefit duration. In addition to OLS specifications that make use of
all variation in state-level UI duration over the entire period, we also provide
an instrumental variables estimate using variation induced solely by national
level policy changes—namely the November 2008 expansion and the December
2013 expiration of the Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC) pro-
gram. These national level policy changes are less endogenous to employment
changes between neighboring counties than variation resulting from the move-
2This border-county-pair strategy was first used in Dube, et al. (2010) to study minimum
wage policies, which change discontinuously at state borders. Note that the same problem
of mechanical endogeneity does not arise when studying the effects of the minimum wage, as
statutory wage rates are not directly tied to measures of state level unemployment. However,
minimum wage policies can also be subject to endogeneity bias through political economic
channels, and more generally may be correlated with spatially varying confounders.
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ments in state-level unemployment rates. At the same time, the bite of the
policy differed across state borders, which allows us to use the BCP strategy in
conjunction with the IV approach. We show changes in aggregate employment
during the 12 months before and after these expansion and expiration events;
we also combine the data for both events to produce a pooled IV estimate.
Our main results are as follows. We find no evidence that UI benefit exten-
sions substantially affected county-level employment. For the full sample OLS
regressions, our point estimates for the effect of expanding maximum benefit
duration from 26 to 99 weeks range from 0.21 to 0.43 percentage points of
the employment-to-population (EPOP) ratio. These estimates are not signif-
icantly different than zero, and they allow us to rule out negative effects on
EPOP greater than -0.48 percentage points at the 95% confidence level. For
comparison, the total change in EPOP over the course of the Great Recession
was about -3 percentage points in our sample.
Our IV estimates that specifically use variation from the national level
policy changes in 2008 and 2014 reach a similar conclusion. For the 2008 IV
estimation, the point estimates also indicate positive impacts on EPOP as a
result of the UI expansion, but the standard errors are much larger. For the
2014 IV analysis, however, the impacts are estimated with more precision: the
point estimates are -0.02 and -0.18 percentage points of EPOP, suggesting a
very small negative impact on employment. When pooled over both events,
our point estimates for the effect of increasing the maximum benefit duration
from 26 to 99 weeks range between -0.07 and 0.14. While the IV estimates
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are somewhat less precise (especially for the 2008 expansion event), the most
precise pooled estimate rules out effects more negative than -1.31 percentage
points of EPOP from a 73-week increase in maximum benefit duration, at the
95 percent confidence level. Similarly, the estimates from the 2014 expiration
event rules out effects more negative than -1.20 from the same policy change.
These conclusions are reinforced when evaluating dynamic evidence from
our distributed lag specifications. For the full sample, we find that employ-
ment remained essentially unchanged over a 36 month window that includes
24 months after treatment. In particular, we see no trends prior to treatment,
indicating that neither endogeneity nor policy anticipation confound our es-
timates. Event studies for the 2008 introduction and 2014 expiration also
show qualitatively similar results. Taking into account the micro-econometric
estimates of labor supply from other studies, we back out ranges of poten-
tial Keynesian multipliers that would be consistent with our macroeconomic
estimates. Our macro employment estimates are consistent with a range of
positive fiscal multipliers centered near 1 when we consider typical labor sup-
ply estimates from the UI benefit expansion—as found in many of the studies
using data from the Great Recession.
A number of recent papers have exploited the panel variation across U.S.
states over time in benefit duration during the Great Recession to study
(micro-level) labor supply behavior. Rothstein (2011) uses data from the
Current Population Survey (CPS) and variation from the uneven roll-out of
extended benefits across states and finds that UI extensions were responsible
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for an increase in unemployment of 0.2 percentage points.3 In concurrent work
using similar variation, Farber & Valetta (2015) find that the availability of
extended benefits increased the unemployment rate by 0.4 percentage points.
Farber et al. (2015) find similar results when they exploit variation in UI
generosity that arises due to the phase-out of extended benefits in 2012-2014:
the effect of UI on duration to re-employment is small. Evaluating a sudden
reduction in benefits in Missouri, Johnston & Mas reach a different conclusion:
they find that newly unemployed workers who are eligible for 16 fewer weeks
of UI (due to starting their claim shortly after a policy change) were 10 per-
centage points more likely to be employed starting in the quarter immediately
after the policy change took place.
In contrast to the large empirical literature on the micro-level labor supply
elasticity, there are relatively fewer papers that have estimated the macro-
level impact of unemployment insurance on overall employment. The papers
most closely related to ours are Hagedorn, Karahan, Manovskii, & Mitman
(2016)—hereafter HKMM—and Hagedorn, Manovskii, & Mitman (2016)—here-
after HMM. Like us, these papers use a BCP strategy; HKMM provide evi-
dence complementary to us that the BCP strategy mitigates the endogeneity
problem. However, they both estimate large negative effects of UI on aggregate
employment. HKMM find that the expansion of UI during the Great Reces-
sion from 26 to 99 weeks increased the unemployment rate by 80%, which is
an effect on unemployment that is roughly comparable to the unemployment
3This calculation is made for December 2010.
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growth that actually occurred during the Great Recession itself; they inter-
pret this result as an explanation for the slow recovery in the unemployment
rate in the years after the trough of the Great Recession. HMM study the
2014 expiration of EUC and find that that expiration was responsible for the
creation of approximately two million jobs. This effect would translate into a
1.1% decrease in employment as a result of the expansion of UI from 26 to 99
weeks, which corresponds to about one third of the employment decrease of
the Great Recession as measured in our data set.
However, our results are quite different from those in HKMM and HMM,
despite employing apparently similar strategies. In Section 2.8.1, we com-
pare our results to both HKMM and HMM and we discuss in detail what
accounts for the substantial differences in our respective estimates. In sum-
mary, with respect to HKMM, we have found that a few factors explain the
bulk of the difference between our two sets of results. First, our dependent
variable is constructed using county-level employment data from the Quarterly
Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW), which is derived from adminis-
trative filings. HKMM and HMM, in contrast, use as their primary dependent
variable the county-level unemployment rate from the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics LAUS program, which is partially model-based. Second, we handle the
dynamics of the treatment effect differently. HKMM quasi-forward difference
their dependent variable, and scale up their estimate to deduce the effects of a
permanent change in policy. In contrast, we use a less parametric distributed
lag framework to document the dynamics of the employment response in a
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transparent fashion over a window spanning from a year prior to treatment
to two years following treatment. This provides clear evidence on endogeneity
concerns, policy anticipation, and the actual impact on employment over the
two years following the policy change. We also replicate HMM and find that
our replication of their estimates for the 2014 expiration of the extended ben-
efits fall close to zero when we use the most recent LAUS data, which were
substantially updated in a 2015 redesign of the LAUS estimating procedure.
Additionally, in an event study specification, HMM estimate a substantial
negative employment effect using QCEW data. These results seem primar-
ily driven by their choice of auxiliary parametric assumptions—namely their
use of a county-specific polynomial trend model, estimated over a long time
horizon. Instead of relying on a parametric counterfactual, we show that our
treatment and control units across the border exhibited parallel trends prior to
the expiration, display no jump at expiration and continue in parallel fashion
after expiration—implying little employment effect.
More recently, two working papers have estimated the macro effect by
exploiting variations in state-level UI extensions coming from measurement
error in the total unemployment rate. Coglianese (2015) uses the variation
between the CPS-measured unemployment rate and a constructed unemploy-
ment rate from UI records as an arguably exogenous shifter in the maximum
benefit duration. Using a conceptually similar strategy, Chodorow-Reich &
Karabarbounis (2016) use the variation in benefit duration coming from the
gap between real-time and subsequently revised official unemployment rates.
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Both Chodorow-Reich & Karabarbounis (2016) and Coglianese (2015) find
very small effects of UI extensions on aggregate employment. One limita-
tion of the measurement error based approach is that the policy changes they
study are less durable than the changes we examine in this paper and thus the
external validity may be more limited. However, the very different types of
variation leveraged across our two sets of papers makes them complementary.
Our findings are also consistent with Marinescu (2017), who finds that UI
benefit extensions during the Great Recession decreased job applications but
not posted vacancies, implying a modest impact of the extensions on overall
job finding and unemployment rates. Finally, in their case study of Missouri,
Johnston & Mas (2016) find substantially larger, negative, macro employment
effects than we find in this paper. Their macro estimates are similar in size
to their micro estimates. Our approach differs from their macro estimates
primarily in that we aggregate across many different benefit extensions and
reductions and that our analysis uses variation across border counties rather
than neighboring or similar states.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2.2, we dis-
cuss important institutional details of the unemployment insurance extensions
during the Great Recession that are critical for our identification strategy.
In Section 2.3, we discuss our data. In Section 2.4, we discuss the identifi-
cation challenges we face in our estimation and present our methodological
approaches. In Section 2.5, we present our empirical results. In Section 2.6,
we compare our macro estimates of UI expansion on employment with micro-
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level estimates based on labor supply elasticities, and back out an implied
fiscal multiplier. Finally, in Section 2.7, we conclude.
2.2 Unemployment Insurance Background
The Great Recession saw a dramatic expansion of unemployment insurance
benefits in all states. In part, this expansion occurred due to policies that
were put in place prior to the Great Recession. However, Congress also passed
legislation extending the maximum duration of unemployment insurance. In
a majority of states, maximum benefit duration increased from 26 weeks to
a maximum of 99 weeks depending on the state of the local labor market.
In this section, we describe these extensions and how they were rolled out
across states. It is precisely these differences across states—and in particular
neighboring states—which we exploit in our identification of the impact of
unemployment insurance benefit duration on employment.
2.2.1 Extended Benefits (EB)
Historically, when not in recession, most U.S. states have provided a maxi-
mum of 26 weeks of unemployment insurance to job-losers. At the onset of
the Great Recession, in 2008, only two states offered more than 26 weeks of
regular benefits. Massachusetts had a maximum of 30 weeks of UI benefits
and Montana had a maximum of 28 weeks and no states offered less than 26
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weeks.4
However, since Congress created the Extended Benefits (EB) program in
1970, maximum benefit lengths increase automatically when unemployment is
high and growing. At a minimum, in states where the Insured Unemployment
Rate (IUR) exceeds 5%, and the IUR is at least 1.2 times the IUR in the
previous two years, claimants are eligible for 13 additional weeks of UI after
the expiration of regular benefits.5 The same law also provides two optional
“triggers,” which can be adopted by states at their own discretion. The first
trigger provides for 13 weeks of EB for states whose IUR exceeds 6% (regardless
of the change in the IUR over time). The other optional trigger is based on
the Total Unemployment Rate (TUR): the trigger provides for 13 weeks of
EB when both (1) the TUR exceeds 6.5% and (2) the current TUR is at
least 1.1 times its value in the prior two years. States adopting this second
trigger must provide 20 weeks of EB when (1) the TUR exceeds 8%, subject to
the same growth-over-time requirement.6 States can adopt zero, one, or both
optional triggers, but no more than one trigger can be “on” at any point in
4Not all claimants are eligible for the maximum number of weeks of benefits. In most
states, individuals with relatively weak recent labor force attachment are eligible only for
a fraction of the maximum weeks of benefits. Throughout this paper, we abstract from
this complication by focusing on the maximum UI duration. Our estimates, therefore, can
be seen as an intention to treat effect. Johnston & Mas (2016), using micro-data from
Missouri, find that approximately 70% of UI claimants had sufficient labor force attachment
to be eligible for the full 26 weeks of regular benefits from 2003-2013.
5The Insured Unemployment Rate (IUR) is, roughly, the ratio of current regular UI
claimants to the number of UI-covered jobs. The Total Unemployment Rate (TUR) is the
usual “unemployment rate”: i.e., the ratio of unemployed persons to persons in the labor
force.
6From December 2010 through the end of 2013 (a period in which the unemployment
rate remained high but was generally not growing), states were allowed to apply a three-
year lookback period instead of a two-year lookback period for the purpose of determining
growth over time.
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time, meaning that the number of weeks of EB is capped at 20.
Normally, the costs of EB are shared equally between the federal and state
governments. As a result, many states did not have statutes activating the
optional EB triggers at the onset of the Great Recession. However, after the
passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), the federal
government paid for the full amount of EB extensions. Some states (mostly
deeply conservative ones) nonetheless declined to activate the optional triggers.
For example, while Mississippi had a TUR of well over 8% continuously from
January 2009 through October 2016, peaking at over 11% in 2010, they were
never eligible for EB because the insured unemployment rate never went above
5.6% and the state declined to enact the optional triggers. Thus, different
states had different numbers of weeks of EB in part due to differences in the
state unemployment rates and in part due to state policy differences. The
federal government maintained its full support of EB until the end of 2013
when it returned to the default equal cost sharing rule.
2.2.2 Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC)
In response to the first signs of a weakening labor market, on June 30, 2008,
Congress and President Bush created the Emergency Unemployment Com-
pensation (EUC) program. At first, EUC provided for 13 additional weeks of
benefits for all UI-eligible unemployed workers.7 The Unemployment Compen-
7To be more precise, this legislation—and all subsequent legislation related to
EUC—provided for increases in benefit lengths equal to the lesser of (1) a specified number
of weeks or (2) a fraction of the number of weeks of regular benefits. For the initial legisla-
81
sation Extension Act of 2008 was then signed into law by President Bush on
November 21, 2008. It augmented the EUC program while also creating the
first differences across states in their access to the EUC extensions. It autho-
rized 20 weeks of EUC for all states (an increase from 13) and an additional
13 weeks for those with a total unemployment rate exceeding 6%.8 These
additional weeks were organized into “tiers”: Tier 1 corresponded to the first
20 weeks of EUC, while Tier 2 corresponded to the baseline 20 weeks plus
an additional 13 weeks. During this period, a state with 26 weeks of regular
benefits could qualify for up to 79 weeks total of benefits. Then, on November
6, 2009, the Worker, Homeowner, and Business Act of 2009 further increased
maximum UI duration. Tier 1 remained in place. However, Tier 2 was in-
creased from 13 to 14 weeks and extended to all 50 states. The law also added
Tier 3, providing 13 additional weeks to states with a TUR of greater than
6%, and Tier 4, providing 6 additional weeks for states with a TUR of greater
than 8.5%. After the passage of this law, states had access to a maximum of
99 weeks of benefits. This schedule remained in place, with the exception of
temporary lapses, until early 2012, when Congress enacted laws that slowly
began to phase out EUC.9
tion in June 2008, the specified number of weeks was 13 and the fraction of the number of
weeks of regular benefits was 50%. For the vast majority of states that had regular benefits
greater than or equal to 26, the specified number of weeks was the binding factor. For those
states with fewer than 26 weeks of regular benefits, the percentage of regular benefits was
always binding. In this paper, we code the weeks available under EUC exactly as specified
in the law; however, in the discussion that follows, we discuss only the specified number of
weeks, which applies to states with at least 26 weeks of regular benefits.
8A state could also have become eligible for 33 weeks with a sufficiently high IUR; in
practice, the IUR trigger was never binding.
9There were four lapses in EUC that occurred in 2010, arising due to political disagree-
ments regarding the extension of the program. The longest such lapse lasted from May
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On February 22, 2012, Congress passed and the President signed The Mid-
dle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 which slightly lowered the
generosity of the EUC in a gradual way, first starting on May 27, 2012, and
then again on September 2, 2012. By September 2, 2012, Tier 1 had been
scaled back to 14 weeks and was still available to all states. Tier 2 remained
at 14 weeks but again became available only to states with a TUR of greater
than 6%. Tier 3 was scaled back from 13 to 9 weeks and the state TUR
threshold was raised to 7%. Finally, Tier 4 was increased to provide 10 extra
weeks for states with a TUR of above 9%. The program finally came to an end
at the end of December 2013.10 In total, over the Great Recession, individu-
als in qualifying states received up to 99 weeks of unemployment insurance.
Compared to the baseline of 26 weeks, this is an increase of 73 weeks; so the
maximum UI benefit duration in some qualifying states increased by almost
300%.
30, 2010 to July 18, 2010. In each of the lapses, beneficiaries were paid retroactively for
any weeks of missed payments. Furthermore, during these lapses, the funding rules for EB
reverted to their pre-ARRA levels, which led many states to suspend EB payments during
these lapses as well.
10Upon the expiration of EUC at the end of 2013, EUC beneficiaries immediately stopped
receiving benefit payments. Prior to the final expiration, however, the phase-out was more
gradual. If a state “triggered-off” a certain tier, people who had already qualified for a
given tier were allowed to finish that tier. However, beneficiaries were not allowed to move
to the next tier. One exception, discussed in the following subsection, is North Carolina,
which lost access to all EUC money as of July 1, 2013. In our econometric specifications,
our duration variable is the maximum duration available in a given month for a new entrant
into unemployment. Thus, we do not distinguish between gradual phase-outs and sudden
benefit cessations.
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2.2.3 Changes in State-Level Regular Benefits
In addition to changes in federal policy and changes in state unemployment
rates which triggered changes in unemployment benefit generosity, during our
sample period, UI duration was also influenced by state-level policy changes.
Starting in 2011, some states began to lower maximum duration for regular
state-level benefits below the usual 26 weeks. Arkansas reduced its maximum
benefit duration to 25 weeks and both Missouri and South Carolina to 20 weeks
in 2011. Then, in 2012, Florida, Georgia, Illinois and Michigan reduced their
maximum benefit duration. Michigan lowered it to 20 weeks, while the other
three made it contingent on the state unemployment rate. North Carolina also
reduced its regular benefits to 20 weeks; additionally, North Carolina reduced
the weekly benefit amount from $535 to $350, which violated its agreement
with the Department of Labor. For this reason, all EUC benefits immediately
expired in North Carolina, which caused its maximum benefit duration to fall
by 53 weeks. The duration of regular benefits fell further in North Carolina in
2014, as it was also set to be contingent on the state unemployment rate.
2.2.4 Variation Between Neighboring States
Importantly, the path of benefit extensions—from regular benefits, EB, or
EUC—often differed markedly across neighboring states. These differences
across neighboring states were largely a result of differences in state unem-
ployment rates, but also to some degree due to variations in state policy. It
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is precisely these time-varying differences across neighboring states that we
use for our identification strategy. In Figure 2.1, we graphically show the
evolution of the benefit generosity over time nationally, which strongly (nega-
tively) co-varies with the national employment-to-population ratio.11 In Fig-
ure 2.2, we show the differences across neighboring counties in the numbers
of weeks of available unemployment insurance, where the reported difference
is between “high” and “low” benefit duration counties, defined by comparing
the average duration in the treatment period (2008m11-2013m12) versus the
the prior 12 months (2007m11-2008m10) when these differences were typically
zero or very small. Prior to November 2008, most counties had access to an
identical amount of unemployment insurance, with the exception of those in
Massachusetts and Montana. Afterwards, however, some neighboring states
(and thus neighboring counties across state borders) started offering different
lengths of maximum benefit duration. The average gap between states with
longer versus shorter total duration within the county pairs rose to nearly 12
weeks by late 2011, before declining to an average gap of near zero with the
expiration of EUC in December 2013. This variation over time is used in our
full panel estimates. We also use the national level policy variation due to the
the November 2008 expansion, and the late 2013 expiration, of the EUC pro-
gram as instruments for our IV strategy. In Figure 2.3, we show a map of the
counties that had different generosity levels right before the EUC expiration
11Our measure of EPOP is below the US DOL measure. This is largely because our
measure is based upon UI employment, and thus excludes those in the informal sector as
well as the self-employed. Additionally, we calculate EPOP by dividing employment by the
15+ population in the county, rather than the 16+ population used by the DOL.
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in December 2013. Figure 2.15 shows the analogous map for the variation
created by expansion of the EUC program in November 2008.
2.3 Data
We use county-level employment data from the Quarterly Census of Employ-
ment and Wages (QCEW). The QCEW data is based on ES-202 filings that
nearly all establishments are required to file quarterly with their state gov-
ernment, for the purpose of calculating UI-related payroll taxes. These em-
ployment and earnings counts are shared by the states with the Bureau of
Labor Statistics, which releases the data at the county-industry-month level.
Since 98% of jobs are covered by unemployment insurance, these payroll counts
constitute a near census of employment and earnings. There are some limita-
tions: the QCEW does not capture workers in the informal sector or the self-
employed, and it misses the small number of workers who participate in their
own unemployment insurance system, such as railroad workers and workers
at religiously-affiliated schools. Importantly, the QCEW covers both private
and public sector employment.12 The QCEW provides total employment for
each month at the county level. In our baseline estimation, we require that
each county be in the data set in every month. This excludes four counties for
which there is at least one month in the sample where the QCEW does not re-
port data due to confidentiality problems with disclosure. This occurs only in
12We focus our analysis on total employment (the sum of private and public sector em-
ployment), though we do provide results on private employment as a robustness check.
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counties with very low population. In our robustness section, we additionally
report estimates using the full unbalanced panel.
We divide employment by population of those 15 and older, which we
obtain from the census at the annual level and interpolate log-linearly within
each year. Prior to estimation, we seasonally adjust our dependent variables
by subtracting off the county-month specific mean of the variable in question,
where this mean is calculated over the period 1998-2004.13 As we show later in
the paper, however, our results are robust to using raw rather than seasonally
adjusted data.
Our data on the number of weeks of regular benefits comes from Depart-
ment of Labor reports which are issued biannually.14 To account for occa-
sional changes in the numbers of weeks of regular benefits that occur dur-
ing the intervening period, we augment these data with online searches of
news media and state government websites. We obtain information on EUC
and EB from the trigger reports released by the Department of Labor, avail-
able at http://www.oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/claims_arch.asp. These
reports provide the number of weeks of EB and tiers of EUC available for
each state, in each week. When a change in weeks of benefits happens within
a month, we assign the time-weighted average of the maximum duration to
that month.
As discussed above, there were several lapses in the EUC program during
13For the sake of summary statistics and the small number of specifications we estimate
without county fixed effects, we add back the overall mean level of EPOP for each county
measured over the 1998-2004 period.
14http://www.unemploymentinsurance.doleta.gov/unemploy/statelaws.asp
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2010. In the popular press, expectations were that these lapses would be re-
versed, and that the original EUC benefit durations would be reinstated. This
is in fact what did happen. In our baseline specifications, we treat the lapses
as true expirations—that is, those county-by-month observations are coded as
having EUC equal to zero. However, we show in robustness checks that our
estimates are not substantially affected if we code the benefit durations for
these few months as having remained unchanged at their pre-lapse level.
We also use a list of all contiguous county pairs that straddle state borders;
this data comes from Dube, et al. (2010). In our baseline specifications, we
have a total of 1,161 county-pairs.
In addition, we obtain county level unemployment and employment data
at the quarterly level from the Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS)
published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. We obtained the most current
data (as of November 10, 2016) via http://download.bls.gov/pub/time.
series/la/. We additionally obtain a vintage series of county unemployment
rates and employment (prior to the March 2015 redesign) via FRED. This is
the main data source used by HKMM and HMM, and we use it as part of our
reconciliation exercise in Section 2.8.1.
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2.4 Research Design
2.4.1 The Identification Problem
To credibly estimate the effect of UI extensions on aggregate employment, we
need to address a serious problem of reverse causality. Negative employment
shocks that raised the unemployment rates were likely to mechanically raise
the maximum benefit duration within the policy environment during the Great
Recession. Figure 2.1 illustrates the identification problem facing researchers
when estimating the effect of UI extensions on employment. Between 2008 and
2014, we see a U-shaped time path of maximum benefit duration, along with
an inverted-U shaped time path for the employment to population ratio.15
However, it would be naive to assume that this correlation is causal in nature.
A closer look confirms that the decline in employment in 2008 preceded the EB
and the EUC tier extensions. Similarly, employment was already on the mend
well before the 2014 EUC expiration occurred. It is possible that UI extensions
were responsible for some of the decline and some of the persistence in the high
unemployment rates the U.S. experienced in the 2009-2013 period. However,
as Figure 2.1 highlights, it is likely that some or much of this relationship
reflects a mechanical endogeneity of UI maximum benefit duration to the state
of the economy.
While the endogeneity problem is most obvious when considering time se-
15To be consistent with our baseline regression specifications, this figure shows the time
series of EPOP and duration taken as an unweighted average of counties.
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ries variation, a differences in differences (or the classic two-way fixed effects)
strategy is unlikely to eliminate the endogeneity bias. On the one hand, there
was a substantial amount of variation in UI generosity over time and dif-
ferentially across US states, making it feasible to use panel variation in UI
duration. However, the assumption that states which saw larger increases in
the maximum benefit duration had parallel employment trends with states
which experienced smaller increases is unlikely to hold due to the mechanical
endogeneity: the rules of EUC and EB provide for longer benefits in a given
state when the unemployment rate in that state is higher. Locations which
switch into offering higher benefit duration will likely be locations in decline,
and locations that switch into offering lower benefit duration will be locations
in recovery—likely causing a bias in the two-way fixed effects estimate.
We explicitly demonstrate the scope of this endogeneity problem by show-
ing how high-treatment counties—i.e., counties that would eventually expe-
rience a large increase in the maximum benefit duration—had very different
employment trends prior to treatment as compared to other counties. For this
exercise, we construct a time-invariant, continuous measure of the average
treatment intensity for each county, treatc. This is defined as the difference in
time-averaged maximum benefit duration in a given county during the “treat-
ment period” (i.e., between November 2008 and December 2013) versus the 12
months prior (i.e., between November 2007 and October 2008).16 For exam-
16This “non-treatment” value will in general not be equal to 26, since it includes the
period from July to October 2008 when all states were eligible for 13 weeks of EUC.
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ple, if a state’s average maximum UI duration during the treatment period was
90 weeks, and the average maximum benefit length in the 12 non-treatment
months was 30 weeks, it would have a value of treatc equal to 60 weeks. For
ease of interpretation, we rescale this variable by dividing it by 10, so that a
value of 1 corresponds to a difference of 10 weeks of treatment, which is roughly
equal to the mean difference in duration between neighboring counties which
straddle state borders during the treatment period. We then estimate the fol-
lowing model over the 2004m11-2008m10 period, i.e., the four years preceding
the introduction of differential UI benefits:
Ect = α× treatc × t+ λc + θt + εct (2.1)
where t is time measured in months divided by 48.17 λc is a set of county
fixed effects, while θt is a set of common period fixed effects. Our estimate of
α thus measures the difference in the linear employment trend between high-
and low-treatment counties prior to November of 2008. For this specification,
we cluster our standard errors at the the state level. The first column of
Table 2.1 shows our estimate for α̂. The estimate, significant at the 1% level,
implies that EPOP declined by 0.78 percentage points in the four years prior
to November 2008 in counties that would subsequently receive an additional
10 weeks of benefits. This result is consistent with the mechanical endogeneity
problem discussed above, and casts doubt on the assumption of parallel trends
17Note that there are 48 months in this sample, so the date variable equals (essentially)
zero at the start of the sample and one at the end.
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across counties prior to increases in benefit duration.18
2.4.2 Border county pair strategy
The failure of the two-way fixed effects strategy motivates us to restrict our
sample to contiguous county pairs which straddle state borders (Dube et al.
(2010, 2016)) and estimate the effects within border county pairs. The main
idea behind this strategy is that neighboring counties in adjacent states are
reasonably well matched. Dube et al. (2016) show that adjacent county pairs
straddling state borders are much more alike in terms of levels and trends in
covariates than are randomly matched pairs of counties. However, while ad-
jacent counties are likely to face similar economic shocks as each other, their
UI maximum benefit durations will be driven by their respective states’ unem-
ployment rates and policy choices—which may be quite different. Therefore,
by focusing on comparisons between border counties, we are able to account
for all confounders that vary smoothly geographically, and better account for
the mechanical endogeneity problem that plagues the two-way fixed effects
approach. Table 2.2 shows that the treated and control counties were quite
similar: pre-existing characteristics seem relatively balanced between the high-
treatment and low-treatment counties within pairs.
For each month t, our border county pairs (BCP) data is organized to
have two observations in each pair p—one for each county c of the pair. Note
that this also means that a given county c appears in the data k times (for
18We show results from a two way fixed effects model in Table 2.12.
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each month t) if it borders k counties in adjacent states. Before describing in
detail our key empirical specifications, we first use this BCP data to show that
within-pair variation dramatically reduces the problem of pre-existing trends.
We re-estimate a regression of EPOP on the time-invariant average treatment
intensity, treatc, and county fixed effects, similar to Equation (2.1). But
now, instead of a single set of period effects, we include a full set of pair-
period fixed effects, νpt. This sweeps out the variation between pairs, and only
uses within-pair variation to identify α.19
Ecpt = α× treatc × t+ λc + νpt + εcpt (2.2)
As before, the estimation period runs from November 2004 to October 2008.
The coefficient α has a similar interpretation as in the prior strategy, but now
measures the differential pre-existing employment trends by treatment status
within each adjacent county pair. The results in Column 3 of Table 2.1 show
that for the sample of border counties, the differential pre-existing trend within
county pairs (-0.24) is much closer to zero and statistically insignificant, in
contrast to the estimates from the two-way fixed effects model using the same
sample (-0.98). This constitutes very clear evidence that the estimates using
neighboring counties as controls are likely to exhibit less bias than those from
the two-way fixed effects model. Moreover, the standard error from the BCP
19With two observations within each pair-period group, this approach gives the identical
coefficients as if we dropped the pair-period fixed effects and instead (1) took the spatial
difference of the dependent variable and main independent variable across each county pair
p at each time t, and (2) replaced county fixed effects by pair fixed effects.
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model (0.29) is not dramatically larger than that of the two-way fixed effects
model (0.21), suggesting that it is a reduction in bias and not statistical power
that drives the changes in statistical significance in Table 2.1.20
While the evidence on pre-existing trends from Table 2.1 show that the
BCP strategy is a very important improvement over the two-way fixed effects
model, we may worry about remaining endogeneity bias, especially given the
explicit reverse causality in this context. This motivates us to implement
an additional data-driven refinement to the BCP strategy. In particular, we
drop the quartile of pairs with the largest absolute differences in pre-existing
EPOP trends over the 2004m11-2008m10 period. These BCPs appear to be
more poorly matched in that the counties in these pairs exhibit qualitatively
different trajectories prior to the UI extensions, and these trajectories may be
mechanically correlated with subsequent UI duration.21 Hereafter, we refer
to this specification as trimming our sample based on pre-treatment trends,
or PTT-trimming. Column 4 of Table 2.1 shows α̂ for the PTT-trimmed
sample and confirms that removing the worst-fitting quartile further reduces
the extent of pre-existing trends to -0.11.
In this paper, we report estimates using several different types of regres-
20This evidence is complementary with the evidence provided in Section 4.3 of HKMM.
HKMM find substantially larger estimates of the effect of UI on unemployment when their
border pair sample is replaced by a “scrambled border pair” sample, in which pairs are
formed randomly (rather than by reason of geographical adjacency). HKMM argue (and we
agree) that this is indicative of the role played by the BCP strategy in reducing mechanical
endogeneity.
21Even if economic conditions evolve continuously across state borders, the statistics for
a given border county will measure an average of economic conditions some positive dis-
tance away from the border. This might be a concern for geographically large counties in
the western United States. In our robustness section, we show that dropping pairs whose
centroids are more than 100 km apart has little effect on our estimates.
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sions. First, to visually show how employment evolves on the high-treatment
versus low-treatment sides of the border, we estimate a model using the same
time-invariant average treatment intensity, treatc, that we used above for the
assessment of pre-existing trends. We regress EPOP on a a set of interactions
treatc × 1{t = s} variables, where 1{t = s} is an indicator for date s. In
the full sample, we omit the variable corresponding to October 2008. We ad-
ditionally control for county fixed effects λc and pair-period effects νpt. The




βstreatc1{t = s}+ λc + νpt + εcpt (2.3)
Since treatc is a continuous, time-invariant measure, the coefficients βs trace
out how EPOP evolves in the treated versus control sides over time, as com-
pared to a base period of October 2008, the month before the first cross-state
variation in federal UI benefits in our sample.
While the time-invariant treatment measure is useful for a qualitative, vi-
sual assessment of how employment evolved on the two sides of the border,
it does not use the timing of policy changes with any precision. Our baseline
BCP-FE specification equation uses a normalized maximum benefit duration
(in weeks), Dct, to estimate the following equation:
Ecpt = βDct + λc + νpt + ηcpt (2.4)
We normalizeDct by dividing the maximum benefit duration by 73, to make
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β interpretable as the change in EPOP from the median expansion in duration
that took place in the Great Recession.22 Again, we include county fixed effects
λc to account for persistent differences between the two members of the pair,23
and pair-period effects νpt to sweep out between-pair variation. Clearly, this
strategy still relies onDct being uncorrelated with ηcpt, i.e., E(Dctηcpt) = 0, but
now this assumption needs to hold only within a local area that is likely to be
experiencing more similar economic shocks. The third column of Table 2.1
shows why we believe this assumption is closer to the truth in the county-
pair setting relative to the two-way fixed effects setting. Equation (2.4) is
estimated for both the baseline sample of all border county pairs, as well as
the PTT-trimmed sample of county pairs. The baseline regression is estimated
over the period from November 2007 to December 2014, which includes the
period of differential EUC (November 2008 - December 2013) as well as 12
months prior and 12 months after.
We also present the dynamics of employment around the time of the pol-
icy change. There are two specific aims that underlie this analysis. First, we
wish to use the leading coefficients to detect pre-existing trends and assess the
validity of the research design. Second, we wish to assess possible anticipa-
tion or lagged effects of the policy. To this end, we utilize a first-differenced
distributed lags specification with a set of 11 monthly leads and 24 monthly
22All but two states had 26 weeks of benefits prior to the onset of the Great Recession,
and the median as well as mode for state UI duration was 99 weeks from November 2009
until April 2011.
23We replace county fixed effects with county-cross-county-pair fixed effects in the small
number of specifications in which the panel is unbalanced.
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lags, along with the contemporaneous benefit duration, Dct. This specification
allows us to focus on employment changes within the 36 month window around
the time of treatment.




βk∆Dc,t−k + νpt + εcpt (2.5)
Successively summing the coefficients traces out the cumulative response to a
one-time, permanent unit change in D: ρτ =
∑τ
k=−11 βk represents the cumu-
lative response at event time, τ .24 For ease of interpretation, we center the
cumulative responses around a baseline of the month just prior to treatment,
ρ̃τ = ρτ − ρ−1, which imposes that ρ̃−1 = 0. We plot the centered cumula-
tive response ρ̃τ by event time, along with the associated confidence intervals
below.
While the border county pairs strategy provides greater internal valid-
ity, one potential concern is about the representativeness of border counties.
Summary statistics in Table 2.11 confirm that border counties are relatively
comparable to the full set of counties, indicating that the sample restriction
for purposes of internal validity comes at minimal sacrifice of external validity.
24Note that βk is the response associated with Dt−k. This indexation convention allows
us to index the coefficients by event time.
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2.4.3 Instrumental variables estimation: EUC Policy
Changes
Estimating Equation (2.4) by OLS exploits all of the variation in maxi-
mum benefit duration induced by both policy changes (EUC, state adoption
of optional EB triggers, and state changes to regular benefits) and endoge-
nous movements in state unemployment rates across various thresholds (from
EUC and EB triggers). That is, our OLS specification has the undesirable fea-
ture that it exploits variation in benefit duration in a given month which was
caused by a change in contemporaneous state-level unemployment. By only
comparing adjacent border counties, we are likely to reduce the scope of the
endogeneity problem, since the employment shocks affecting policy are from
the state as a whole, while we are accounting for the county’s employment
shock by comparing it to its cross-state neighbor. Nonetheless, to the extent
that endogeneity bias may remain, we can further reduce it by restricting the
variation we use to national-level policy changes. Counties within a border
pair are less likely to have systematically different employment trends when
UI duration changes due to national policy than when one county’s state is
triggering on or off of EB or an EUC tier. We therefore develop an instru-
mental variables approach that isolates the effects of cross-border changes in
benefit duration that are triggered by persistent changes in national policy,
and not by contemporaneous economic shocks.
The first policy change that we use is the passage of the Unemployment
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Compensation Extension Act (UCEA) in November of 2008, which granted
states 20 weeks of federally funded benefits, or 33 if the total unemployment
rate at the time exceeded 6%. This led to an increase in UI benefit durations
which varied across states, introducing the first across-state variation in EUC
availability in our sample.25 The second national policy change we use is
the expiration of the EUC program in December 2013, which led to a larger
reduction in UI duration which also varied across states.
Of course, the change in national policy creates variation precisely because
there were differences in the level of unemployment across states. For the 2008
policy change, states that had a TUR exceeding 6% saw a bigger increase in
benefit duration than states with a lower TUR. Similarly, for the 2014 expi-
ration, states with higher unemployment rates experienced larger reductions
in benefits. While high and low unemployment states very well may have
been on different trajectories around these two events, the BCP strategy is
arguably better able to account for such trends compared to times when the
policy change is directly induced by changes in state unemployment rates.
For our IV specifications, we use a two year window—one year on each side
of the national policy change. We regress EPOP on weeks of benefits, control-
ling for pair-period fixed effects and county fixed effects. We then instrument
benefit duration with a variable that reflects only the change in duration caused
by the EUC policy change. The instrument does not exploit variation caused
25Prior to UCEA, variation in federally provided benefits existed in two states: North
Carolina and Rhode Island were eligible for 13 and 20 weeks of EB, respectively, at the time
of the policy change. No other state was eligible for EB at that time.
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by EB triggerings, EUC triggerings, and state-level policy changes. Our two
stage least squares estimation strategy is thus given by the set of equations:
Ecpt = βDct + λc + νpt + ηcpt (2.6)
Dct = βzzct + ρc + γpt + εcpt (2.7)
where the instrument zct reflects the instantaneous change in the maximum
UI duration available in the county due to the national EUC policy change.
The instrument zct is defined as follows:
zct =

D08c Nov. 2007 - Oct. 2008
D08c + δ08c Nov. 2008 - Oct. 2009
D13c Jan. 2013 - Dec. 2013
D13c − δ13c Jan. 2014 - Dec. 2014
For the 12 months prior to the 2014 policy change, we set the value of zct
to equal the number of weeks of UI available in the last week of December
2013 (immediately prior to the EUC expiration), D13c . For the remaining 12
months in the sample, we subtract from D13c the number of weeks of benefits
lost as a result of the EUC expiration (δ13c ), and set zct equal to this value.26
For the two year window around the 2008 policy change, the instrument is
26Therefore, the change in the instrument zct between December 2013 and January 2014
takes into account the decline in duration explicitly resulting from the EUC expiration, but
not any contemporaneous changes in state-level regular benefits. In our robustness section,
we show results from a specification where the instrument also takes into account the five
state-level policy changes that occurred at the same time as the national policy change.
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defined analogously, using the maximum UI duration available just before
(D08c ) and just after the introduction of the new EUC program. Therefore, the
jump in zct that occurs in November 2008 (δ08c ) exactly equals the differential
number of weeks made available by the onset of the UCEA. We also pool
both events together, and estimate this model using the 24 months of data
around the 2008 onset along with the 24 months of data around the 2014
expiration.27 For all of these specifications, we estimate the results using the
complete baseline BCP sample as well as the refined (PTT-trimmed) sample.
Because the EUC program in North Carolina expired at the end of June 2013
(rather than December), we drop county pairs that include a North Carolina
county from the 2014 subsample in the baseline analysis.28
We additionally show reduced form and first stage estimates underlying
the IV regressions by month relative to the event. As with OLS, the dynamic




βτδct1{eventdatet = τ}+ νpt + ηcpt (2.8)
27For this pooled specification, we allow the county fixed effects to vary across the two
subsamples (that is, the county fixed effects are replaced with county-by-subsample fixed
effects).
28In the robustness section, we report results from specifications which keep North Car-
olina as well as others which redefine the instrument for North Carolina to exploit variation
from its earlier benefit cut.
29We note that estimating this model in levels (i.e., using Ecpt and Dct and mean differ-
encing) versus first-differences is immaterial in this case where we are estimating monthly






βzτδct1{eventdatet = τ}+ γpt + εcpt (2.9)
We define δct = δ08c for the 2007-2008 sample and −δ13c for the 2013-2014
sample, each divided by 10 for the ease of interpretation. As with OLS, the sum
of coefficients ρτ =
∑τ
k=−11 βk and ρzτ =
∑τ
k=−11 βzk represent the cumulative
response by event time. These represent the average within-pair differences in
employment and the prevailing maximum benefit duration—over a 24 month
window around the national policy change—for a pair in which the difference
in the instantaneous increase in maximum benefit duration (due to the policy
change) was 10 weeks. We omit the variable corresponding to eventdatet = −1
(which corresponds to October 2008 and December 2013), meaning that the
plotted coefficients are centered relative to date -1 leading values.30
It is useful to consider where our policy variation is coming from when us-
ing this IV approach along with BCP sample. Consider two adjacent counties,
A and B, which followed similar employment trends prior to October 2008, but
where side A saw a larger increase in benefit duration in October 2008 because
it happened to be in a state with an already high state unemployment rate.
Variation in policy, then, is coming largely from more negative past employ-
ment shocks in other counties in A’s state—as compared to past employment
shocks in other counties in county B’s state. The same logic applies to EUC
30For ease of interpretation, we omit January 2014 instead of December 2013 in the first
stage when constructing the graph that analyzes only the 2014 expiration event. This allows
the graph to show a drop in relative benefits roughly from 10 to 0 rather than 0 to -10.
As we do not report standard errors for this specification, this amounts to a simple vertical
shift of the graph.
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expiration in December 2014. The combination of more plausibly exogenous
variation due to national policy changes with local cross-state comparisons
guards against endogeneity bias by putting both geographic and temporal dis-
tance between shocks in employment in a county and the shocks that drive
the policy.
2.4.4 Standard errors
Except where noted, our standard errors are clustered two-way at the state-
pair level and at the state level. Clustering at the state-pair level is designed
to account for common, serially correlated shocks to local economies. We also
cluster at the state level to account for the mechanical correlation in error
terms that is introduced when one county borders counties in at least two
states (and thus appears in multiple state-pairs) as well as any state level
shocks. Note that our clustering strategy fully accounts for the appearance of
a single state multiple times in the border county pair sample.
2.5 Empirical Findings
2.5.1 Motivating graphical evidence
Figure 2.4 plots the regression coefficients for the time-invariant average
treatment intensity measure, treatc, period by period, using Equation (2.3).
The figure plots two sets of coefficients: one with EPOP as the dependent vari-
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able, and the other with maximum UI benefit duration as the outcome. This
figure shows that the side of the border receiving a larger treatment (averaged
over the full treatment period) experienced a slight decline in employment
starting several years prior to treatment, though this pre-existing trend is not
statistically significant. The differential employment trend greatly accelerated
between 2009 and 2012—at a time when the UI extensions are implemented.
This might indicate a causal effect of the UI extensions. However, contrary
to that interpretation, employment continued to fall at a similar rate on the
side receiving a larger treatment in the post-2011 period when UI generosity
difference within the pair was in decline.
Figure 2.5 shows the results of the same analysis using our refined PTT-
trimmed set of border county pairs, where we exclude the pairs with the largest
differences in pre-existing trends. The findings are reinforced when we consider
this refined BCP strategy. Over the 2004-2014 period, employment on the side
of the border receiving greater treatment remained essentially unchanged, even
as benefit duration rose sharply in late 2008, and then dropped sharply in late
2013. This figure provides compelling visual evidence of the validity of the
refined BCP design (no pre-existing trends), and that any causal employment
effect of of the policy is likely to be quite small.
Together, the two figures convey several important features of the data and
the research design. First, when using the baseline BCP sample, the monotonic
decline in employment on the high-treatment side of the border throughout
the entire period—both when UI benefit duration difference within the pair
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is increasing and when it is decreasing—previews our regression results that
overall employment effects are likely to be modest in that specification as well.
Second, trimming on pre-treatment trends eliminates not only trends prior to
treatment but also the secular decline in EPOP post-treatment. These findings
suggest that the secular employment decline was due to poor match quality in
a minority of observations rather than a causal effect of treatment.
2.5.2 Main Estimates
We present our full-sample OLS estimates for the time period from November
2007 to December 2014 in the top panel of Table 2.3. This panel reports
two columns of regressions estimating Equation (2.4). The first column
reports results using the baseline (i.e., untrimmed) BCP sample and the second
column reports results using the sample that we refined based on pre-existing
trends (the PTT-trimmed sample). The point estimate for the baseline BCP
sample is 0.430. Recall that we normalizedD by dividing the maximum benefit
duration by 73 weeks, so this allows us to interpret the coefficient as the
estimated impact on EPOP from an increase in maximum benefit duration
from 26 to 99 weeks. Consequently, the baseline BCP estimate suggests that
the 73 week increase in maximum benefit duration raised the EPOP ratio by
0.430 percentage points. The standard error is 0.466 and thus the estimate
is not statistically distinguishable from zero. When we restrict the analysis
to the PTT-trimmed sample in Column 2, the coefficient falls to 0.213. Even
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though the PTT-trimmed sample size is 25% smaller than the baseline BCP
sample, the standard error for the PTT-trimmed estimate is smaller at 0.270:
trimming on PTT rids the sample of poorly matched county pairs and thereby
reduces residual variance. As a consequence, when moving from the baseline
BCP to the refined BCP estimates, the maximal negative impact of expanding
UI from 26 to 99 weeks which can be rejected at the 95% level of confidence
falls in magnitude from -0.483 to -0.316.31
Figure 2.6 visually displays the employment dynamics around the treat-
ment event in a transparent manner using the first-differenced distributed lag
specification of Equation (2.5). These estimates are useful for assessing pol-
icy anticipation and lagged effects of the policy, as well as possible biases in
the research design arising from pre-existing trends. The figure shows the cu-
mulative response in employment (ρ̃τ ) starting 12 months before treatment,
and extending up to 24 months after. Recall that these cumulative responses
are centered at event time τ = −1, so the estimates of confidence intervals
for ρ̃τ are expressed relative to the month before treatment. The top panel
displays the coefficients for the full sample of BCPs, while the bottom panel
displays them for the PTT-trimmed sample. For both specifications, during
the twelve months prior to treatment, i.e., between τ = −12 and −1, there is
little change in employment. The leading values of the cumulative responses
31Table 2.12 presents results from the two-way fixed effects model for the all-counties
sample and the border county pair sample. The point estimates are somewhat more negative,
consistent with the problem of pre-existing trends documented in Table 2.1. Nonetheless,
the unweighted estimates which are most comparable toTable 2.3 are modest in magnitude:
-0.385 (with a standard error of 0.355) for the all-counties sample, and -0.382 (with a
standard error of 0.361) for the border counties sample.
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range between -0.321 and 0.403, and are never statistically distinguishable
from zero. Overall, the distributed lag specifications produce little evidence
to indicate reduced hiring in anticipation of the policy change.
Following treatment, both the baseline BCP specification and the PTT-
trimmed specification show no change in employment over the 24 months fol-
lowing the policy change. The cumulative responses are typically positive and
not statistically significantly different from zero. Even as the precision declines
for longer lags, 12 months after the policy change, we can nonetheless still rule
out employment effects more negative than -0.6 with 95 percent confidence
for both specifications. Overall, the dynamic evidence from the OLS model
suggests little employment change in the year prior to treatment (e.g., through
anticipation), or during the two years following the policy change.
The instrumental variables estimates from Equations (2.6) and (2.7) are
presented in the bottom three panels of Table 2.3. In panel 2 of Table 2.3,
we report our pooled results using both the 2008 introduction (i.e., a positive
treatment) and the 2014 expiration of the EUC (i.e., a negative treatment).
For our preferred PTT-trimmed specification, the first stage F-statistic for the
excluded instrument is 262.3, indicating that the instantaneous changes due
to the national policy changes were responsible for a sizable fraction of the
variation in benefit duration over the event window; the first stage coefficient
is 0.842.32 Our preferred PTT-trimmed second stage estimate is close to zero
32If the only changes in duration in the year before and the year after policy change were
due to the policy change itself, the first stage coefficient would be 1.
107
(-0.069), with a standard error of 0.635. While less precise than the OLS
estimate, these estimates using only national level policy changes in the PTT-
trimmed sample can rule out employment reductions of -1.31 percentage points
from the 73 week expansion of maximum benefit duration during the Great
Recession. The point estimate from the untrimmed BCP sample is similar
(0.143), though less precise with a standard error of 0.964.
To assess the employment dynamics around the national policy changes,
Figure 2.7 shows the first stage and reduced form estimates period by period
around the event date, as compared to the values from the month just prior to
treatment (i.e., -1). The EPOP difference between the two sides of the border
is plotted on the left hand Y-axis, with the difference in maximum benefit
duration plotted using the right hand Y-axis. The top graph uses the baseline
BCP-FE sample while the bottom graph uses the refined PTT-trimmed sam-
ple. The dynamic evidence mirrors the numerical results in Table 2.3. At
date 0, there is (by construction) a clear increase of approximately 10 weeks in
the maximum benefit duration relative to the neighboring county.33 Much of
this increase in benefits persists over the following 12 months. There is little
indication of a differential trend in employment prior to the national level pol-
icy changes, which provides additional validation for the IV coupled with the
border county design. Importantly, employment remains fairly stable over the
12 months following treatment and we see little indication of job loss following
33The increase is not exactly 10 weeks because the policy changes in question did not
occur precisely at the end of a calendar month.
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the national level policy changes. Furthermore, the results are visually similar
both in the baseline BCP-FE and the refined PTT-trimmed sample.34
The pooled estimates combine both the positive treatment in 2008 and the
negative treatment in 2014. We also show the disaggregated effects from each
of these treatments. The 2008 results using the 2007m11 to 2009m10 period
are reported in the third panel of Table 2.3, and we show the corresponding
graphical evidence in Figure 2.8. Again, there is a strong first stage (the
F-statistic for the excluded instrument is over 40), though this first stage is
substantially weaker than the pooled first stage or the 2014 first stage dis-
cussed below. As Figure 2.8 shows, the duration differences created by the
implementation of UCEA in 2008 were somewhat less persistent. The more
limited persistence is also reflected in the first stage coefficient of 0.729, as
shown in Table 2.3. This is unsurprising given the economic turbulence and
resulting triggering that followed the UCEA of November 2008.
In general, the second stage estimates from the 2008 event study are fairly
noisy. The estimate on the baseline BCP sample is 0.549, with a very large
standard error of 2.515. The large standard error is likely because (1) there
was a lot of variability in the drop in EPOP across counties during the early
part of the Great Recession, substantially increasing error variance (reduced
form), and (2) the duration differences created by UCEA were less persistent
34We also estimate the model using a sample trimmed based on trends estimated over
the 2004m11-2007m10 period in order to address any concerns that PTT-trimming is me-
chanically eliminating anticipation effects. The graphical results, presented in Figure 2.8,
are quite similar to the results presented in Figure 2.16 Regression results are presented
in the robustness section, below.
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(first stage). Turning to our preferred PTT-trimmed sample, the coefficient
falls to 0.198, while the standard error also halves to 1.265. While the standard
error remains large, the PTT-trimmed sample is somewhat more precise due
to a smaller residual variance. As shown in Figure 2.8, however, there is
little indication of systematic employment changes—either in the year prior
to the 2008 UCEA implementation, or during the subsequent year. Overall,
while noisy, the estimates from the 2008 event (especially from our preferred,
more precise trimmed sample) are broadly consistent with those from the
pooled estimates and do not indicate substantial losses in employment from
this policy change.
Panel 4 of Table 2.3 reports our IV results from the 2014 elimination of
EUC. The EUC program expired at the end of December 2013, leading to
large reductions in UI generosity in almost every state. Importantly, some
states experienced substantially larger reductions in benefits than others. For
example, benefits were reduced by 47 weeks in Illinois, Nevada, and Rhode
Island, but only by 14 weeks in Virginia, Iowa, New Hampshire, Minnesota
and 10 other states. Figure 2.3 shows a map of the reduction of UI duration
at the end of 2013. As discussed above, North Carolina lost all EUC benefits
and the maximum benefit fell to 20 weeks a full six months before the national
EUC expiration. As a result, we remove North Carolina from our 2014 event
study sample.35 However, in the robustness section below, we show the results
35To be clear, in the pooled estimates reported above, we include North Carolina in the
2007-2009 portion of the sample but exclude it from the 2013-2014 portion.
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from specifications in which North Carolina is included in the sample.
We show our results graphically in Figure 2.9. The figure does not show
much of an effect on EPOP from the program expiration. Of note, the duration
differences between county pairs were much more persistent (looking backward
in time), mostly exceeding 80% of their immediate pre-expiration duration
during the entirety of 2013. This explains why the first stage coefficient is
much closer to unity: 0.915 for the baseline BCP sample and 0.903 for the
PTT-trimmed sample. The first stage F-statistics are very high: 393 for the
baseline sample and 424 for the PTT-trimmed sample. The point estimates
are slightly lower than the pooled sample, at -0.024 and -0.182, respectively.
However, the standard errors are substantially smaller than the 2008 analysis:
0.562 for the baseline BCP sample, and 0.521 for the PTT-trimmed sample.
These estimates suggest a relatively precise null estimate of the effect of UI
extensions on employment.
Although not statistically distinguishable from zero, the point estimates for
the 2008 analysis are somewhat more positive than the 2014 estimates or the
full sample OLS results. If these differences are real, and not merely noise, one
speculative possibility is that the estimates from 2014 are less positive because
they are estimated at a point in time when aggregate demand multipliers are
lower.
Overall, both the OLS and IV estimates suggest that there was no sizable
positive or negative employment effect of the 73 week increase in UI maximum
duration during the Great Recession. This is true when we use all policy
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variation in our OLS specifications, or when we instrument the policy variation
using national level changes. Our dynamic evidence suggests no employment
changes for the first year and a half following the policy innovations. And
when we consider our preferred refined BCP strategy that excludes some of
the more poorly matched pairs, we find no evidence of employment changes
up to 24 months following treatment.
2.5.3 Robustness of estimates
In this subsection, we perform a number of robustness checks. First, we show
how our estimates vary with the sample period used in our estimation, and why
we believe this validates our use of the refined BCP sample that trims on match
quality. In the second subsection, we show how our refined PTT-trimmed
results vary as we alter the trimming threshold. In the third subsection, we
consider our results’ robustness to a wide range of other specification choices
and controls.
Choice of sample period
Table 2.4 shows results from the full sample OLS specification for alterna-
tive samples beginning in 2007m11, 2006m11, 2005m11, and 2004m11. The
first column shows results for the baseline BCP sample and the second col-
umn shows results for the PTT-trimmed sample. Overall, the baseline BCP
estimates range between 0.430 and -0.330, while the PTT-trimmed estimates
range between 0.213 and 0.064. Importantly, while the estimates differ in size,
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we stress that none of the eight estimates shown in Table 2.4 is statistically
significant at conventional levels, and six of the eight are positive in sign.
At the same time, the baseline BCP estimates vary somewhat by sample,
and these estimates decrease monotonically in the length of the window: the
earlier the sample start date, the more negative the estimate. The gap between
the estimate for the sample starting in November 2007 to the sample starting
in November 2004 is non-trivial; it represents a differential impact of roughly
0.75 percentage points of EPOP from a 73-week increase in UI duration. Note
that the pattern in the estimated effect is consistent with the presence of a
downward trend in EPOP in treatment counties relative to control. As we
discussed above, and as shown in Figure 2.4, between 2004 and 2008 we see
a relative decline in EPOP on the side of the border that would eventually
have higher UI duration. By pushing the start date further back in time, we
are only adding data from the pre-treatment period; there is essentially no
variation in UI benefits between 2004 and 2007. Adding observations from a
time period when EPOP was relatively higher on the high-treatment side and
when treatment was low makes the estimated treatment effect more negative.
The fact that the estimated effect varies across the different sample periods
leads us to believe that the baseline specification with pair-period fixed effects
may reflect a degree of residual endogeneity. Put another way, a 2007m11-
2014m12 sample frame – with twelve months before treatment begins and
after treatment ends – ensures that any differential trends between counties
is approximately orthogonal to D, our independent variable of interest. This
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orthogonality implies that differential trends have relatively little effect on our
estimates. By contrast, with a larger amount of time before treatment than
after treatment, these trends are no longer orthogonal toD, potentially leading
to bias.
The variation in estimates is much smaller for the PTT-trimmed estimates:
the 2007-2014 estimate is 0.213 and the 2004-2014 estimate is 0.064. We believe
that this relative robustness to sample date validates the use of this refined
sample (selected based on an absence of pre-treatment trends): even as the
sample window becomes more asymmetric around the “treatment” period, the
estimates do not change substantially, suggesting that differential trends are
much smaller in magnitude in this sample. Additionally, the standard errors
for the PTT-trimmed samples are also uniformly lower by between 16% to
42%, consistent with better match quality in the refined BCP sample.
Trimming on pre-treatment trends
The refined BCP strategy trims the pairs with the worst matches—25% of
the sample with the biggest absolute differences in pre-treatment employment
trends. In Table 2.5, we show how our four main estimates (OLS, 2008 IV,
2014 IV, and Pooled IV) vary as our threshold for trimming on PTT varies.
We show estimates for different trimming thresholds across 7 rows. The rows
are, respectively: no trimming, 10% trimming, 20% trimming, 25% trimming,
30% trimming, 40% trimming, and trimming at the median of the difference in
PTT. The 25% trim is our main PTT specification from Table 2.3. In all four
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columns (i.e., for all 4 specifications), the range in the point estimates across
trimming thresholds is below 1 standard error in magnitude. The coefficient
estimates are fairly robust to changes in the trimming threshold. The standard
error is minimized for the full sample at a 25% trim. It is minimized at a 10%
trim for the pooled IV sample and the 2014 sample. It is minimized at a 30%
trim for the 2008 sample. Thus, our choice of a 25% benchmark trim across
all specification is a reasonable one.
Additionally, for all specifications, the primary impact of trimming seems
to be a reduction in the standard errors by improving the match between
high-treatment and low-treatment counties. It does not seem to systematically
change the magnitude of the estimate in a positive or in a negative direction.
The reduction in the standard errors is often up to 50% from the baseline sam-
ple. The one exception is the 2014 IV estimate where the maximum reduction
across trimming thresholds is approximately 20%.
Other robustness checks
In Table 2.6, we consider a number of other robustness checks for our OLS es-
timates on the full 2007-2014 sample and for our pooled IV.36 We do this both
for the baseline BCP sample as well as the PTT-trimmed sample. The first row
in the table reproduces the estimates from Table 2.3. Each of the remaining
rows varies the specification, data, or sample as follows. We show estimates
of impacts on private employment only. As an additional strategy to miti-
36The corresponding results for the separate 2008 and 2014 IV regressions are shown in
Section 2.8.3.
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gate residual mechanical endogeneity, we drop pairs containing counties that
show a high correlation between county EPOP and the EPOP of its state over
the 2004m11-2008m10 period (“correlation trimming”). Comparison within
these county pairs should be less prone to contamination from state-specific
employment shocks that endogenously determine state-level benefit duration.
We include an (in sample) county specific linear trend (ISLT) control. We
trim based on pre-treatment trends estimated over the 2004m11-2007m10 pe-
riod (instead of 2004m11-2008m10) to address concerns that PTT trimming
could be mechanically removing anticipation effects. Because the lapses (cor-
rectly) might not have been seen as changes because they were expected to be
reversed in a very short period of time, we recode treatment during temporary
lapses at the level of the duration during the last week before the lapses; we
do not recode for the IV estimates because none of the lapses occur during
the relevant sample periods. We also estimate using quarterly as opposed to
monthly data: once using the same QCEW employment data but aggregated
to the quarterly level, and once using quarterly employment statistics from a
different data set, the Quarterly Workforce Indicators (QWI). We show results
using data that have not been seasonally adjusted. To demonstrate that our
controls are well matched to our treatments, we show robustness to restrict-
ing the sample to a plausibly better-matched group of pairs whose population
centroids are less than 100 km apart. We also estimate a specification where
we allow for imbalance in our panel by including counties with missing values
in the sample. In addition, we show a pooled IV specification where we in-
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strument using the total change in benefits rather than the change in benefits
due solely to the expiration of EUC. In this case, the instrument includes the
additional decreases below 26 weeks made by state governments in Florida,
Georgia, Kansas, and South Carolina, as well as an increase from 26 to 30
weeks in Massachusetts. We also show three different specifications where
we alter our baseline treatment of North Carolina, which lost access to EUC
benefits earlier than other states.37 Finally, as a further alternative, we use a
log-log specification instead of the level-on-level specification used throughout
the paper. We do this using both log employment and log EPOP as out-
comes, but also report the EPOP-equivalent estimates in square brackets for
comparability.38
For the OLS specifications in Columns 1 and 2, the range of the estimates
from these changes is not substantial. The coefficients (or EPOP-equivalent
coefficients as is the case when using logged outcomes) range between -0.145
and 0.692. In no case do we see any indication of substantial disemployment
37Recall that North Carolina lost access to EUC at the end of June 2013. This was a
full 6 months before the other states lost access to EUC benefits, which means that North
Carolina gets treated half way through the control period in the 2014 IV analysis. In our
main specifications analyzing the 2014 EUC expiration, therefore, we drop all county pairs
containing a county from North Carolina. We also drop North Carolina from the 2014 part
of the sample in the pooled IV regression. As robustness checks, we drop North Carolina
from the entire baseline BCP-FE full sample estimation as well as from the entire pooled
IV specification. We also include North Carolina in the 2014 portion of the pooled IV
specification. Finally, we retain the inclusion of North Carolina in the 2014 portion of the
pooled IV sample but redefine the instrument, in North Carolina’s case, to reflect the drop
in EUC benefits for North Carolina in July 2013.
38For instance, the estimate of 0.006 in column 1 for log EPOP would imply that the
expansion of UI from 26 to 99 weeks increased EPOP by (( 9926 )
.006−1)×42 = 0.35 percentage
points (since the unweighted mean EPOP in this sample is approximately 42), similar to
the coefficients that we see in the level-on-level specification (0.430). The level equivalents
for the log-log specification are displayed in brackets below the coefficient estimates. The
level-on-level equivalents of the log employment estimates are quite close to the original
estimates.
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effects of the UI extensions. For the IV specifications in Columns 3 and 4,
the estimates range between -0.147 and 0.930 for the baseline BCP sample,
and between -0.406 and 0.659 for the PTT-trimmed sample. The greater
variability for the IV is consistent with the IV estimates being more imprecise,
and the standard errors are two to three times as large as the OLS counterparts.
However in none of these cases are the estimates statistically distinguishable
from zero.
In Table 2.13, we show the robustness checks for the 2008 and 2014 IV
analyses separately. The results are largely similar to our pooled IV results,
though the standard errors are significantly larger for the 2008 IV and often
30-50% smaller for the 2014 IV. The 2008 IV estimates are imprecise because
the initial 2008 triggering explains less of the variation in treatment in the
surrounding 2 year sample period. In addition, they are imprecise because of
the large variation in EPOP during the onset of the Great Recession.
2.5.4 External validity: size and persistence of policy
changes
One potential concern with our border county pair design—or any county
panel design for that matter—is whether the differences in UI benefit duration
between counties across the state border were sizable and persistent, especially
as compared to the national level changes in benefit duration that took place
during the Great Recession. Figure 2.10 shows the distribution of differ-
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ences in maximum benefit duration across county pairs and over time for the
full sample. Here each observation is a county pair in a given week between
November 23, 2008, and December 22, 2013. As the figure shows, around
40% of pair-week observations in this sample have no difference in UI benefit
durations. However, nearly half of the observations have a benefit duration
exceeding 10 weeks. To put this in perspective, a 10 week differential is almost
40% of the typical maximum benefit duration of 26 weeks that prevailed in all
but two states prior to the Great Recession. Therefore, the gaps across state
borders that we are evaluating are economically substantial. In Figure 2.17,
we show that similar sized duration gaps existed between the two sides of the
border just prior to the EUC expiration in 2014.
The gaps in UI benefit duration between neighboring counties across the
border were substantial, but were they also persistent? Figure 2.11 shows
the mean benefit duration gap (as a share of the initial gap) by weeks fol-
lowing a particular event.39 On average, ten weeks after the event, 70% of
the original gap in maximum benefit duration between the two sides of the
border remained in place. Even 52 weeks after the event, on average, more
than 50% of the original gap in duration persisted across the border. Overall,
39In this analysis, all changes in relative benefit differences are treated as “events” or
“shocks.” With the data organized at the pair-by-shock (ps) level, we regress the change in
relative duration on a set of shockps × eventdateτ indicator variables, where shockps is the
size of the initial shock and eventdateτ runs from zero to 51 weeks after the initial shock.
For instance, suppose at time t, county A increased duration from 53 to 63 weeks while
county B held constant at 47 weeks, then shockps would be equal to 10. The dependent
variable in the regression (for τ = 0, 1, ..., 51) would be equal to DA,t+τ −DB,,t+τ − 6, since
the pre-shock difference was 6 weeks. Therefore, the regression coefficients trace out the
share of the original shock that remains after τ weeks.
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the evidence suggests that the benefit durations we are using for identification
are not transitory policy shocks. The duration series in Figures 2.8 and 2.9
show similar information for the specific 2008 and 2014 events.
We additionally show that the high average persistence of the policy shocks
is not driven by a small number of cases but rather policy persistence was
widespread across counties. In panel A of Figure 2.18, we show the share
of counties where the duration gap continuously remained at least as large as
the initial gap by weeks following the the 2008 event. The figure shows that
after approximately 20 weeks, the initial gap remained in place or increased in
about 60% of the county pairs; by 40 weeks, about 15% of the pairs retained
the full gap. Panel B shows evidence for the 2014 expiration. Even 50 weeks
before the EUC expiration, over 40% of counties had gaps in duration at least
as large as the gap at the time of expiration. Thus, the 2014 event study
estimates are based on the expiration of highly persistent differentials across
county pairs.
Overall, while the cross sectional differences in size and persistence of the
UI benefit durations are not as dramatic as the overall national level changes
that occurred during the Great Recession, they are nonetheless quite substan-
tial—especially for the 2014 expiration event. Moreover, the persistence of
the events in our samples are quite a bit greater than those used in some of
the other papers in the literature. For example, the measurement error based
identification used in Chodorow-Reich & Karabarbounis uses treatment events
whose half life is roughly 8 weeks (see their Figure 2). In contrast, as shown in
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our Figure 2.11, the half life of the typical event used for our baseline OLS
estimate exceeds 52 weeks.
2.6 Rationalizing Macro and Micro Effects of
UI Extensions
A higher benefit duration has an unambiguously negative labor supply effect
through increasing reservation wages. In the UI literature, the micro-based
estimates of extensions on employment reflect only these labor supply consid-
erations. In this section we compute and interpret the gap between our macro
estimate and some of the prevalent micro estimates from the literature.
How do the macro effects of UI extensions on employment that we esti-
mate compare with employment change implied by micro-level labor supply
elasticities? In order to answer this question, we first express both our macro
estimates and the micro literature estimates in numbers of jobs. This entails
multiplying our estimates (which are in terms of EPOP) by the 15+ popu-
lation in 2012 (253 million) and the micro-estimates (which are in terms of
unemployment rates) by the 2012 labor force (134 million). The gap between
the macro and the micro estimates of the UI extensions on employment can
be written as:
GAP = ∆EMACRO −∆EMICRO = (βMACRO × P + βMICRO × L)
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where βMICRO is a micro estimate from the empirical literature of the impact
of raising the UI benefit duration from 26 to 99 weeks on the unemployment
rate, L is the size of the labor force (in 2012), βMACRO is an estimate from this
paper, P is the 15+ population in 2012, ∆EMACRO is the predicted change
in national employment from increasing UI benefit duration from 26 to 99
weeks using our estimates, and ∆EMICRO is the predicted change in national
employment from increasing UI benefit duration using micro estimates from
the literature. In Table 2.7 we report computations using 6 estimated micro
responses to the impact of increasing UI duration from 26 to 99 weeks in the
literature. Five of these are from four papers estimated using data from the
Great Recession (Daly et al. (2012); Farber & Valletta (2015); Johnston &
Mas (2016); Rothstein (2011)). Four of these numbers range between 0.1 to
0.8. Johnston & Mas (2016) is much larger in magnitude at 4.6. We also use
one estimate from before the Great Recession which comes from Elsby et al.
(201): 2.4.40 In addition, we use two estimates of βMACRO from Column 2
of Table 2.3 (-0.069 and 0.213, rounded to -0.1 and 0.2 for simplicity). For
each combination of estimates, we calculate the employment gap between the
macro and micro employment estimates.
40As we noted in the introduction, Johnston & Mas (2016) provide a case study of Missouri
where there was a sudden reduction in benefits, and find a much larger micro-level response
than most of the literature. Besides providing labor supply based estimates, they also
provide synthetic control and difference-in-difference estimates for aggregate employment
effects from the benefit reduction. These macro estimates are similarly sized as their micro
estimates, and are much larger than the macro effects that we find in this paper. Therefore,
the size of the estimates from Johnston & Mas (2016) seem less about the micro versus
macro effects than about the Missouri case study. Nonetheless, here we include the implied
βMICRO estimates from Johnston et al. study since those are specifically based on the labor
supply response to the policy change.
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Our macro estimates imply a range of employment change between -0.3
million and 0.5 million. In contrast, the range implied by the micro elasticities
is -6.2 million and -0.1 million; excluding the Johnston and Mas estimate, the
range is -3.2 million to -0.1 million. For 11 out of the 12 combinations of
estimates, the predicted macro employment change is more positive than the
predicted micro change, sometimes sizably so.41
One explanation for a more positive macro than micro effect is the Key-
nesian aggregate demand channel. UI puts cash in the hands of unemployed
individuals whose earnings in the absence of UI payments are likely to be well
below their permanent incomes. These individuals are likely to be liquidity
constrained and thus a dollar of UI expenditures is highly likely to be con-
sumed. Empirical work has shown that the marginal propensity to consume
out of one-time tax rebates during the Great Recession was 25% (Sahm et
al. (2012)). Though lower income individuals responded more, the differences
were not large. However, economic theory suggests that liquidity constrained
unemployed individuals should have a substantially larger response to cash
receipts than other groups. If UI recipients spend most of their money on
consumption, this can impact aggregate demand. The total impact will de-
pend upon the fiscal multiplier, over which there is substantial disagreement
among macroeconomists. For example, when analyzing the likely impact of
the ARRA, the CBO estimated an output multiplier for UI benefits rang-
41The exception is when we take the lower bound of the βMICRO estimate (0.1) and the
lower bound of the βMACRO estimate (-0.1).
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ing between 0.4 and 2.1—with the larger estimate being more relevant when
monetary policy is at the zero lower bound.
How large a fiscal multiplier is needed to rationalize the gap between the
micro and macro effects of the UI extensions? For this back-of-the-envelope
exercise, we assume that the gap between the micro and macro estimates,
∆EMACRO −∆EMICRO, arises solely due to aggregate demand effects. Since
the multiplier is the ratio of total dollars created to total dollars spent, we first
convert the employment effect of increasing UI from 26 to 99 weeks into an
impact on overall income, and then divide by UI expenditures. Our estimate of
the change in total income is the product of the employment change (rescaling





.42, National EB and EUC transfer payments between Novem-
ber 2008 and December 2013 averaged $49.3 billion annually, and during this
time period the average number of weeks of UI available was 74.4. In order to
obtain an estimate of UI expenditures corresponding to an increase from 26 to
99 weeks, we scale the actual expenditure by 99−2674.4−26 (∆B = $49.3×10
9× 7348.4).
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42GDP per worker data from 2012 is from the World Bank: http://data.worldbank.
org/indicator/SL.GDP.PCAP.EM.KD?locations=US. Note that this implicitly assumes
that jobs created from the fiscal stimulus have mean productivity. Chodorow-Reich (2017)
provides evidence supporting the validity of this approximation. Assuming that capital
is fixed, but hours and employment adjust, he derives the following relationship between
change in output and change in (headcount) employment: ∆Y ≈ θ × (1 + χ) × YE × ∆E,
where θ is labor’s share, while χ is the elasticity of hours with respect to (headcount) em-
ployment. Given his estimates of χ = 0.5 and θ = 0.7, the constant-capital and hours
adjustment channels cancel each other out, implying ∆Y ≈ YE × ∆E. He also validates
the rough approximation using multipliers estimated from ARRA stimulus on state level
employment and output. Similarly, Nakamura & Steinsson (2014) report both output and
employment multipliers using defense spending shocks, and the magnitudes of both are are
consistent with this approximation.
43We obtain the data for payments made through the EB and EUC programs from http:
//oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/euc.asp.
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Dividing the estimated change in total income by the estimated UI expenditure
gives our estimate of the fiscal multiplier, mf .










= 3.7× βMACRO + 1.9× βMICRO
In Table 2.7, we find that the implied fiscal multipliers using the first
four micro estimates range between -0.2 and 2.3, centered around 1. However,
when we use pre-Great Recession micro estimates, our implied multipliers are
substantially larger, and range between 4.2 and 5.3. Finally, if we use the
micro estimates from Johnston & Mas (2016), our implied fiscal multipliers
are extremely large, exceeding 8. Since our macro effects are small, modest
micro effects suggest a modest multiplier. However, large negative micro effects
require a counterbalancing large fiscal multiplier to rationalize the small macro
effect.
A caveat about our estimates is that our employment effects are estimated
locally, and may differ from national multipliers for a number of reasons. First,
a substantial fraction of the increased spending from UI extension is likely on
tradable goods, much of which is produced outside of the local area. We are
not capturing these demand leakages in our local analysis. Since a US county
is substantially more open than the US as a whole, our local multiplier esti-
mates are, ceteris paribus, likely to be smaller (and possibly substantially so)
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than national multipliers. Second, the multipliers estimated here are “transfer
multipliers” as they are financed by transfers to the state from other states as
opposed to through taxes or borrowing (Farhi & Werning (2016)). Therefore,
the transfer multiplier may reflect a wealth effect which would not be present
at the national level when the spending is deficit-financed, making the local
multiplier larger than the national multiplier. Nonetheless, Farhi & Wern-
ing (2016) and Chodorow-Reich (2017) point out that as an empirical matter,
externally funded transfer multipliers may provide a rough lower bound for
the national, deficit-financed multipliers during liquidity traps. This is espe-
cially true when the transfer is not highly persistent, which was indeed the
case for UI extensions. Overall, our estimates imply that a moderately sized,
positive multiplier can rationalize the difference between the macro and the
micro effects of UI, suggesting that the optimal benefit duration is likely to be
countercyclical. This implication is consistent with the arguments in Landais
et al. (2015) and Kroft & Notowidigdo (2016).
There are two other potential explanations for the gap between the micro
and macro effects that come from recent work in search theory. The standard
Pissarides (2000) search and matching model predicts that a higher benefit
duration raises the negotiated wage, thereby reducing vacancies and employ-
ment through the job-creation effect (HKMM). However, if jobs are rationed,
then a decrease in labor supply by some unemployed individuals from a more
generous UI policy will tend to increase the job-finding probability of other
unemployed workers, which can increase labor market tightness through the
126
rat race effect (e.g., Mhciallat (2012), Landais et al. (2015)). From the search-
and-matching perspective, the net effect on employment will be a combination
of the direct labor supply effect, the job creation effect, and the rat race effect.
The positive macro effect, ∆EMACRO, cannot be explained by the labor supply
(which is negative), the job creation (which is negative) and rat race effects
alone (which is positive but merely attenuates the negativity of the former
two effects). As a result, it is indicative of at least some positive stimulative
effect that may offset the negative effects from job creation and labor supply
effects. However, the imprecision of the gap between the micro and the macro
estimates suggests caution against interpreting this evidence too strongly.44
Better distinguishing the search and aggregate demand channels remains an
important area for future research.
2.7 Conclusion
Despite a large literature that has evaluated the labor supply effects of unem-
ployment insurance, the overall impact of the policy on aggregate employment
is a relatively new and understudied area of research. Yet, this is an important
question from a public policy perspective. If there are sizable negative effects
of UI employment via labor supply, but these are counteracted by positive
aggregate demand effects, the overall employment effects can be more positive
44Many of our implied employment effects are not statistically distinguishable at a 95%
level of confidence from the micro effects. However, for our PTT-Trimmed full sample
specification, the 90% confidence interval does not contain the employment impacts implied
by Rothstein’s upper bound or any of the more negative micro estimates in Table 2.7.
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than what is implied by the labor supply estimates—making the policy more
effective. Conversely, if the labor supply effects are small, but higher reser-
vation wages fuels lower hiring and hence a higher unemployment rate, the
policy can be less attractive than may initially appear.
In this paper, we add to the small but growing literature on the impact of
UI on overall employment. We utilize variation across counties which straddle
state borders where the states differ in their UI duration during the Great
Recession. We find that this strategy substantially reduces likely bias from
endogeneity that would plague a two-way fixed effects model assuming parallel
trends across counties (or states) receiving differential treatment. To account
for remaining endogeneity, we utilize a variety of strategies including refining
our sample and focusing on variation driven by the national policy changes
created by the introduction of differential EUC in 2008 as well as the expiration
of the EUC program at the end of 2013.
Whether we use all policy variations, or whether we use variation induced
solely by national level policy changes, most of our estimates are quite small in
magnitude. Our OLS results using a refined border county pair design suggest
the employment to population ratio rose by a statistically insignificant 0.21
due to the 73 week increase in benefits. The IV results that use the national
policy variation from 2008 expansion and 2014 expiration of EUC suggests
the EPOP ratio changed by -0.07. While the 95% confidence intervals for
the OLS estimate rules out change in EPOP more negative than -0.32, the
confidence bounds for the IV rule out changes more negative than -1.31. Across
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a variety of specifications and samples, our preferred point estimates suggest
that the extension of unemployment insurance duration from 26 to 99 weeks
during the Great Recession led to a change in EPOP between -0.18 and 0.43
percentage points. Finally, our dynamic specifications do not indicate any
policy anticipation effects.
Overall, our findings are similar to recent estimates by Chodorow-Reich &
Karabarbounis (2016) and Coglianese (2015), who use policy variation that is
quite different from what we use in this paper. At the same time, our estimates
and conclusions are quite different from those reached by HMM and HKMM,
even though they also use a border county pair based strategy. As we show
in our Section 2.8.1, the differences are in large part due to their use of
(model-based) LAUS data, as well as auxiliary parametric assumptions used
by authors of the two papers which we do not find to be warranted by the
data.
The small macro employment effects of UI found in this paper are consis-
tent with small negative effects on labor supply typically (though not always)
found in the existing literature, together with moderately sized, positive ef-
fect on aggregate demand in the local economy. Future research should better
disaggregate the macro effect into its constituent components: labor supply,
demand multiplier, rat race and job creation effects. Nonetheless, our results
suggest that the overall employment impact of the sizable UI extensions during
the Great Recession was likely modest. At worst they led to a small reduction




Table 2.1: Pre-existing employment trends prior to November 2008 UI benefit
expansion
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All counties Border counties Border counties PTT-trimmed
Treatment X Date -0.780∗∗∗ -0.976∗∗∗ -0.241 -0.110
(0.244) (0.206) (0.286) (0.110)
Observations 148896 111456 111456 83520
County fixed effects X X X X
Pair-period fixed effects X X
Notes: In columns 1 and 2, each cell reports the coefficient on treatc × t from a regression
of the following form: Ect = α × treatc × t + λc + θt + εct. In columns 3 and 4, each
cell reports the coefficient on treatc × t from a regression of the following form: Ecpt =
α × treatc × t + λc + νpt + εcpt. In all columns, the dependent variable is the seasonally-
adjusted ratio of total employment to population age 15+, scaled in percentage points. The
regression is estimated over the period 2004m11-2008m10 and t is the date divided by 48
(representing the 48 month period between the beginning and the end of this sample). The
time-invariant variable treatc is the average treatment intensity for each county, defined as
the average duration over the 2008m11-2013m12 period, minus average duration from the 12
months prior (2007m11-2008m10), divided by 10. In column 1, standard errors are clustered
at the state level. In columns 2, 3, and 4, standard errors are clustered two-way at the state
and state-pair level. Columns 4 report the estimates from the set of border county pairs
in the PTT-trimmed sample. PTT-trimming removes the quartile of county pairs with the
highest differential in linear trends between November 2004 and October 2008. * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics: High-treatment versus low-treatment counties in border county pair sample
Baseline PTT-Trimmed
High: Mean Sd Low: Mean Sd p-val High: Mean Sd Low: Mean Sd p-val
EPOP (A) 44.227 17.113 44.741 15.269 0.679 42.983 14.641 44.075 13.721 0.285
Private EPOP (A) 34.773 16.168 35.132 14.567 0.762 33.723 13.652 34.804 13.342 0.243
LAUS unemp. rate (A) 5.127 1.674 4.864 1.843 0.135 5.241 1.585 4.916 1.794 0.023
Population age 15+ (A) 79,283 207,157 69,625 148,849 0.214 91,211 231,886 78,193 153,538 0.088
Share white (B) 0.811 0.182 0.811 0.177 0.998 0.815 0.180 0.818 0.176 0.838
Share black (B) 0.085 0.145 0.086 0.147 0.966 0.087 0.146 0.085 0.144 0.862
Share hispanic (B) 0.067 0.111 0.059 0.092 0.491 0.061 0.102 0.054 0.087 0.455
Share H.S. grad (B) 0.569 0.064 0.567 0.065 0.724 0.568 0.063 0.566 0.066 0.726
Share college (B) 0.179 0.078 0.189 0.086 0.010 0.182 0.080 0.193 0.088 0.000
Median h.h. income (B) 42,645 11,459 43,535 12,127 0.198 42,997 11,881 44,145 12,728 0.073
New mortgage debt p.c. (A) 3.456 3.226 3.674 3.039 0.423 3.556 2.961 3.836 3.090 0.251
Share in cities 50k+ (C) 0.190 0.331 0.196 0.331 0.759 0.203 0.338 0.222 0.348 0.267
Min. weeks of UI elig. 24.470 3.495 24.631 3.199 0.718 24.478 3.495 24.720 3.092 0.609
Max. weeks of UI elig. 96.105 6.674 86.996 13.320 0.000 96.452 6.212 87.755 12.787 0.000
Pairs w/ different avg treatment 1131 1131 849 849
Pairs w/ identical avg treatment 30 30 21 21
Notes: The first four columns report summary statistics in border counties in the estimation sample, separately for “high” and
“low” treatment counties. A county’s assignment to the “high” or “low” group is defined by its average treatment intensity relative
to its counterpart within each pair. Average treatment intensity (treatc) is a time-invariant, continuous measure defined as the
average duration over the 2008m11-2013m12 period, minus average duration over the 2007m11-2008m10 and 2014m1-2014m12
periods. The 30 (baseline) or 20 (PTT-trimmed) border county pairs with identical treatment are dropped in this table. The
fifth column reports the p-values from a test that the means for high counties and low counties are equal, robust to clustering
two-way at the state and state-pair level. Columns 6-10 report analogous statistics for the subsample of border county pairs in the
PTT-trimmed sample. PTT-trimming removes the quartile of county pairs with the highest differential in linear trends between
November 2004 and October 2008. If a border county appears in j county-pairs, then it appears j times for the purpose of creating
the estimates in this table. (A) is from 2007 data, (B) is from the 2005-2009 ACS, and (C) is from the 2010 Census. High school
graduates are those who have attained a high school degree but not a bachelor’s degree. College graduates are those who have
attained a bachelor’s degree.
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OLS Estimate 0.430 0.213
(0.466) (0.270)
County pairs 1161 870
Observations 199692 149640
Pooled sample (IV)
IV estimate 0.143 -0.069
(0.964) (0.635)
First stage coef. 0.847*** 0.842***
(0.052) (0.051)
F stat. [262.2] [262.3]
County pairs 1161 870
Observations 108000 81120
2008 sample (IV)
IV estimate 0.549 0.198
(2.515) (1.265)
First stage coef. 0.717*** 0.726***
(0.110) (0.113)
F stat. [41.3] [40.3]
County pairs 1161 870
Observations 55728 41760
2014 sample (IV)
IV estimate -0.024 -0.182
(0.562) (0.521)
First stage coef. 0.915*** 0.903***
(0.046) (0.043)
F stat. [392.6] [423.8]
County pairs 1089 820
Observations 52272 39360
Notes: Each panel reports two coefficients on Dct from a regression of the form Ecpt = βDct+λc+νpt+ηcpt.
Ecpt is the seasonally-adjusted ratio of total employment to population age 15+, scaled in percentage points
and Dct is the potential weeks of UI benefits divided by 73. The second column restricts the sample to
the PTT sample. PTT-trimming removes the quartile of county pairs with the highest differential in linear
trends between November 2004 and October 2008. Regressions in the first panel use OLS estimated over
the 2007m11-2014m12 period. Regressions in the remainder of the table are estimated on subsamples using
instrumental variables. The instrument zct is defined as follows. From 2007m11-2008m10, zct is equal to
the duration available immediately prior to the implementation of UCEA; from 2008m11-2009m10, zct is
equal to the duration available immediately after the implementation of UCEA. From 2013m1-2013m12, zct
is equal to the duration available immediately prior to the expiration of EUC; from 2014m1-2014m12, zct is
equal to the duration available immediately after EUC expiration, before any changes in regular benefits took
effect. Estimates in the second panel pool the 2007m11-2009m10 and 2013m1-2014m12 samples and replace
county fixed effects with county-by-subsample fixed effects. Estimates in the third panel use data from
2007m11-2009m10; estimates in the fourth panel use data from 2013m1-2014m12. In the IV specifications,
first stage coefficients and standard errors are also reported. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and
first stage F-statistics in square brackets. Standard errors are clustered two-way at the state and state-pair
level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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N = 199692 N = 149640
2006m11-2014m12 0.142 0.175
(0.451) (0.322)
N = 227556 N = 170520
2005m11-2014m12 -0.088 0.138
(0.440) (0.356)
N = 255420 N = 191400
2004m11-2014m12 -0.330 0.064
(0.452) (0.378)
N = 283284 N = 212280
County pairs 1161 870
Notes: Each cell reports the coefficient on Dct from a regression of the form Ecpt = βDct +
λc + νpt + ηcpt. Ecpt is the seasonally-adjusted ratio of total employment to population age
15+, scaled in percentage points and Dct is the potential weeks of UI benefits divided by
73. The second column restricts the sample to the PTT sample. PTT-trimming removes
the quartile of county pairs with the highest differential in linear trends between November
2004 and October 2008. The regression in each row is estimated over the sample-period
indicated. The estimates in row 1 correspond to the estimates in the top panel of Table 2.3.
Standard errors are clustered two-way at the state and state-pair level. * p < 0.10, ** p <
0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.5: Robustness of the effects of UI benefit duration on EPOP: choice of cutoffs for trimming on match quality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Pooled 2008 2014
Baseline 0.430 0.143 0.549 -0.024
(0.466) (0.964) (2.515) (0.562)
N = 199692 N = 108000 N = 55728 N = 52272
10th percentile 0.161 0.199 0.558 0.049
(0.304) (0.599) (1.274) (0.456)
N = 179568 N = 97152 N = 50112 N = 47040
20th percentile 0.170 0.042 0.314 -0.074
(0.276) (0.612) (1.241) (0.507)
N = 159616 N = 86544 N = 44544 N = 42000
25th percentile 0.213 -0.069 0.198 -0.182
(0.270) (0.635) (1.265) (0.521)
N = 149640 N = 81120 N = 41760 N = 39360
30th percentile 0.221 -0.109 0.184 -0.232
(0.272) (0.629) (1.216) (0.549)
N = 139664 N = 75648 N = 38976 N = 36672
40th percentile 0.329 0.085 0.929 -0.257
(0.286) (0.660) (1.305) (0.558)
N = 119712 N = 64800 N = 33408 N = 31392
50th percentile 0.340 0.048 1.007 -0.328
(0.302) (0.719) (1.435) (0.601)
N = 99760 N = 53952 N = 27840 N = 26112
Notes: Each cell reports the baseline coefficient from the full sample, pooled event sample, and 2008 and 2014 subsamples, estimated over a different
subsample of border county pairs. The cells in row 1 correspond to the estimates in column 1 of Table 2.3. In the other rows, the sample of border
county pairs (BCPs) is trimmed based on the magnitude of differences in pre-existing trends estimates from 2004m11-2008m10. We rank and then
trim all BCPs according to the magnitude of differences in pre-treatment trends (PTT). In the second row, we drop the bottom 10 percent of BCPs
with the largest differences in pre-existing trends, in the third row, we drop the bottom 20 percent, and so forth. The fourth row (the 25th percentile)
corresponds to the estimates in column 2 of Table 2.3. Standard errors are clustered two-way at the state and state-pair level. * p < 0.10, ** p <
0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.6: Additional robustness checks on the effects of UI benefit duration
on EPOP
Full sample OLS Pooled sample IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BCP-FE PTT-Trimmed BCP-FE PTT-Trimmed
1. Baseline -0.709 -0.913 -2.308 -3.093
(0.645) (0.780) (1.813) (2.256)
2. Private EPOP -0.549 -0.754 -2.271 -3.117
(0.601) (0.769) (1.951) (2.481)
3. Correlation-trimmed -0.931 -0.944 -3.631∗∗ -4.602∗∗∗
(0.771) (0.903) (1.500) (1.682)
4. ISLT 0.027 -0.451 -1.857∗ -1.537
(0.603) (0.727) (1.088) (1.281)
5. PTT through 2007m10 -0.512 -2.327
(0.790) (2.309)
6. Eliminate lapse -0.578 -0.872
(0.670) (0.808)
7. Quarterly data -0.757 -0.984 -2.367 -3.285
(0.702) (0.849) (1.756) (2.196)
8. QWI EPOP (quarterly) -0.771 -1.415∗ -2.456 -4.123∗
(0.652) (0.779) (1.733) (2.121)
9. Not seasonally adjusted -0.582 -0.761
(0.638) (0.775)
10. Distance trimming -0.769 -1.043 -2.048 -3.341
(0.690) (0.805) (1.903) (2.381)
11. Unbalanced panel -0.709 -0.913 -2.308 -3.093
(0.645) (0.780) (1.813) (2.256)
12. Hinterland pairs 1.787∗ 0.701 -0.949 0.475
(0.943) (0.660) (1.726) (1.344)
13. Exploit ∆ reg. benefits -2.391 -3.217
(1.781) (2.205)
14. Drop NC -0.699 -0.982 -2.308 -3.093
(0.721) (0.833) (1.813) (2.256)
15. Keep NC -3.073 -4.445*
(2.003) (2.700)
16. NC: Alt. instrument -1.441 -2.529
(1.327) (1.828)
17. ln(EPOP ) -0.036∗∗ -0.035∗ -0.034 -0.047
(0.016) (0.021) (0.038) (0.048)
[-1.847**] [-1.832*] [-1.810] [-2.434]
18. ln(emp) -0.052∗∗ -0.057∗∗ -0.026 -0.042
(0.020) (0.027) (0.042) (0.054)
[-2.684**] [-2.921**] [-1.383] [-2.202]
Notes: Each cell reports regressions analogous to those reported in Table 2.3 for the full sample with OLS or
the pooled event samples (IV). The estimates in the 1st row correspond to the estimates in the top two panels
of Table 2.3. The estimates in the 2nd row replace (total) EPOP with the ratio of private employment to
population age 15+. In the 3rd row, we trim the set of border county pairs based on the level of correlation
between county EPOP and state EPOP over the period 2004m11-2008m10 (see text for details). The 4th
row controls for county-specific linear trends. The 5th row trims based on PTT estimated through 2007m10
instead of 2008m10. The 6th row recodes the periods in 2010 when EUC lapsed by assigning EUC values
during these lapses as equal to their prior value. The 7th row uses quarterly data instead of monthly (and
estimates over the 2007q4-2014q4 period). The 8th row uses EPOP derived from the QWI (at the quarterly
level) instead of the QCEW. The 9th row uses seasonally-unadjusted data. The 10th row drops county-pairs
whose population centroids are greater than 100km apart. The 11th row includes counties without full EPOP
data for each month, which we drop by default. The 12th row uses a modified version of the instrument
zct which exploits all changes in benefits, including changes in regular benefits, which occur at the end of
December 2013. Rows 13-15 report estimates using alternative strategies for dealing with North Carolina
(NC); by default, border county pairs (BCPs) with one neighbor in NC are kept in the full sample OLS and
the 2008 subsample and dropped in the 2014 subsample. The 13th row completely drops all NC BCPs. The
14th row keeps all North Carolina BCPs. The 15th row keeps NC BCPs but redefines the instrument for
NC counties (see text for details). The 16th and 17th row use ln(EPOP ) and ln(employment), respectively,
as dependent variables. The bracketed estimates in these two rows are the level-on-level equivalent, equal
to ( 9926
β̂ − 1)Ē, where Ē is the mean EPOP level in the given sample. Cells which are not applicable in
the given sample, or which provide estimates that are mechanically equal to the baseline estimates, are left
blank. Standard errors are clustered two-way at the state and state-pair level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01.
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Table 2.7: Rationalizing micro and macro employment effects of UI: demand
side effects and implied fiscal multipliers
βMICRO βMACRO ∆EMICRO ∆EMACRO mf
Rothstein (2011), lower bound 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.2
0.1 0.2 -0.1 0.5 0.9
Farber and Valletta (2015) 0.4 -0.1 -0.5 -0.3 0.4
0.4 0.2 -0.5 0.5 1.5
Rothstein (2011), upper bound 0.5 -0.1 -0.7 -0.3 0.6
0.5 0.2 -0.7 0.5 1.7
Daly et al. (2012) 0.8 -0.1 -1.1 -0.3 1.2
0.8 0.2 -1.1 0.5 2.3
Elsby et al. (2010), upper bound 2.4 -0.1 -3.2 -0.3 4.2
2.4 0.2 -3.2 0.5 5.3
Johnston and Mas (2016) 4.6 -0.1 -6.2 -0.3 8.4
4.6 0.2 -6.2 0.5 9.5
Notes: The table displays estimates of implied fiscal multipliers, using a range of micro
estimates from other studies (Column 1) and two macro estimates from this paper (Column
2). βMICRO is an estimate of the change in the unemployment rate resulting from only
the micro-level effect of a 73-week increase in maximum UI duration, while βMACRO is
a direct estimate of the aggregate change in EPOP. Columns (3) and (4) represent the
resulting impact on employment (in millions of workers), and are calculated as ∆EMICRO =
βMICRO × L and ∆EMACRO = βMACRO × P , where P is the population and L is the
labor force, expressed in millions. mf is the implied fiscal multiplier, computed under
the assumption that the entirety of the gap between the macro and micro employment








E is output per worker in 2012, and ∆B is annual
EB and EUC expenditure, averaged over the period from November 2008 through December
2013 and scaled to correspond to a 73-week increase in duration.
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2004m1 2006m1 2008m1 2010m1 2012m1 2014m1 2016m1
Date
EPOP Weeks of UI
Notes: EPOP is the seasonally-adjusted ratio of employment (from the QCEW) to popula-
tion age 15+. Weeks of UI represents the maximum number of weeks of UI compensation
available. In this figure, both EPOP and weeks of benefits are calculated via an unweighted
average of counties.
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Figure 2.2: Difference in UI benefit duration between high-treatment and low-



















2007m7 2009m7 2011m7 2013m7 2015m7
Date
Notes: For each county pair, we compute the difference between maximum duration in the
high-duration county and in the low-duration county. We plot the average difference across
all county pairs. “High” and “low” status is determined by comparing the difference between
average duration from 2008m11-2013m12 and average duration from 2007m11-2008m10 and
2014m1-2014m12. The counties in the 30 pairs where this difference is identical are assigned
arbitrarily to the “high” and “low” sets.
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Figure 2.3: Reduction in UI benefit duration from the December 2013 expiration of EUC
30 weeks or more
20−29 weeks
19 weeks or less
Non−border
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Figure 2.4: Evolution of EPOP and UI benefit duration differentials by average






























2004m1 2006m1 2008m1 2010m1 2012m1 2014m1
Date
EPOP difference Duration difference
Notes: This figure plots (solid line, left axis) the set of βs coefficients from the following
regression: Ecpt =
∑τB
s=τA βstreatc1{t = s}+λc + νpt + εcpt. Ecpt is the seasonally-adjusted
ratio of total employment to population age 15+, scaled in percentage points. The average
treatment intensity, treatc, is a time-invariant, continuous measure defined as the average
duration during the treatment period (2008m11-2013m12), minus average duration from
the 12 months prior (2007m11-2008m10), divided by 10. The shaded region corresponds to
the 95% confidence interval, robust to two-way clustering at the state and state-pair level.
The dotted line (right axis) reflects the analogous coefficients with Dct as the dependent
variable, where Dct is weeks of benefits. The month 2008m10, the last month prior to the
first introduction of differential EUC, is marked with a dotted vertical line. The sample
includes 1,161 county pairs.
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Figure 2.5: Evolution of EPOP and UI benefit duration differentials by average






























2004m1 2006m1 2008m1 2010m1 2012m1 2014m1
Date
EPOP difference Duration difference
Notes: This figure plots (solid line, left axis) the set of βs coefficients from the follow-
ing regression estimated over the set of border county pairs in the PTT-trimmed sample:
Ecpt =
∑τB
s=τA βstreatc1{t = s} + λc + νpt + εcpt. Ecpt is the seasonally-adjusted ratio
of total employment to population age 15+, scaled in percentage points. The average
treatment intensity, treatc, is a time-invariant, continuous measure defined as the average
duration during the treatment period (2008m11-2013m12), minus average duration from
the 12 months prior (2007m11-2008m10), divided by 10. The shaded region corresponds to
the 95% confidence interval, robust to two-way clustering at the state and state-pair level.
The dotted line (right axis) reflects the analogous coefficients with Dct as the dependent
variable, where Dct is weeks of benefits. The month 2008m10, the last month prior to the
first introduction of differential EUC, is marked with a dotted vertical line. PTT-trimming
removes the quartile of county pairs with the highest differential in linear trends between
November 2004 and October 2008. The sample includes 870 county pairs.
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−10 0 10 20
Lag/lead length (months)
PTT−trim
Notes: This figure reports the monthly cumulative response of EPOP from a 73 week increase
in maximum UI benefit duration, centered around event date -1 whose cumulative response
is defined as zero. The model is estimated on the full sample (2007m11-2014m12), using all
border county pairs (BCPs) (hollow circles) and the subset of BCPs in the PTT-trimmed
sample (hollow squares), where all independent variables are divided by 73. The dependent
variable is the first-differenced seasonally adjusted ratio of total employment to population
age 15+, scaled in percentage points. The regression includes 24 lags and 11 leads in first-
differenced benefit duration, and is estimated using EPOP data from 2007m11-2014m12
(and thus duration data from 2005m11-2015m11). Lags are to the right of zero; leads are
to the left of zero. The zeroth cumulative response is equal to the estimated coefficient
on contemporaneous benefit duration. The jth cumulative lag is equal to the estimated
coefficient on contemporaneous duration plus the sum of the estimated coefficient on the 1st
through jth lag term. The jth cumulative lead is equal to -1 times the sum of the estimated
coefficients on the first through the j − 1th lead terms. The shaded region corresponds to
the 95% confidence interval, robust to two-way clustering at the state and state-pair level.
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Figure 2.7: Evolution of EPOP difference and UI benefit duration difference




































































−12 −8 −4 0 4 8 12
Event date (months)
PTT−trimmed
Notes: This figure reports the monthly cumulative response of EPOP (left axis, hollow
circles) from the pooled 2008 and 2014 samples, centered around event date -1 whose cumu-
lative response is defined as zero. The dependent variable is the first-differenced seasonally
adjusted ratio of total employment to population age 15+, scaled in percentage points. The
regression includes 11 lags and 12 leads in first-differenced benefit duration: for the 2008
sample, the duration variable is equal to the increase in weeks of UI duration immediately
upon the implementation of UCEA, divided by 10; for the 2014 sample, the duration variable
is defined as -1 times the weeks of UI duration lost as a result of EUC expiration, divided by
10. The dashed line (right axis) reports the monthly cumulative response of benefit duration
around the event; the regression is identical to the EPOP specification except that the de-
pendent variable is the first-differenced benefit duration in weeks. The upper panel reports
the results from the baseline BCP-FE sample consisting of all border county pairs; the lower
panel reports results using the PTT-trimmed sample, which drops the quartile of county
pairs with the highest differential in pre-treatment linear trends between November 2004
and October 2008. Event date zero is marked with a dotted vertical line; this corresponds
to November 2008 for the 2008 sample and January 2014 for the 2014 sample.
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Figure 2.8: Evolution of EPOP difference and UI benefit duration difference




































































−12 −8 −4 0 4 8 12
Event date (months)
PTT−trimmed
Notes: This figure reports the monthly cumulative response of EPOP (left axis, hollow
circles) from the November 2008 EUC expansion, centered around event date -1 whose
cumulative response is defined as zero. The dependent variable is the first-differenced sea-
sonally adjusted ratio of total employment to population age 15+, scaled in percentage
points. The regression includes 11 lags and 12 leads in first-differenced benefit duration,
where this duration variable is equal to the increase in weeks of UI duration immediately
upon the implementation of UCEA, divided by 10. The dashed line (right axis) reports the
monthly cumulative response of benefit duration around the event; the regression is iden-
tical to the EPOP specification except that the dependent variable is the first-differenced
benefit duration in weeks. The upper panel reports the results from the baseline BCP-FE
sample consisting of all border county pairs; the lower panel reports results using the PTT-
trimmed sample, which drops the quartile of county pairs with the highest differential in
pre-treatment linear trends between November 2004 and October 2008. Event date zero is
marked with a dotted vertical line, and corresponds to November 2008.
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Figure 2.9: Evolution of EPOP difference and UI benefit duration difference












































































−12 −8 −4 0 4 8 12
Event date (months)
PTT−trimmed
Notes: This figure reports the monthly cumulative response of EPOP (left axis, hollow
circles) from the EUC expiration at the end of 2013, centered around event date -1 whose
cumulative response is defined as zero. The dependent variable is the first-differenced sea-
sonally adjusted ratio of total employment to population age 15+, scaled in percentage
points. The regression includes 11 lags and 12 leads in first-differenced benefit duration,
where this duration variable is defined as change in weeks available as an immediate result
of EUC expiration, divided by 10. The dashed line (right axis) reports the monthly cumula-
tive response of benefit duration around the event; the regression is identical to the EPOP
specification except that the dependent variable is the first-differenced benefit duration in
weeks. The upper panel reports the results from the baseline BCP-FE sample consisting
of all border county pairs; the lower panel reports results using the PTT-trimmed sample,
which drops the quartile of county pairs with the highest differential in pre-treatment linear
trends between November 2004 and October 2008. Event date zero is marked with a dotted
vertical line, and corresponds to January 2014.
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Differential duration
Notes: This figure plots the distribution of duration differences across border county pairs,
with each observation at the pair-by-(calendar)-week level. The sample is restricted to weeks
between November 23, 2008, and December 22, 2013.
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0 10 20 30 40 50
Weeks after event
Notes: This figure plots the persistence of all changes in relative duration in the full sample.
In particular, the data is organized at the pair (p), event (s), event-week (τ) level, where
an event is any change in the duration difference across a county pair. The dependent
variable ypsτ is the difference in duration across the county pair, minus that same difference
immediately prior to the event. This dependent variable is regressed on the size of the initial
event interacted with 52 dummies for the 52 event-weeks τ immediately following the event.
This figure plots those coefficients. See text for details.
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2.8 Appendix
2.8.1 Comparison with HKMM and HMM
The results in this paper are quite different than the results in Hagedorn, Kara-
han, Manovskii, & Mitman (2016) (which studies the effect of UI from 2005
to 2012) and the results in Hagedorn, Manovskii, & Mitman (2016) (which
studies the effect of EUC expiration at the end of 2013). Similar to this paper,
both HKMM and HMM use border county pairs for their estimation. However,
there are differences in data, in econometric specification, and in sample defi-
nitions between our paper and these two studies. Some differences are minor,
while others are quite important. In this section, we offer a reconciliation of
these sets of results, and assess which of the differences in sample definition,
data and specifications drive the differences in the estimates and conclusions
reached by our respective papers.
In this section, we compare our OLS estimates from the baseline BCP
sample to the baseline estimates of HKMM. The HKMM estimation equation
is as follows, where data for a given pair p at time t has already been spatially
differenced (after taking logs):
ln(upt)− β(1− st) ln(upt+1) = α ∗ ln(Dpt) + λ′pFt + εpt (2.10)
Here, upt is the unemployment rate from LAUS,45 β is the discount factor
(equal to 0.99), st is the separation rate, Dpt is the same measure of maxi-
mum benefit lengths that we use, and λ′pFt are interactive effects. Thus, the
dependent variable is a quasi-forward difference (QFD) of the log of the un-
45The LAUS data used by HKMM has been substantially revised since they accessed it.
We have estimated the models using both the pre-revision version of the LAUS data used by
HKMM and the more recent, revised version of the data. We have found both versions of the
data give similar results in the HKMM specifications. We use pre-revision data throughout
the discussion of HKMM.
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employment rate. They then calculate the total effect of UI on unemployment
by considering the steady state (upt = upt+1) impact of a persistent increase in
Dpt. In the steady state, ln(up) = α1−β(1−s) ln(Dp). Therefore, HKMM’s head-
line claim comes from multiplying their main estimate by a factor 11−β(1−s) ,
which is approximately equal to 10. They perform their estimation over the
period 2005q1-2012q4.
Our full-sample BCP-FE estimation strategy is different from HKMM in
five distinct ways. These differences are: (1.) we do not transform our depen-
dent variable using quasi-forward-differencing, (2.) we use employment data
from the QCEW rather than unemployment data from LAUS, (3.) we estimate
the results using monthly data from 2007m11-2014m12, instead of quarterly
data from 2005q1-2012q4, (4.) we control for differences across county pairs
using a fixed effects model rather than the Bai (2009) interactive fixed effects
model, and (5.) we use levels instead of logs.
Table 2.8 describes the impact of each of these five steps. Because differ-
ent specifications have different dependent variables, and because the implied
effect is not equal to the coefficient in some specifications, we standardize each
specification into an implied effect of the 26-to-99 week expansion on EPOP.46
We “translate” between implied effects on the unemployment rate and implied
effects on EPOP by using the total peak-to-trough impact of the Great Reces-
sion. We measure this peak-to-trough impact using the unweighted average
of counties in our border-pair sample. In particular, in this sample, EPOP
fell from 44.3% to 41.2% and the unemployment rate increased from 4.8% to
9.7%. So, if one estimation suggests that the impact of the 26-to-99 week
expansion was 3 percentage points of unemployment, we would convert that
specification’s estimate into an EPOP effect of 3×(41.2−44.39.7−4.8 ) ≈ −1.9 percentage




Table 2.8 analyzes one-off changes either starting from the HKMM spec-
ification (column 1), or moving to our specification (column 2). The first row
begins with reporting the estimates: our replication of the HKMM estimates
suggest that the UI benefit expansion from 26 to 99 weeks has an implied
EPOP effect of -2.72, which is nearly 90% of the decrease in EPOP during
the Great Recession within our sample. This corresponds to a coefficient esti-
mate of 0.052, while HKMM report a very similar estimate of 0.049. We find
that this estimate is statistically significant, as HKMM do. In contrast, the
point estimates for the full sample BCP-FE estimates in this paper suggest
that the decline in EPOP would have been about 10% greater without the UI
expansions, though this is not distinguishable from zero.
The next five rows report the marginal impact of each of the five steps. In
column 1, we show what happens when the step reported in the row is added
starting with the HKMM specification. In column 2, we show what happens
when this step is added to our specification. Finally, in column 3, we consider
all possible transition paths between HKMM’s estimates and our estimates,
and report the average marginal contribution of each of the steps, across all
of these transition paths.47
The key findings are as follows. Quasi-forward differencing, the use of
the LAUS unemployment data as opposed to the QCEW employment data,
47We do not consider the step of switching from logs to levels in column 1, because the
quasi-forward-differencing is motivated by theory which requires the data to be in logs. With
quasi-forward-differenced data in levels, it is neither clear what we are measuring, nor what
the total effect of UI on employment would be. For the same reason, we do not consider
adding quasi-forward-differencing to our specification in column 2 (which is in levels). In
addition, when calculating the averages in column 3, we discard transition paths that involve
using quasi-forward-differenced data in levels. In the end, we estimate 24 models with all
allowable combinations of the five sources of differences; we then take 60 paths (equal to
5! paths with 1/2 thrown out because eliminating quasi-forward differencing happens after
the logs to levels conversion) between the HKMM and BDGK estimates, and calculate the
contribution of each of these five factors averaged across these 60 paths.
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and sample alignment are all consequential choices. In contrast, the use of
interactive fixed effects as opposed to linear fixed effects and the use of logs
versus levels are not consequential choices.
Column 1 shows that, starting from the HKMM estimate, switching from
the LAUS unemployment rate, or getting rid of quasi-forward differencing,
dramatically reduces the HKMM estimates in magnitude towards zero. In
particular, just switching from the LAUS unemployment rate to the QCEW
EPOP (as shown in Row 4) changes the estimates to −2.724+1.356 = −1.368,
suggesting the UI benefit expansion explained around 40% of the fall in EPOP
rather than 90% as implied by HKMM’s estimates. Similarly, removing quasi-
forward differencing (Row 2) changes the estimates to −2.724+2.688 = −0.036
percentage points of EPOP. Column 2 shows that use of the LAUS unemploy-
ment rate also leads to a (mistaken) suggestion of job loss when we start
from our specification, although the impact of this is more modest. Starting
from our BCP-FE specification, when we use the LAUS unemployment rate
as the outcome, the translated result suggests the UI benefit expansion led to
a change in EPOP equal to .430− 1.133 = −0.703, just under a quarter of the
overall change during the Great Recession. When we average the incremental
contribution of these two steps across all permissible paths going between the
HKMM specification and ours (in column 3), we find that dropping quasi-
forward differencing increases the estimates by around 1.32 percentage points
of EPOP (about 40% of the change in unemployment rate during the Great
Recession), while switching the outcome from LAUS unemployment rate to
QCEW based EPOP increases the estimate by about 0.74 percentage points
of EPOP.
Aligning our samples also has a meaningful impact. The HKMM sample of
2005q1-2012q4 starts and ends earlier than our sample of 2007m11-2014m12.
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As we showed in Table 2.4, while the baseline BCP-FE approach greatly
reduces the pre-existing trend, it does not completely remove it. Use of an
earlier start date, as well as an end date prior to the phase-out of differential
UI benefits across state borders, can produce a more negative estimate in the
presence of such trends. We find that use of this altered sample period leads to
somewhat smaller magnitudes of estimates, reducing the impact of the policy
by around 0.846, 1.461, and 0.863 percentage points of EPOP in columns 1,
2, and 3, respectively.
In contrast, the use of Bai (2009) interactive effects versus fixed effects,
and use of logs versus levels, make fairly small contributions in explaining the
difference between our two sets of estimates.
This analysis shows that (1) changing the sample period (and frequency)
from HKMM’s specification to ours, (2) eliminating quasi-forward-differencing,
and (3) changing the dependent variable from the LAUS unemployment rate
to QCEW EPOP all reduce the implied negative impact of UI on employment,
by 0.74 to 1.25 percentage points of EPOP when averaged over all possible
paths. We next discuss our justification for making the specification choices
that we do.
Quasi-Forward Differencing
HKMM derive Equation (2.10) by considering a search-and-matching frame-
work where the rate of vacancy posting or firm job creation depends on a firm’s
expectation about future wages. Since unemployment insurance puts upward
pressure on wages, an increase in benefits would reduce the expected profits of
the firm and lead to a reduction in job creation. Because expectations about
future benefit changes can affect employment today, HKMM make the point
that an empirical approach that only relates current employment to current
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or past policy changes would be misspecified. In order to capture these an-
ticipation effects, HKMM use a quasi-forward-differencing procedure. Their
argument is as follows: the value of an employee to an employer is equal to the
current-period flow profits, plus β(1− s) times the expected value of the em-
ployee tomorrow (since the value of a vacant job is driven to zero by free entry).
Therefore, HKMM argue, we can isolate the impact of UI on current-period
flow profits by considering the quasi-forward difference of the unemployment
rate (which they consider to be proportional to current period flow profits, in
logs). The theory predicts that, in the case of an increase in generosity that
was a surprise and immediately known to be persistent, firms would move
from a low-unemployment steady state to a high-unemployment steady state,
according to the equation ∆ ln(up) = α1−β(1−s)∆ ln(Dp).
48 As we noted above,
this choice is quite important—removing forward differencing essentially erases
the entirety of their effect even in their sample.
We are generally less favorable toward the use of quasi-forward differencing
for several reasons. This model-driven approach relies on strong parametric
assumptions—most notably that labor demand is well-characterized by the
vacancy-posting problem captured in the model. Unfortunately this results in
an empirical approach that is very sensitive to misspecification. For example,
if an increase in UI generosity (Dpt) tends to be associated with a decrease in
future unemployment (upt+1) in the data, then the estimated coefficient α will
be positive. However, such a pattern could also be consistent with a Keynesian
aggregate demand effect that operates with a small delay. That is, if an in-
crease in benefits in one period leads to increased aggregate demand and lower
unemployment in the next period, the HKMM strategy would find that UI in-
creased the unemployment rate, when in fact the opposite occurred. Second,
48Here α is the regression coefficient, β is the discount factor, s is the probability that the
job ends, u is the unemployment rate, and D is the number of weeks of UI benefits.
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as a practical matter, the size of the final estimate is sensitive to assumptions
in the model required for translating a flow result to a steady state effect, and
in the exact magnitudes of separation and discount rates. Both the heavy
dependence on a specific model and the inability to distinguish between alter-
native explanations make quasi-forward differencing an unattractive strategy
from our perspective.
Instead, our preferred strategy is to capture the dynamics in a less model-
driven and a more transparent manner using distributed lags. That specifica-
tion directly estimates employment changes around benefit duration innova-
tions, allowing us to assess possible pre-existing trends, anticipatory effects,
and delayed or slow moving response within the window. As we discussed
in Section 2.5.2, we find no evidence of significant anticipation effects in the
12 months prior to benefit changes. The lack of any anticipation effect raises
questions about the value of quasi-forward differencing the outcome, especially
given the drawbacks discussed above.
LAUS versus QCEW
HKMM predominantly use the LAUS employment data rather than the QCEW
employment data to compute county level measures of employment.49 How-
ever, the LAUS data is partly model-based. In particular, while the LAUS
data uses actual movement to unemployment based upon UI claims, they do
not observe those entering (or re-entering) the labor force. Therefore, the
county level estimates for unemployment are based on state-level data on la-
bor force entry and re-entry—something BLS states explicitly in their online
49They do report results using the log employment from the QCEW and QWI as a ro-
bustness check, in columns 3 and 4 of Table 5. The log employment result, -0.03, would
imply that the 26-99 week expansion of UI caused a reduction of employment by 3.9%,
which would translate to about 1.6 percentage points of EPOP. This is about 40% less than
implied EPOP effect of HKMM’s main result, consistent with the average marginal effects
reported in Table 2.8. The log employment results from the QWI are modestly larger.
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manual (http://www.bls.gov/lau/laumthd.htm):
“The second category, "new entrants and reentrants into the labor
force," cannot be estimated directly from UI statistics, because un-
employment for these persons is not immediately preceded by the
period of employment required to receive UI benefits. In addition,
there is no uniform source of new entrants and reentrants data for
States available at the LMA [labor market area] level; the only
existing source available is from the CPS at the State level. Sepa-
rate estimates for new entrants and for reentrants are derived from
econometric models based on current and historical state entrants
data from the CPS. These model estimates are then allocated to
all Labor Market Areas (LMAs) based on the age population dis-
tribution of each LMA. For new entrants, the area’s proportion of
16-19 years population group to the State total of 16-19 years old
population is used, and for reentrants, the handbook area’s pro-
portion of 20 years and older population to the State total of 20
years and older population is used.”
The use of state-level information in estimating county-level unemployment
rates is problematic for a border discontinuity design. The border county
design attempts to purge reverse causation present at the state level by using
more local comparisons. Use of state-level information raises the possibility of
finding a (spurious) discontinuity in the measured unemployment rate across
the state borders even when there is no such discontinuity in reality.
The QCEW data are based on administrative payroll records provided to
the BLS by states, which protects against finding spurious discontinuities.
Moreover, the QCEW data includes around 98% of all formal sector workers,
making them very close to the true total employment counts in these counties.
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For these reasons, we consider the QCEW to be the preferred data source for
county-level employment. When the results using the QCEW and LAUS data
differ non-trivially—which they do in this case—the QCEW findings are much
more likely to be accurate.
Sample Alignment
HKMM’s sample goes from 2005 through 2012 and uses quarterly data. By
contrast, our main specification uses monthly data, starts in 2007m11, and
goes through 2014m12. Using quarterly versus monthly data has virtually no
impact. For our preferred specification, for example, changing to quarterly
data increases the standard errors by a little more than 0.04 and increases the
the mean estimate by 0.02 (see Table 2.6). Though that represents a 7%
increase, since the baseline estimates are small to start with, the impact is
quite small. However, switching the time period of estimation from 2005-2012
to 2007m11-2014m12 does make a difference. First of all, as we discussed in
Section 2.5.3, the 2007m11-2014m12 sample exhibits a fairly symmetric rise
and then fall in treatment intensity, orthogonalizing possible trends. Moving
to the 2005-2012 sample makes this less so. As can be seen in Figure 2.4,
the 2005-2012 period is largely a period of (1) increasing benefit duration
and and (2) decreasing relative employment on the high-treatment side of the
border. However, after 2012, the high-treatment side of the border starts to
experience a relative decline in duration, while continuing its relative decline
in employment. This is in part due to federal policy changes and in part
due to differential changes in unemployment levels. Thus, it is not surprising
that adding 2013 and 2014, and removing 2005 to 2007m10, has a noticeable
positive impact on the UI duration impact upon employment.
Furthermore, we note that the choice of sample date matters little for
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the PTT-trimmed sample. Table 2.4 shows that the OLS estimates in the
BCP-FE specification fall from 0.41 to -0.35 when the sample is changed from
2007m11-2014m12 to 2004m11-2014m12. However, the OLS estimates in the
PTT-trimmed sample fall only from 0.18 to 0.03. The IV estimates show a
similar pattern, although the range is larger in both samples. This leads us to
be confident that the large negative effects seen in full-sample specifications
with earlier start dates (and/or end dates) reflect endogeneity from pre-existing
trends. Furthermore, since the 2007m11-2014m12 sample window effectively
orthogonalizes these trends with treatment, we believe that our sample window
provides for more reliable estimates than other sample windows, including
HKMM’s 2005q1-2012q4.
2.8.2 HMM comparison
HMM find that the expiration of EUC at the end of 2013 increased employ-
ment, though the implied effect of UI generosity is smaller than that of HKMM.
Whereas the latter suggests that approximately 80% of the increase in unem-
ployment during the Great Recession can be explained by the increase in
benefit generosity, applying the coefficient estimates of HMM to the 26-to-
99 week expansion would imply that UI policy can explain about one third.
Scaled another way, HMM finds that the employment effect of the expiration
is on the same order as total employment gains during 2014. HMM estimate a
variety of different empirical models, all of which are motivated by a desire to
exploit variation in UI benefits solely coming from the EUC expiration, while
at the same time incorporating information over a longer period to formulate
a counterfactual for the county-level employment which would have occurred
had EUC not expired. Broadly, these specifications can be broken into two
groups, which we call the “interaction term” models and the “event study”
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models.50 We discuss each of them in turn.
The following is equivalent to HMM’s “benchmark” interaction term model,
where ect is log employment, measured either in the QCEW or LAUS:51
ect = κ[ln(Dct)1(t ≤ 2013q3)] + α[ln(Dct)1(t ≥ 2013q4)] + µc + νpt + γct+ ucpt
(2.11)
That is, the model includes pair-period fixed effects, county fixed effects, as
well as a county-specific time trend. The coefficient of interest is α, which mea-
sures the effect of duration on employment solely using variation from 2013q4
onward (i.e., from no earlier than the quarter immediately prior to expiration).
The other independent variable, the log of benefit duration in periods prior to
2013q4, soaks up the effect of duration up to 2013q3; this ensures that, after
taking out county fixed effects and county-specific linear trends, the model is
comparing employment differences in 2013q4 to employment differences in all
quarters in 2014.
The first column of the top panel of Table 2.10 shows HMM’s estimate
of this specification over the 2010q1-2014q4 period, as well as our replication.
They estimate a coefficient of -0.0190, with a p-value of zero (to three decimal
places) from a block bootstrap procedure. To place this in the context of our
other estimates, this would translate into a -1.05 percentage point reduction
in EPOP from a 26-to-99 week expansion of duration. While this is smaller
than the corresponding estimate in HKMM, it is still substantial, representing
about one third of the EPOP drop of the Great Recession; it would also
imply that the expiration of EUC was responsible for increasing employment
50The former correspond to models discussed in Sections 3 through 5 of HMM and the
latter correspond to models discussed in Section 6 of HMM.
51We understand that HMM takes the spatial difference across pairs manually; as dis-
cussed above, this is equivalent to including a full set of pair-period fixed effects.
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in 2014 by about 2 million jobs. When we estimate this equation using the
LAUS data that they use on the county pairs in our sample, we estimate a
very similar coefficient of -0.0200, with an analytical standard error (clustered
at the state-pair level) of 0.0082,52 which implies a p-value of about 0.015.53
However, since HMM accessed their data, the entire LAUS series has been
redesigned by the BLS, largely to incorporate information from the American
Community Survey rather than the Decennial Census.54 The second column
of the first panel shows our estimate from the same specification but with
employment derived from the revised data. The coefficient falls in magnitude
by three quarters to -0.0048 and becomes statistically indistinguishable from
zero. Thus, when using the most recent version of the LAUS employment
series, this specification no longer finds that the 2014 EUC expiration caused
an employment boom.
HMM also estimate this model using log employment derived from the
QCEW and find a modestly negative estimate of -0.0100. In our scale, this
would translate to an EPOP effect of -0.558 percentage points from a 26-
to-99 week expansion. When we estimate their model we obtain a similar
coefficient of -0.0078, corresponding to an EPOP effect of -0.435.55 While
-0.558 is more negative than our 2014 IV specification (-0.024 in the full BCP-
52In our baseline specifications, we cluster two-way at the state and state-pair level in order
to account for any common state-level shocks (including mechanical correlation of errors for
those counties that border multiple states). For the sake of this reconciliation exercise, we
cluster at the state-pair level. Clustering at the two-way level in this specification increases
the standard error to 0.0097.
53Our baseline sample includes 1,161 county pairs, and we drop an additional two pairs
due to missing data in this specification. While our baseline specification studying the 2014
EUC expiration drops pairs in which either county is in North Carolina, we do not drop
such pairs in this reconciliation exercise. HMM report using 1,175 pairs with full data.
Such a discrepancy could arise due to reasonable differences in interpretation regarding,
e.g., whether counties that touch only on a corner should be included as a “county pair.”
54See http://www.bls.gov/lau/lauschanges2015.htm for details. We downloaded the
current LAUS data on November 10, 2016.
55In our baseline specifications in this paper, we seasonally adjust the QCEW data as
described in the text. For the sake of this reconciliation exercise, we use not-seasonally-
adjusted data.
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FE sample, or -0.094 in the PTT-trimmed sample), the difference is at the
bottom end of the range of estimates that can be generated using QCEW data
from robustness checks on our main specifications. In results available upon
request, we re-estimate our baseline 2014 BCP-FE IV specification using all
combinations of the following specification choices: (1) using EPOP, log EPOP,
or log employment as the dependent variable,56 (2) using duration in logs or in
levels as the independent variable of interest, (3) keeping county pairs involving
North Carolina or dropping them, (4) defining the instrument based on changes
in duration immediately upon the EUC expiration, or defining it based on the
change between average duration in 2013q4 and the average duration in 2014,
(5) starting the sample in 2013q1 or 2013q4, and (6) using seasonally-adjusted
or not-seasonally-adjusted data. After translating each estimate to its implied
effect on EPOP in levels, we find that these 96 estimates range between -0.637
and 0.473. The EPOP-equivalent estimate from HMM specification using
QCEW data (either -0.558 using their estimate or -0.435 using our replication)
is within that range, though at the negative end. Furthermore, as with the
LAUS specification, we find a lower level of statistical precision than HMM:
our standard error of 0.0068 would mean that HMM’s point estimate of -0.0100
would not be statistically distinguishable from zero at conventional levels.
HMM repeat their analysis with two variants of their benchmark model.
First, they replace the county fixed effects and linear trends with interactive
effects (Bai (2009)) and estimate the model over the 2005q1-2014q4 period.
Second, they add to the benchmark model county-specific coefficients on three
aggregate time series: the price of oil, aggregate construction employment,
and reserve balances with the Fed system. We show these estimates in Panels
2 and 3, respectively, of Table 2.10. The first column shows HMM’s estimate
56We do not estimate a specification using employment in levels.
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and our replication using the pre-redesign LAUS data.57 These estimates are
qualitatively similar to the estimates from the benchmark model. And, like
the benchmark model, the coefficient estimates come much closer to zero when
post-redesign LAUS employment data is used, consistent with the null effect
of benefit expansions that we find in our baseline specifications. We have not
been able to replicate their results with the QCEW.
Additionally, HMM estimate “event study” specifications, as described in
their Section 6. These specifications are designed to compare employment
in 2014 to what is predicted to have occurred in the absence of the EUC
expiration based on pre-expiration data. These predictions are formed by
estimating a model using data solely from 2005q1 to 2013q4, and by using the
resulting parameter estimates to project the future path of employment in a
given county. To estimate the pre-event model, HMM regress county-level log
employment on county fixed effects, date fixed effects, a county-specific cubic
in the quarterly date, and four lags of log employment. They then define
their dependent variable e∗ct as the difference between actual log employment
and predicted log employment based on the model parameters. Finally, they
recover the effect of the EUC expiration by estimating the following model





+ νpt + εcpt (2.12)
They estimate a coefficient of approximately -0.02, both using employment
from LAUS and from the QCEW, meaning that counties which saw larger
declines in benefits than their neighbors (i.e., whose independent variable is
more negative) experienced higher growth of log employment in 2014, relative
57We calculate standard errors in Panel 2 via a block bootstrap at the state-pair level.
We use four factors, as HMM report using for LAUS employment, throughout Panel 2.
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to their neighbors, relative to the prediction of their model. As with the
estimates found in the “interaction term” models using pre-revision LAUS,
this estimate would imply that the 26-to-99 week expansion would explain
about one third of the EPOP drop during the Great Recession.
While we have not been able to replicate their results exactly, we do obtain
qualitatively similar results. The main result from the event study strategy
can be seen immediately in Figure 2.12, which plots the time series of the
average value of log employment, as well as the series of predicted log employ-
ment, for high-benefit counties relative to low-benefit counties (where “high”
and “low” status is defined by the size of the drop in log duration between
2013q4 and 2014, relative to the county pair partner). The model predicts
that employment in high-benefit counties will continue to fall in 2014 relative
to their lower-benefit neighbors, when in fact, a modest reversal occurs. The
event study approach attributes this to the effect of the EUC expiration. As
in the “interaction term” models discussed above, the redesign of the LAUS
series affects the results substantially. When we repeat the analysis using the
revised data, we find that the coefficient estimate becomes slightly (and in-
significantly) positive, as shown in Figure 2.13. HMM also estimate the event
study with QCEW data, and find an estimate of -0.0236, which is larger (in
magnitude). When we estimate this model using employment from the QCEW,
we find a coefficient of -0.0126 (with a standard error of 0.0113), which is in
between our estimates for the specifications with revised and vintage LAUS
log employment, respectively.58 This is shown graphically in Figure 2.14.
When translated to a change in EPOP, our replication of HMM’s event
study estimate using the QCEW (-0.703) is substantially more negative than
58This standard error takes the parameters of the model estimated in the pre-change
period as non-random, likely causing us to understate this standard error. HMM use a
bootstrapping procedure to construct these standard errors.
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our estimates using EUC expiration, which ranged between -0.024 (full BCP-
FE sample) and -0.182 (PTT-trimmed sample). HMM’s event study strategy
estimates a negative effect of EUC expiration using QCEW data because it con-
structs a counterfactual where the employment differential between the high
and low treatment counties is expected to become more negative in 2014. How-
ever, this HMM counterfactual is largely driven by a county-specific polyno-
mial time trend, whose identification is heavily reliant on employment changes
that occur up to nine years before the treatment event.59 As an indication of
the type of problem with such a parametric strategy, the employment rever-
sal (both in the QCEW data and, in fact, in the pre-revision LAUS data as
well) appears to begin a few quarters prior to the expiration of EUC—a “pre-
reversal” which casts doubt on the plausibility of a continuing downward trend
as the appropriate counterfactual. In contrast, we take a much more flexible
approach by showing whether the employment rates were following parallel
trends prior to 2014 by treatment status on the two sides of the border in
our 2014 expiration IV. We find that they were, indeed, following parallel
trends—as shown clearly in Figure 2.9 for the full set of border county pairs.
And that this employment gap between the two sides of the border remained
largely unchanged following the 2014 expiration. We think the more trans-
parent evidence from the 2014 event that we provide in Figure 2.9 raises
questions about the causal import of the parametric model used by HMM to
construct the counterfactual employment path.
59The use of a cubic trend, rather than some other degree of polynomial, does not affect
these results substantially.
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Table 2.8: Decomposition of difference between estimates from HKMM and
BDGK into contributing factors
Step From HKMM To BDGK Average Marginal
Effect
Base Estimate -2.7238*** 0.4299
(0.6636) (0.4946)
No QFD 2.6883*** 1.3156***
(0.6311) (0.4192)
Align sample 0.8460 1.4613* 0.8629**
(0.6930) (0.8803) (0.3409)
Urate to EPOP 1.3562 1.1334** 0.7421*
(1.1691) (0.4869) (0.4023)
Bai to FE 0.8300 0.6469 0.2186
(0.7012) (0.5636) (0.2968)
Logs to levels 0.0777 0.0146
(0.3348) (0.1392)
Notes: The first row reports the total effect of the expansion of UI from 26 to 99 weeks,
in percentage points of EPOP, implied by the coefficient estimates of HKMM (column 1)
and the full sample BCP-FE estimates of this paper (BDGK) (column 2). The remaining
estimates in the first column represent the increased total implied effect of UI when one
specification change is made from the original HKMM estimate. The remaining estimates
in the second column represent the effect of taking each final step to arrive at the BDGK
estimate. Because the total implied effect is not well motivated by theory when using
quasi-differenced data in levels, we leave two cells blank in these first two columns. The
third column represents the average incremental effect of taking each step along all possible
transition paths between HKMM and BDGK estimates, except that we discard transition
paths that involve estimating models with quasi-differenced data in levels. See text for
details regarding each step and the conversion of each coefficient estimate into an effect on
EPOP. Standard errors are calculated via a block bootstrap at the state-pair level with 300
replications. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.9: Transitioning from HKMM to BDGK estimates: Contribution of factors along three particular paths
Path 1 Path 2 Path 3
Coefficient EPOP effect Coefficient EPOP effect Coefficient EPOP effect
HKMM reported result 0.0490*** -2.5885***
HKMM replication 0.0519*** -2.7238*** HKMM replication 0.0519*** -2.7238*** HKMM replication 0.0519*** -2.7238***
(0.0093) (0.6564) (0.0093) (0.6564) (0.0093) (0.6564)
Eliminate QD 0.0086 -0.0355 Urate to EPOP -0.0025 -1.3676 Align sample 0.0153*** -1.8778***
(0.0321) (0.1327) (0.0020) (1.0434) (0.0030) (0.4642)
Bai to FE 0.1304*** -0.5825*** Elimate QD -0.0021 -0.1220 Elimate QD 0.0061 -0.0251
(0.0415) (0.2021) (0.0054) (0.3180) (0.0224) (0.0925)
Urate to EPOP -0.0275** -1.6064** Logs to levels -0.0298 -0.0298 Logs to levels 0.3197* -0.2046*
(0.0123) (0.7034) (0.2440) (0.2440) (0.1692) (0.1083)
Align sample 0.0059 0.3523 Align sample -0.2170 -0.2170 Bai to FE 1.0995*** -0.7035***
(0.0081) (0.4870) (0.1405) (0.1405) (0.2473) (0.1582)
Logs to levels (BDGK) 0.4299 0.4299 Bai to FE (BDGK) 0.4299 0.4299 Urate to EPOP (BDGK) 0.4299 0.4299
(0.4662) (0.4662) (0.4662) (0.4662) (0.4662) (0.4662)
Notes: This table presents three transition paths from HKMM’s estimates to the full sample BCP-FE estimates of this paper (BDGK). Each cell
presents the coefficient estimate, as well as the implied total effect of the 26-99 week expansion of UI expressed as an implied impact of EPOP, in
percentage points. Once a step is made in a given path, it is retained in subsequent specifications in the same path. See text for details regarding each
step. Standard errors for specifications involving the Bai (2009) interactive effects estimator are calculated via a block bootstrap at the state-pair
level with 300 replications. Standard errors for other specifications are clustered twoway at the state and state-pair level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01.
166
Table 2.10: Estimates using the HMM interaction-term model: Alternative
data sets and specifications
(1) (2) (3)
LAUS (orig.) LAUS (rev.) QCEW
Benchmark
HMM’s estimate -0.0190*** -0.0100***
[0.000] [0.050]
Our estimate -0.0200** -0.0048 -0.0078
(0.0082) (0.0060) (0.0069)
Observations 46440 46440 46440
Interactive Effects
HMM’s estimate -0.0233*** -0.0121***
[0.000] [0.030]
Our estimate -0.0231** -0.0050 -0.0031
(0.0099) (0.0073) (0.0086)
Observations 92720 92720 92880
Natural Factors
HMM’s estimate -0.0144*** -0.0141***
[0.000] [0.020]
Our estimate -0.0138 -0.0013 -0.0065
(0.0104) (0.0070) (0.0067)
Observations 46440 46440 46440
Notes: This table reports estimates of α from HMM’s “interaction-term” model: ect =
κ[ln(Dct)1(t ≤ 2013q3)] + α[ln(Dct)1(t ≥ 2013q4)] + νpt + εcpt, under different characteri-
zations of the error term εcpt. In each panel, the top row reports the estimates reported by
HMM, with p-values (from a block bootstrap at the state-pair level) in brackets. The second
row reports our replication, with standard errors in parentheses. The first column uses log
employment from LAUS, prior to the 2015 redesign. The second column uses post-redesign
LAUS data, downloaded on September 9, 2016. The third column uses (not-seasonally-
adjusted) log employment from the QCEW. The first panel represents the “benchmark”
specification, in which εcpt = µc+γct+ucpt. The second panel replaces the fixed effects and
county-specific trends with interactive effects (Bai (2009)): εcpt = λ′cFt + ucpt. The third
panel adds to the benchmark specification county-specific coefficients on three national time
series: the price of oil, employment in the construction industry, and reserve balances with
the Fed system. Standard errors in the first and third panel are analytical, clustered at the
state-pair level. Standard errors in the second panel are derived from a block bootstrap at
the state-pair level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Notes: This figure plots (solid line, solid points) the average difference in log employment
between “high” and “low” counties, where a “high” county is defined to have experienced
a larger drop in log duration between 2013q4 and 2014 than its neighbor; pairs which
experienced identical drops in log duration are not included. The figure also plots (dashed
line, hollow points) the average difference in predicted log employment between high and
low counties, where the prediction is computed by regressing (on quarterly data from 2005q1
through 2013q4) county log employment on four lags of log employment, time fixed effects,
and a county-specific cubic function of the date. Predictions in 2014q1 through 2014q4 are
computed recursively. This figure uses employment data from LAUS, prior to the March
2015 redesign.
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Notes: This figure plots (solid line, solid points) the average difference in log employment
between “high” and “low” counties, where a “high” county is defined to have experienced
a larger drop in log duration between 2013q4 and 2014 than its neighbor; pairs which
experienced identical drops in log duration are not included. The figure also plots (dashed
line, hollow points) the average difference in predicted log employment between high and
low counties, where the prediction is computed by regressing (on quarterly data from 2015q1
through 2013q4) county log employment on four lags of log employment, time fixed effects,
and a county-specific cubic function of the date. Predictions in 2014q1 through 2014q4 are
computed recursively. This figure uses current LAUS data.
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Notes: This figure plots (solid line, solid points) the average difference in log employment
between “high” and “low” counties, where a “high” county is defined to have experienced
a larger drop in log duration between 2013q4 and 2014 than its neighbor; pairs which
experienced identical drops in log duration are not included. The figure also plots (dashed
line, hollow points) the average difference in predicted log employment between high and
low counties, where the prediction is computed by regressing (on quarterly data from 2015q1
through 2013q4) county log(employment) on four lags of log employment, time fixed effects,
and a county-specific cubic function of the date. Predictions in 2014q1 through 2014q4 are
computed recursively. This figure uses employment data from QCEW.
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2.8.3 Additional Tables and Figures
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Table 2.11: Summary statistics for all counties, all county border pairs, and PTT-trimmed sample of county border pairs
All counties Border counties PTT-trimmed
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
EPOP (2007) 44.19 18.33 44.51 16.20 42.73 15.17
Private EPOP (2007) 34.58 17.45 34.88 15.47 33.24 14.78
LAUS unemployment rate (2007) 4.857 1.686 4.948 1.777 5.046 1.795
Population age 15+ (2007) 76818.0 243398.5 72692.4 178383.3 55884.2 120677.9
Share white (2005-2009 ACS) 0.796 0.190 0.812 0.181 0.817 0.187
Share black (2005-2009 ACS) 0.0885 0.144 0.0834 0.145 0.0884 0.154
Share hispanic (2005-2009 ACS) 0.0755 0.128 0.0620 0.101 0.0540 0.0961
Share high school grad, less than Bachelor’s (2005-2009 ACS) 0.564 0.0665 0.568 0.0640 0.570 0.0610
Share Bachelor’s degree or higher (2005-2009 ACS) 0.187 0.0852 0.184 0.0818 0.178 0.0785
Median household income (2005-2009 ACS), 2009 dollars 43299.6 11419.7 42949.1 11725.8 41847.9 11682.7
Newly acquired mortage debt per capita (2007) 3.535 3.216 3.508 3.120 3.216 2.829
Share in cities 50k+ (2010 census) 0.186 0.333 0.188 0.328 0.160 0.304
Minimum weeks of UI eligibility over sample period 23.78 4.365 24.17 4.040 24.20 4.025
Maximum weeks of UI eligibility over sample period 91.37 12.15 90.74 12.38 91.00 12.13
Notes: If a border county appears in j county-pairs in the sample in question, then it appears j times for the purpose of creating estimates in this
table. PTT-trimming removes the quartile of county pairs with the highest differential in linear trends between November 2004 and October 2008.
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Table 2.12: Estimated effect of UI benefit duration on EPOP in specifications
without pair-period fixed effects
(1) (2)
All counties Border counties
No fixed effects -3.037∗∗∗ -3.244∗∗∗
(0.556) (0.756)
County fixed effects -1.826∗∗∗ -1.768∗∗∗
(0.107) (0.135)
Time fixed effects -9.550∗∗∗ -10.670∗∗
(3.551) (4.241)
Twoway fixed effects -0.385 -0.382
(0.355) (0.361)
Observations 266944 199692
No. of counties 3104 1129
Notes: This table reports estimates of the form Ect = βDct + FE + εct, where Ect is the
ratio of employment to population aged 15+, scaled in percentage points. Row 1 considers
models without fixed effect. Rows 2-4 consider models with different sets of fixed effects
(FE). Standard errors are clustered at the state level in column 1, and two-way at the
state and state-pair level in column 2. If a border county appears in j county-pairs, then it
appears j times when creating the estimates in column 2.* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p <
0.01.
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Table 2.13: Additional robustness checks on the effects of UI benefit duration
on EPOP: 2008 and 2014 event samples
2008 sample IV 2014 sample IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BCP-FE PTT-Trimmed BCP-FE PTT-Trimmed
1. Baseline -0.075 1.550 -2.920∗∗ -4.336∗∗∗
(6.180) (7.298) (1.235) (1.507)
2. Private EPOP 0.116 1.186 -2.935∗∗ -4.290∗∗∗
(6.188) (7.476) (1.291) (1.646)
3. Correlation-trimmed -1.510 -1.510 -4.132∗∗ -5.474∗∗∗
(3.893) (3.893) (1.656) (1.952)
4. ISLT -1.241 -1.202 -2.060 -1.657
(2.357) (2.626) (1.369) (1.661)
5. PTT through 2007m10 -1.335 -2.563*
(9.437) (1.403)
6. Quarterly data -0.259 0.770
(6.092) (7.370)
7. QWI EPOP (quarterly) -1.709 -3.287 -2.651∗∗ -4.340∗∗∗
(6.113) (7.899) (1.338) (1.451)
8. Distance trimming 2.448 1.550 -3.298∗∗ -4.748∗∗∗
(5.801) (7.298) (1.339) (1.628)
9. Unbalanced panel -0.075 1.550 -2.920∗∗ -4.336∗∗∗
(6.180) (7.298) (1.235) (1.507)
10. Hinterland pairs 1.886 3.496 -2.380 -1.189
(2.968) (3.310) (2.125) (0.774)
11. Exploit ∆ reg. benefits -3.038** -4.525***
(1.230) (1.479)
12. Drop NC -0.075 1.550
(6.180) (7.298)
13. Keep NC -3.857** -6.065**
(1.737) (2.463)
14. NC: Alt. instrument -1.683* -3.341**
(1.001) (1.330)
15. ln(EPOP ) 0.065 0.114 -0.056∗∗ -0.083∗∗
(0.131) (0.145) (0.027) (0.033)
[3.691] [6.682] [-2.889**] [-4.209**]
16. ln(emp) 0.077 0.101 -0.049 -0.075∗
(0.125) (0.148) (0.032) (0.040)
[4.394] [5.862] [-2.516] [-3.795*]
Notes: Each cell reports regressions analogous to those reported in Table 2.3 for the 2008 and 2014 sub-
samples (each estimated via IV). The estimates in the 1st row correspond to the estimates in panels 2 and
3 of Table 2.3. The estimates in the 2nd row replace (total) EPOP with the ratio of private employment to
population age 15+. In the 3rd row, we trim the set of border county pairs based on the level of correlation
between county EPOP and state EPOP over the period 2004m11-2008m10 (see text for details). The 4th
row controls for county-specific linear trends. The 5th row trims based on PTT estimated through 2007m10
instead of 2008m10. The 6th row uses quarterly data instead of monthly. The 7th row uses EPOP derived
from the QWI (at the quarterly level) instead of the QCEW. The 8th row drops county-pairs whose popu-
lation centroids are greater than 100km apart. The 9th row includes counties without full EPOP data for
each month, which we drop by default. The 10th row uses a modified version of the instrument zct which
exploits all changes in benefits, including changes in regular benefits, which occur at the end of December
2013. Rows 11-13 report estimates using alternative strategies for dealing with North Carolina (NC); by
default, border county pairs (BCPs) with one neighbor in NC are kept in the 2008 subsample and dropped
in the 2014 subsample. The 11th row completely drops all NC BCPs. The 12th row keeps all North Carolina
BCPs. The 13th row keeps NC BCPs but redefines the instrument for NC counties (see text for details).
The 14th and 15th row use ln(EPOP ) and ln(employment), respectively, as dependent variables. The
bracketed estimates in these two rows are the level-on-level equivalent, equal to ( 9926
β̂ − 1)Ē, where Ē is the
mean EPOP level in the given sample. Cells which are not applicable in the given sample are left blank.
Standard errors are clustered two-way at the state and state-pair level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p <
0.01.
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Leads Lags Leads Lags
Contemp. -0.006 0.034
( 0.096) ( 0.084)
Lead/lag 1 0 -0.123 0 -0.063
(0) ( 0.127) (0) ( 0.110)
Lead/lag 2 0.118 0.004 -0.032 0.001
( 0.113) ( 0.149) ( 0.097) ( 0.132)
Lead/lag 3 0.208 0.218 0.083 0.259
( 0.156) ( 0.219) ( 0.133) ( 0.216)
Lead/lag 4 0.263 0.154 -0.047 0.280
( 0.196) ( 0.183) ( 0.171) ( 0.201)
Lead/lag 5 0.148 0.220 -0.075 0.333
( 0.241) ( 0.226) ( 0.218) ( 0.233)
Lead/lag 6 0.243 0.069 -0.037 0.273
( 0.265) ( 0.286) ( 0.233) ( 0.256)
Lead/lag 7 -0.030 0.239 -0.321 0.341
( 0.278) ( 0.284) ( 0.234) ( 0.259)
Lead/lag 8 0.058 0.113 -0.199 0.259
( 0.313) ( 0.314) ( 0.248) ( 0.250)
Lead/lag 9 0.056 0.229 -0.186 0.139
( 0.319) ( 0.333) ( 0.260) ( 0.267)
Lead/lag 10 0.307 0.165 0.122 0.179
( 0.329) ( 0.372) ( 0.253) ( 0.297)
Lead/lag 11 0.403 0.112 0.107 0.106
( 0.341) ( 0.372) ( 0.247) ( 0.312)
Lead/lag 12 0.228 0.168 -0.046 0.136
( 0.334) ( 0.390) ( 0.249) ( 0.336)
Lead/lag 13 0.154 0.198
( 0.399) ( 0.346)
Lead/lag 14 0.094 0.056
( 0.406) ( 0.355)
Lead/lag 15 0.193 0.230
( 0.465) ( 0.409)
Lead/lag 16 0.341 0.360
( 0.440) ( 0.386)
Lead/lag 17 0.273 0.304
( 0.463) ( 0.402)
Lead/lag 18 -0.003 0.054
( 0.494) ( 0.410)
Lead/lag 19 0.155 0.159
( 0.505) ( 0.411)
Lead/lag 20 0.162 0.192
( 0.542) ( 0.437)
Lead/lag 21 0.168 -0.002
( 0.574) ( 0.456)
Lead/lag 22 0.210 0.127
( 0.591) ( 0.472)
Lead/lag 23 0.181 -0.030
( 0.577) ( 0.476)
Lead/lag 24 0.340 0.012
( 0.590) ( 0.502)
Notes: This table reports cumulative monthly lags and leads estimated on the full sample (2007m11-
2014m12), using all border county pairs (BCPs) (column 1) and the subset of BCPs in the PTT-trimmed
sample (column 2), where all independent variables are divided by 73. The dependent variable is the first-
differenced seasonally adjusted ratio of total employment to population age 15+, scaled in percentage points.
The regression includes 24 lags and 11 leads and is estimated using EPOP data from 2007m11-2014m12
(and thus duration data from 2005m11-2015m11) in first differences. The zeroth cumulative lag is equal to
the estimated coefficient on contemporaneous duration. The jth cumulative lag is equal to the estimated
coefficient on contemporaneous duration plus the sum of the estimated coefficient on the 1st through jth lag
term. The jth cumulative lead is equal to the sum of the estimated coefficient on the 1st through the j−1th
lead term. The 1st cumulative lead is normalized to zero. PTT-trimming removes the quartile of county
pairs with the highest differential in linear trends between November 2004 and October 2008. Standard
errors are clustered two-way at the state and state-pair level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Figure 2.16: Evolution of average EPOP difference and UI benefit duration
difference across state borders: Pooled 2008 expansion and 2014 expiration of
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Notes: This figure reports the monthly cumulative response of EPOP (left axis, hollow
circles) from the pooled 2008 and 2014 samples, using an alternative trimmed sample. In
this figure, PTT-trimming removes the quartile of county pairs with the highest differential
in linear trends between November 2004 and October 2007 (not October 2008, as before).
See notes to Figure 2.7 for additional information.
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Figure 2.17: Distribution of EUC differences across border county pairs im-
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Notes: The top graph plots the share of county pairs that continuously have a duration
difference at least as large as immediately after the implementation of UCEA in November
2008. The bottom graph plots the share of county pairs that continuously have a duration
difference (moving backward in time) at least as large as immediately prior to the 2014
expiration of EUC. The sample of pairs is restricted to those with differential duration at
the time of the event in question.
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Chapter 3
Shifting by S Corporation
Shareholders: Evidence from
the 2013 Kansas Tax Reform
3.1 Introduction
In 2013, 4.3 million businesses taxed under subchapter S (of Chapter 1) of the
Internal Revenue Code recorded an estimated $6.9 trillion in gross receipts
(Internal Revenue Service (2017)). The number of such “S corporations,” as
they are known, has increased over three-fold since the mid-1980s, compared
to a modest decline in the popularity of their cousin, the C corporation.1 For
this reason, there is substantial interest in understanding the behavior of S
corporations and their shareholders (Auten, Splinter, & Nelson (2016), Bull
& Burnham (2008), Cooper, et al. (2015), Gordon & Slemrod (2000), Nelson
(2016), Smith, et al. (2017), among others).
1Most S corporations are modest in size; in the tax data that I use in this paper, about
60% of firms have a single shareholder and 99% have six shareholders or fewer. C corpora-
tions can be much larger than S corporations, as S corporations are allowed no more than
100 shareholders. But many smaller firms are C corporations as well. The Internal Revenue
Service (2017) estimates that there were 1.6 million active C corporations in 2013, with total
gross receipts of $20.3 trillion.
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In this paper, I focus on a unique decision that owners of S corporations
must make: how much of their operating income (roughly $55,000 for the me-
dian profitable firm in 2012) to pay themselves in the form of wages, leaving
the remainder to be labeled as “profits.” For certain S corporations, such as
those with a single owner, this distinction between wages and profits would
be meaningless aside from tax consequences. Yet, wages face an additional
tax (FICA) of up to 15.3 percent, meaning that the tax-minimizing strategy
for most S corporation owners is to pay themselves a wage of zero.2 In order
to protect the tax base, however, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) requires
owners of S corporations to pay themselves “reasonable compensation” under
threat of audit. Nevertheless, given the lack of objective standard for what
defines “reasonable compensation,” there is considerable leeway for S share-
holders to reclassify wage income as business income.
The reclassification of wages as profits has a non-trivial effect on tax rev-
enue. The Government Accountability Office (2009) estimates that $24 billion
in wages was underreported by S corporations in 2003 and 2004, in the sense of
being recoverable by audit. Additionally, there is a substantial amount of un-
derreporting does not meet the strong standard of being recoverable by audit.
In particular, Bull and Burnham (2008) estimate that S corporation sharehold-
ers understate their wages by a factor of one-third, which would correspond to
approximately $140 billion in underreporting over this same two-year period.
Furthermore, subject to certain restrictions, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act will
allow for a partial deduction for pass-through income beginning in 2018 – ef-
fectively reducing the tax rate applicable to that income. Because this partial
2This assumes that the increase in the present value of future Social Security benefits
brought about by a one dollar increase in wages is less than the FICA tax payment, which
will generally be true for all but very low-income individuals under plausible assumptions.
Furthermore, 50 percent of the FICA tax is deductible under the income tax, so the true
wedge is slightly smaller than 15.3 percent.
181
deduction will generally apply to profits earned by S corporations but not the
wages paid to shareholders, this has a side effect of increasing the incentive
for some owners of S corporations to reclassify wages as profits. Thus, it is
of considerable interest to determine how elastically owners of S corporation
respond to an increase in this tax wedge.
This paper analyzes such an increase in the tax wedge between wages and
profits. It exploits a natural experiment that took place in Kansas beginning
in 2013 which exempted (among other things) the profits earned by S corpo-
rations in Kansas from state income tax, but did not exempt wage income.
As a result, this reform added up to 4.9 percentage points to the tax wedge
between wage and subchapter-S business income, more than doubling the tax
wedge for high-earnings shareholders and increasing the tax wedge for lower-
earnings shareholders by about one-third. I use administrative tax data to
compare the evolution of wages paid to shareholders in Kansas, relative to
the evolution in other states. The baseline difference-in-differences estimates
imply only a small reduction in wages paid to shareholders in Kansas of about
three percent. Using a randomization inference technique, this estimate is in-
significantly different than zero, and I can rule out effects more negative than
16 percent of baseline shareholder-employee wages. I additionally control for
the change in operating income (i.e., income calculated before deducting wages
to shareholders) to ensure that the estimates correspond to a shifting effect,
rather than a combination of a shifting effect and an effect on general business
activity of Kansas firms. This control variable has little effect, as the change
in operating income in Kansas was similar to that of other states.
I then use two methods to refine the construction of the control group.
First, I reweight the sample by inverse propensity scores, based on the pre-
dicted probability of being a Kansas firm based on observed covariates. Sec-
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ond, I use the synthetic controls method. Neither of these strategies affect
the coefficient estimate substantially. However, the improved matching be-
tween treatment and control causes the confidence intervals to shrink; in the
most precision specifications, I can rule out effects more negative than 6 to 8
percent.
This muted response stands in contrast to the substantial shifting found
in the literature along this margin. In particular, Auten, Splinter, and Nelson
(2016) show that high-income owners of S corporations reduced the wage share
of their income by up to 40% after the 1994 “uncapping” of the Medicare
portion of the payroll tax introduced an incentive to do so.3 Bull and Burnham
(2008) make a similar finding: the authors estimate that wages to shareholders
are 33% lower due to the tax wedge. Smith, et al. (2017) estimate that firms
that switch from C corporations to S corporations reduce their total wage
deductions by approximately two percent of gross sales.4
Furthermore, there is considerable evidence that taxpayers respond sharply
to shifting incentives in other contexts.5 For instance, the growth of S corpora-
tions and other pass-through entities itself is plausibly an example of shifting:
it is a stylized fact that income migrated away from the corporate base (i.e.,
the base applying to C corporations) and toward pass-through entities such
as S corporations after the Tax Reform Act of 1986 reversed the order of the
top corporate and individual tax rates (Slemrod (1995, 1996), Carroll and
Joulfaian (1997), Auerbach and Slemrod (1997), Saez (2004), among others).
Additionally, Auten, Splinter, and Nelson (2016) showed that the amount of
3Auten, Splinter, and Nelson (2016) defined “high-income” to mean having combined
wages and S corporation income in excess of $1 million.
4Of note, during the period studied by Smith, et al. (2017), C corporations generally
faced an incentive to over-report wages relative to the arm’s-length wage. Thus, this estimate
is an upper bound for the under-reporting of wages by S corporations.
5Generically, I define “shifting” to mean changes in the “location” of income recognition,
where “location” can mean different time periods, different tax bases, or different jurisdic-
tions.
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“passive” S corporation income decreased substantially after the Net Invest-
ment Income Tax was introduced in 2013, which applied to “passive” but not
“active” income from S corporations. Furthermore, there is a deep litera-
ture showing that taxpayers are responsive to incentives regarding the timing
of transactions. For instance, Burman and Randolph (1994), Auerbach and
Poterba (1988), Burman, Clausing, and O’Hare (1994), and others have shown
that taxpayers increase their realization of capital gains right before scheduled
increases in capital gains rates take effect. Goolsbee (2000) showed that ex-
ecutives of large firms accelerated the exercise of stock options before tax in-
creases took effect in 1993; Sammartino and Weiner (1997) confirm the results
of Goolsbee (2000) using taxable income more generally. Gorry, et al. (2017)
similarly find that deferred executive compensation increases when tax rates
are high. Relatedly, Dowd and McLelland (2017) find that taxpayers tend
to delay the realization of capital gains until the preferential rates associated
with holding capital assets for 365 days come into effect.
To rationalize the relatively small response of S corporation owners to HB
2117, I adapt standard models of tax evasion (e.g., Yitzhaki (1987)) to this
present setting, and make a minor modification. I show that these models
predict that the size of the shifting effect is a decreasing function of the baseline
wedge; put differently, the amount of shifting in response to the introduction
of a wedge can be much larger than the response to the strengthening of an
existing wedge. There are two stylized forces that drive this result. First,
one component of the marginal cost of shifting is that it increases the risk of
detection, which leads to reversal of the entire stock of shifting; when the tax
wedge increases and the amount of existing shifting is greater than zero, the
existing shifting becomes more valuable and taxpayers become more cautious.
Second, the shape of the perceived probability of audit function may directly
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cause the marginal cost curve to be convex. Intuitively, taxpayers may have
substantial leeway to shift income at low cost, as there may be a wide range of
wages that the taxpayer believes will pass IRS scrutiny with high probability.
But, as the amount of shifting increases, the IRS becomes more suspicious at
a faster rate. The resulting convexity of the marginal cost curve causes the
magnitude of the shifting effect to shrink when the baseline wedge is larger.
Consistent with either of these two forces inherent in these models, I find
evidence that S corporations that faced a lower tax wedge prior to the reform
showed a stronger shifting response. In particular, owners of S corporations
with initial wages or self-employment income (from all sources) in excess of
the Social Security cap face an initial tax wedge of 2.9% or 3.8%, rather than
15.3%. I find a somewhat larger shifting effect for these firms. However,
these results are consistent with other explanations as well, such as the tax
change being more salient to larger, more sophisticated firms. Furthermore,
the precision of these estimates drops noticeably.
In addition to the literature studying the effect of tax incentives on shifting
or reclassifying income, this paper also fits into a nascent literature studying
the effect of HB 2117 in Kansas. The work most similar to mine is DeBacker,
Heim, Ramnath, and Ross (2017). Like me, the authors use tax data to study
the effect of HB 2117 on pass-through businesses. They find a modest increase
in the number of taxpayers reporting Schedule C (sole proprietor) income,
along with suggestive evidence that some of this increase is driven by rechar-
acterizing labor income as business income through independent contracting
arrangements. Their findings regarding Schedule E (partnerships, S corpo-
rations, rent, and royalties) are more mixed. They do not directly examine
wages paid by S corporations to their shareholders. By contrast, I link tax re-
turns and information returns to explicitly analyze wages paid to shareholders,
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thereby providing direct evidence regarding one of the most plausible channels
for income shifting in response to HB 2117.
Additionally, McCloskey (2017), Turner and Blagg (2017), Mazerov (2016)
study the effect of HB 2117 on employment. They generally find that Kansas
employment growth fell modestly after the implementation of HB 2117 relative
to employment growth in control states and counties, though the statistical
significance of these findings is not clear. The present paper focuses primarily
on a different outcome (reported wages to shareholders), which need not be
linked closely to the effect on economic outcomes such as employment.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents
the policy background. Section 3.3 describes the administrative tax data used
in this paper. Section 3.4 presents the main empirical strategy and results.
Section 3.5 presents the results from two refinements of the baseline empirical
strategy. Section 3.6 provides a discussion of the results in the context of
standard theories of tax evasion. Section 3.7 performs a suggestive empirical
test of this model. Section 3.8 provides for sensitivity analyses. Section 3.9
concludes.
3.2 Policy Background
Broadly speaking, business income is taxed under the federal income tax in
one of two ways.6 Most large businesses are taxed under Subchapter C (of
Chapter 1) of the Internal Revenue Code; such firms are known as “C cor-
porations.” C corporations pay an entity-level tax on income. Additionally,
taxable shareholders of C corporations generally pay individual income tax
(sometimes at preferential rates) on dividends and capital gains derived from
6This section presents a very brief overview of the law as it existed prior to Tax Year
2018. See JCX-42-17 (Joint Committee on Taxation (2017)) for a more full treatment.
186
their holdings in these corporations.
Most other businesses fall into the category of “pass-through” businesses.
The income from these firms is allocated to each owner, whether distributed
or retained in the business. During the period under study in this paper (i.e.,
prior to 2018), each owner then paid tax on this income under the usual in-
come tax rules that apply to him or her. The three main subcategories of
pass-through businesses are partnerships, sole proprietorships, and S corpora-
tions. The present study concerns S corporations, which are so named because
their tax rules are provided in Subchapter S.7 Figure 3.5 uses data from Joint
Committee on Taxation (2017) to show the evolution of the number of firms
organized as C corporations, S corporations, partnerships, and sole proprietor-
ships, normalized to one in 1985, the year before the Tax Reform Act (TRA) of
1986. The figure shows the enormous growth in the number of firms organized
as S corporations in the aftermath of TRA 1986, which made pass-through
entities more tax-favored relative to C corporations.
An entity can elect to be taxed as an S corporation if it meets certain
requirements. In particular, it must have no more than 100 shareholders,
generally all of these shareholders must be U.S. natural persons (e.g., not
partnerships or other corporations), and all shareholders must be permanent
residents and/or citizens of the United States.8 Furthermore, S corporations
may not have multiple classes of stock.
The present study concerns how S corporations allocate their operating
income, which I define as revenues minus costs other than shareholder com-
7Limited liability companies (LLCs) organized under state law can generally elect treat-
ment as one of several subcategories if they meet certain requirements. Single-owner LLCs
can choose to be taxed as a sole proprietorship (which is the default) or as an S corporation.
Multi-member LLCs can choose to be taxed as a partnership (which is the default) or as
an S corporation. For the purpose of this study, the definition of “S corporation” includes
LLCs that elect to be taxed as an S corporation.
8Under certain circumstances, trusts and employee stock option plans may also be share-
holders of S corporations.
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pensation. A given firm must allocate some portion of this income as “wages”
that it pays to its shareholder-employees, and the remainder as “profits” earned
by the firm. For a single-owner firm, this distinction is meaningless but for
tax: wages paid to the shareholder reduce the profits of the firm – over which
the shareholder has exclusive ownership – dollar for dollar. Furthermore, prior
to 2018, both the wages and profits of the firm were subject to federal income
tax in the same way.9 However, there exists a tax wedge which makes the
wages relatively costlier than profits. This wedge arises because FICA tax of
up to 15.3 percent is imposed on wages to shareholders (just as it is generally
imposed on wages generally) but not on the profits of the firm.10 Formally, half
of this 15.3 percent is statutorily leveed on the employer, while the other half
is levied on the employee; the “employer share” is deductible against income
tax, which effectively reduces the wedge to 15.3× (12 +
1
2(1−τ)), where τ is the
marginal income tax rate.11 Importantly, the business income earned by the
firm is subject neither to FICA nor the essentially equivalent self-employment
tax under SECA. This creates an incentive for owners of S corporations to
reduce the wages they pay themselves and thus increase the business income
earned by the firm.12
9There are exceptions to this general rule. For instance, in the unusual case when the
S corporation passes through losses to the taxpayer in excess of the taxpayer’s basis in the
corporation, an additional dollar in wages would be taxable while the additional dollar of
losses would not be deductible. As basis cannot easily be observed in the data, this study
abstracts from this complication.
10As of 2013, S corporation profits allocated to a high-income passive shareholder are
generally subject to the 3.8% Net Investment Income Tax (NIIT). I abstract from this
complication.
11For total wages/self-employment income (“earnings”) under the Social Security cap
($117,000 in 2014), the tax rate is generally 15.3%. In 2011 and 2012, the employee share
was temporarily reduced by 2 percentage points. For earnings between this cap and $200,000
($250,000 for joint filers), the rate reduces to 2.9%. As of 2013, for earnings above this
threshold, the rate increases to 3.8%, with the additional 0.9% paid by the employee.
12On the margin, wages (and self-employment income) earned below the Social Security
cap can increase the Social Security benefits that an individual will be entitled to upon
retirement. This tax-benefit linkage – if understood by taxpayers – can reduce the true
wedge between wages and other types of income below the statutory wedge. However, this
tax-benefit linkage effects only the initial tax wedge; the policy variation under study in this
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To prevent a loss of tax revenue, the IRS requires shareholders of an S cor-
poration to take “reasonable compensation.” In IRS Fact Sheet 2008-25, the
IRS explicitly says that there is no explicit test for what makes compensation
reasonable: “There are no specific guidelines for reasonable compensation in
the Code or the Regulations.” Instead, the IRS lists nine factors that courts
have used on a case-by-case basis.13 In several court cases, the IRS has suc-
cessfully increased the amount of wages treated as having been paid to certain
taxpayers. Most notably, in Watson v. U.S., the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the 8th Circuit upheld the IRS’s determination that accountant David
Watson’s $24,000 salary (in years in which he received profit distributions in
excess of $175,000) was unreasonably low. In this case, the IRS increased
the wage payment by over $65,000 in two years, and Watson was required to
pay FICA tax on the difference. Nevertheless, the definition of “reasonable
compensation” remains highly subjective, leaving taxpayers with considerable
leeway to “push the envelope.”
Furthermore, practical details suggest that adjustment frictions are not
very large. In particular, the tax withholding associated with wages to share-
holders (just as with other wages) must be made at least quarterly, with
monthly or more frequent payments being required in many circumstances.
Thus, S corporations must make an active decision regarding wages to share-
holders fairly early in the year, though this decision can be partially changed
later in the year. The data provide further evidence of a lack of adjustment
paper increased the tax wedge between wages and profits, and did not affect relationship
between wages and future Social Security benefits. Furthermore, the progressivity of Social
Security benefits means that the Social Security-inclusive tax wedge (holding current wages
fixed) is increasing in lifetime wages.
13These factors are “[t]raining and experience,” “[d]uties and responsibility”, “[t]ime and
effort devoted to the business,” “[d]ividend history,” “[p]ayments to non-shareholder employ-
ees,” “[t]iming and manner of paying bonuses to key people,” “[w]hat comparable businesses
pay for similar services,” “[c]ompensation agreements,” and “[t]he use of a formula to de-
termine compensation.”
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frictions: in my data, only 16% of those firms with positive wages to share-
holders in year t pay their shareholders the same nominal amount in year
t+ 1.14
3.2.1 Policy variation: HB 2117
This study exploits variation created by a tax reform in Kansas, known as
HB 2117, which took effect January 1, 2013. Among other reforms, the law
exempted pass-through income — specifically, amounts recorded on Schedules
C (sole proprietorships), E (partnerships, S corporations, rents, and royalties),
and F (farms) on federal Form 1040 — from state income tax. The exemption
did not apply to wages, including wages earned by owners of S corporations.
Thus, the wedge between wages and business income increased by 4.9 percent-
age points for most affected taxpayers, the rate that applied to taxable income
greater than $30,000.15 This tax change was likely quite salient for affected
individuals. The bill received considerable local press at its signing in May of
2012.16 Furthermore, it continued to receive substantial press over the next
several years, as it became a controversial political issue within Kansas. In
2017, the Kansas legislature repealed (among other things) the exemption of
pass-through income, overriding the governor’s veto.
Although HB 2117 affected sole proprietorships and partnerships, I do
not study such entities in this paper. Unlike S corporations, owner of sole
proprietors generally do not pay themselves wages for tax purposes; instead,
14Anecdotally, one common piece of advice for S corporation shareholders is to pay wages
to shareholders that are a fixed share (e.g., 50%) of operating income. In unreported results,
I find no bunching in the distribution of the ratio of wages to operating income, or the ratio
of wages to lagged operating income.






all income earned by sole proprietors is generally subject to self-employment
tax and all such income was exempted under HB 2117. Furthermore, some
partners (e.g., limited partners) face an incentive to reduce wage-equivalent
payments known as “guaranteed payments” in order to avoid self-employment
tax. However, HB 2117 initially applied the exemption from state income tax
to all income earned by partners, including guaranteed payments, meaning
that HB 2117 did not initially increase the relevant tax wedge for partners.
For these reasons, I restrict attention to S corporations in this study.
3.2.2 Section 199A deduction for qualified business in-
come
As part of Public Law No: 115-97 (originally referred to as the “Tax Cuts
and Jobs Act”), Congress introduced Section 199A to the Internal Revenue
Code. Under Section 199A, taxpayers may generally claim a deduction equal
to 20 percent of income earned through pass-through businesses, including S
corporations – reducing the effective marginal tax rate on that income. This
deduction is subject to various restrictions. First, the deduction is not avail-
able to a “specified service trade or business”, which includes firms in such
industries as law, accounting, financial services, and consulting.17 Second, the
deduction is limited to max(0.5W, 0.25W + 0.025A), where W is the total W2
wages paid by the business (including but not limited to wages to sharehold-
ers) and A is the original purchase price of certain depreciable assets held by
the business. However, neither of these two limitations (the denial to service
firms and the wage/asset limitation) apply if the taxpayer has taxable income
(computed without regard to this deduction) less than $157,500 (or $315,000
for married couples filing jointly).
17To be clear, this is a non-exhaustive list.
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Generally, Section 199A will have the effect of increasing the wedge be-
tween wages to shareholders and profits earned by S corporations, since the
profits will effectively be subject to a lower federal income tax rate (by 0.2×τ ,
where τ is the marginal rate) than wages. However, unlike HB 2117, this
will not be true for all firms: some service-firms owned by high-income share-
holders will not experience this increase in wedge. Furthermore, for a small
number of S corporations, the wage limitation (limiting the deduction to
max(0.5W, 0.25W + 0.025A)) could actually cause the wedge to fall.18 Thus,
while studying HB 2117 can provide insights on the effect of wages to share-
holders generally, one must be careful in applying this result to predict the
effects of Section 199A.
3.3 Data and Sample Construction
This paper uses data drawn from the database of administrative tax records.
The underlying database contains the near-universe of certain tax forms over
certain years. I use data primarily from three forms. First, I use data from
Form 1120S, which is filed by all S corporations. Form 1120S identifies the
corporation (typically through the Employer Identification Number (EIN))
and reports various income and deduction items as well as the number of
shareholders. Second, I use Schedule K-1 of Form 1120S, which is issued to
each shareholder of an S corporation. In addition to identifying the identity of
each shareholder (generally their Social Security Number (SSN)), Schedule K-1
allocates income and/or loss items to each shareholder. Third, I use Form W2,
which reports wage amounts paid by an firm to an individual. I use Form W2
18Consider a firm that earns operating income z before paying a wage w to its shareholders.
It has no other wages, and owns no assets. The owner has taxable income high enough to
be subject to the wage limitation. For this firm, the deduction will equal min(0.2(z −
w),max(0.5w, 0)) = min(0.2(z − w), 0.5w). A higher wage will lead to a larger deduction




(in combination with the shareholder-firm links established by Schedule K-1)
to calculate the total wages paid to all shareholders in a given year by a given
firm.19 The unit of observation is therefore at the firm-by-year level. Because
HB 2117 applies to Kansas residents earning income from activities performed
in Kansas, I restrict the sample to firms with at least one shareholder living
in the same state (according to Schedule K-1) as the firm’s home state (as
indicated by Form 1120S).20
I use the universe of S corporations from 2003 to 2015 with personal iden-
tifiers (such as SSNs and EINs) masked to protect taxpayer confidentiality.21
I make several restrictions to the data. First, the CDW data is raw and
unedited, and thus have several imperfections that require careful attention.
I drop firm-year observations with any of these imperfections. For instance, I
drop firm-year observations for which I cannot find a Schedule K-1. I also drop
firm-year observations in which the income reported on Form 1120S does not
match the sum of the income reported on the Schedules K-1. Further details
are discussed in Section 3.10.1.
Second, I keep only those firms for which wages and profits are one-for-
one substitutes (at least over some range). This is most apparent for single-
shareholder firms, as observed by Bull and Burnham (2008), but more gener-
ally this property applies to all firms in which all shareholders are employees.
19I define wages as Box 1 wages from Form W2. However, owners of S corporations
generally include in Box 1 wages health insurance premiums paid or reimbursed by the
corporation. Thus, ideally, one would prefer a measure of wages that strips out these health
insurance premiums. However, strategies for doing so introduce their own problems, as
discussed in Section 3.10.1. The inclusion of health insurance premiums in the definition
of wages will have the effect of adding noise and, as also discussed in Section 3.10.1, could
conceivably have the effect of biasing my results downward, suggesting that the true shifting
effect is less negative than my estimates.
20Additionally, I use Form 1041, Schedule K-1 to identify the beneficial owners of the
small number of trusts that are themselves the shareholders of S corporations. See Section
3.10.1 for details.
21Prior to 2003, the Form 1120S data do not include the number of shareholders, which
I use as a data quality check (see below).
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Such firms can construct a wage change that holds pre-tax allocations fixed,
and thus face the shifting incentive most strongly.22 By contrast, if at least
one shareholder has zero wages, then it is impossible to reduce wages without
changing pre-tax allocations: intuitively, the share of profits owned by the
set of shareholder-employees increases by less than one dollar for every dollar
of wage reduction. Ideally, I would operationalize this sample restriction by
dropping firms with at least one shareholder that is truly not an employee
(i.e., a shareholder that would not receive a wage under a counterfactual of no
tax wedge). This is not observable. Thus, I approximate this ideal restriction
by dropping firms that, as of time t − 1, have (1) multiple shareholders and
(2) at least one of these shareholders does not receive a wage from the firm.23
I do not drop any single-shareholder firms in this step, as the vast majority of
shareholders of single-shareholder firms perform services for the corporation
and thus are “potential” employees. For the sake of brevity, I will refer to the
survivors of this restriction as “Type A” firms (and the remainder as “Type
B” firms).
This second restriction (and the definition of the dependent variable, dis-
cussed below) leads mechanically to the third restriction: I require a firm to
be in the raw data, and free of the data imperfections described above, at time
t and t − 1 in order for the firm to be included in the estimation sample at
time t.
These various selection criteria are non-trivial and introduce some non-
randomness into the sample. Figure 3.6 shows that the share of firms that
are dropped starts just over 0.6 in 2004 – meaning that only 0.4 of firms are
kept – and decreases to 0.45 by the end of the sample period. Figure 3.7
22In particular, suppose shareholders 1, . . . , N (indexed by i) have ownership shares
λ1, . . . , λN that sum to one. If each shareholder’s wage is reduced by θλi for some pos-
itive amount θ, pre-tax allocations are unchanged.
23I will examine such firms separately in the Robustness section.
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shows the effect of each of the three steps sequentially. The upper-left panel
shows the share of observations dropped when requiring presence in the raw
data in t−1 and t. In Kansas, this share drops from about 0.11 to 0.08 over the
sample period, with a share consistently slightly higher in states other than
Kansas. The upper-right panel enforces sample-selection due to data quality
(and re-forces sample balance over t− 1 and t). This restriction – to be free of
data problems for two consecutive years – causes me to drop about 40% of the
remaining sample in the beginning period, and about 20% of the remaining
sample at the end of the sample period. Finally, the bottom panel restricts
the sample to “Type A” firms, which causes me to drop about 30% of the
remaining sample in Kansas and 25% in other states. Reassuringly, the trends
in the share dropped in all three steps are quite parallel in Kansas relative to
other states.
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics for the main estimation sample in
2010 through 2012. There are approximately 51,400 such firm-year observa-
tions in Kansas and 6,962,300 such firm-year observations in the sample in
other states.24 I report the share of firms that are single-shareholder firms, the
average number of shareholders, and medians of total income (gross receipts
less cost of goods sold), ordinary income, wages paid to shareholders, and to-
tal reported assets.25 The first column reports these statistics in Kansas, the
second column reports these statistics in the four bordering states of Colorado,
Missouri, Nebraska, and Oklahoma, and the third column reports these statis-
tics for all states other than Kansas (including D.C.). The number in brackets
indicates Kansas’s ranking among all 51 states for the statistic in question.
Of note, Kansas firms tend to be larger and earn higher profits than firms
in other states. Total income and total assets are each about 50% larger in
24To protect taxpayer confidentiality, these counts are rounded to the nearest 100.
25The median is rounded to the nearest $100 in order to protect taxpayer confidentiality.
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Kansas than in other states, and wages are about 70% larger in Kansas than in
other states, and ordinary income is nearly double other states. However, these
statistics seem to match other similarly rural states. For instance, Kansas has
the 8th highest ordinary income median of all states (as indicated by the “8”
in brackets); the seven states with a higher ordinary income pseudomedian are
(in order) North Dakota, Alaska, South Dakota, Nebraska, Wyoming, Iowa,
and Oklahoma.
Of note, roughly 27% of firms in Kansas (and 37% in other states) pay zero
wages to shareholders, consistent with results reported in Bull and Burnham
(2008). At first glance, this appears surprising, as we might intuitively expect
these firms to be at high risk for audit. However, as shown in Table 3.14,
the data shows that these firms are qualitatively different than firms that
pay positive wages to shareholders. As a first sanity check, only 8% of firms
that do not pay a wage to shareholders report a positive amount of officer
compensation on Form 1120S, compared to 93% for firms paying positive wages
to shareholders. This suggests that the firms that I identify as paying zero
wages to shareholders are, in fact, paying zero wages to shareholders, and
that this is not a data anomaly. Furthermore, it appears that zero-wage firms
are operating on a somewhat smaller scale. The median amount of assets is
approximately $12,600 for firms paying zero wages to shareholders and $77,700
for firms paying positive wages to shareholders. Furthermore, only 34% of zero-
wage firms have any employees, according to Form 941 (which records payroll
tax payments), while 65% of firms that pay positive wages to shareholders have
a non-shareholder employee. Similarly, firms that pay positive wages to their
shareholders are much more likely to have positive operating income and total
income. In sum, based on these statistics, it is perhaps less surprising that
a large number of firms pay zero wages to shareholders. As some number of
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these firms paying zero wages to shareholders may be on the margin between
paying and not paying, I include them in the sample.
3.4 Empirical Strategy and Main Results
3.4.1 Regression equation
To motivate the regression equation, I assume that the data generating process
for wages paid to shareholders, wist, is given by the following equation, where
i indexes firms, s indexes state, t indexes time, treats is a Kansas dummy, and
zist is operating income (i.e., ordinary income plus wages to shareholders).
ln(wist) = λt + µi + αs × t+ δ ln(zist)
+ β1
(








treats × 1(t ≥ 2015)
)
+ εist (3.1)
That is, log wages are given by firm (µi) and year (λt) fixed effects, a state-
specific linear trend, plus some multiple of log operating income, plus three
treatment effects. The first treatment effect, β1 represents the immediate effect
in 2013 and the second two effects, β2 and β3 represent the additional effects
in 2014 and 2015 respectively, which could reflect a delayed response due to
information or other adjustment frictions. The total (persistent) effect is equal
to β1 + β2 + β3, which is the primary object of interest.
However, this regression equation needs to be adjusted to account for
observations where wist = 0 or zist ≤ 0. This adjustment becomes more
tractable after taking a first difference, as follows, where λ̃t = λt − λt−1 and
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ε̃ist = εist − εis,t−1:














treats × 1(t = 2015)
)
+ ε̃ist (3.2)
I approximate the left-hand-side of Equation (3.2) by its second-order Tay-
lor approximation: the percent change at the midpoint, also known in the firm
dynamics literature as the “Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh” (DHS) difference
(Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996), Tornqvist, Vartia, and Vartia (1985)).
This functional form has the advantage of being defined when wist or wis,t−1
is equal to zero and is defined as follows:
yist =

0 wist = wis,t−1 = 0
wist−wis,t−1
0.5(wit+wis,t−1) else
Unfortunately, one cannot make the same approximation to (ln(zist) −
ln(zis,t−1)), since operating income can take on negative values. Thus, I re-
place ln(z) with a modified version of the inverse hyperbolic sine, sinh−1(z).
The inverse hyperbolic sine of z is equal to g(z; a) = ln(z +
√
z2 + exp(2a)),
with a = 0. When z is positive and not close to zero, this expression is approx-
imately ln(2) + ln(z). This means that the difference g(zist; a) − g(zis,t−1; a)
will approximate the log difference whenever zist and zis,t−1 are both positive
and not close to zero. The parameter a controls the size of this difference
when zist and zis,t−1 are of different “sign” (where “sign” is defined for this
purpose as “positive and not near zero”, “near zero”, and “negative and not
near zero”). A larger value of a reduces this difference.26 I use the value a = 9;
26This is equivalent (aside from an additive constant) to the functional form discussed in
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this value preserves the approximation between g(zist; a)−g(zis,t−1; a) and the
log difference when z is greater than $15,000 or so, while minimizing the noise
created by changes in sign. This choice of a has little effect on the results.27
Additionally, some preliminary data exploration suggests that this spec-
ification can be further improved. Figure 3.8 shows a binned scatter plot
(using all observations, in all states, from 2010-2015) of yist (the DHS differ-
ence in wages to shareholders) against g(zist; 9) − g(zis,t−1; 9) (the change in
operating income). The relationship is more appropriately described as logis-
tic rather than linear. This is unsurprising, given that yist is bounded above
and below, while g(zist; 9) − g(zis,t−1; 9) is not. For this reason, I will replace
∆zist ≡
(
g(zist; 9)− g(zis,t−1; 9)
)
with its logistic transformation, 11+exp(−∆zist) .
In sum, the first empirical specification in this paper is the following regres-
sion equation, where yist is the DHS difference in wages to shareholders, and
∆zist is defined as above as the difference in the modified inverse hyperbolic
sine of operating income, with a = 9:













treats × 1(t = 2015)
)
+ ε̃ist (3.3)







. This can be seen by considering θ = exp(−a).
27Of course, I could use this same functional form to approximate ln(wist)− ln(wis,t−1). I
show these specifications in the Robustness section. While results are qualitatively similar,
the choice of a does affect the precision of the results. Additionally, Table 3.13 shows the
nature of these approximations in general. It shows the value of f(xt, xt−1) for three types
of differences (log differences, DHS differences, and IHS differences), holding xt−1 fixed at
$30,000, and varying xt down the columns. We see that both the DHS difference and IHS
difference are within 10 percent of the log difference when xt is between $15,000 (i.e., a 50
percent decrease from $30,000) and $90,000 (i.e., a 200 percent increase). The functions
diverge when xt approaches zero.
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in the four states that border Kansas (Colorado, Missouri, Nebraska, and
Oklahoma).28
While this specification is most general, it is natural to consider a special-
ization in which we impose that δ = 0 by dropping the control for change
in operating income. This specialization leads to a regression equation that
is more transparent – a simple twoway fixed effects models (albeit where
the dependent variable is already an approximate first difference). Further-
more, this specialization is computationally easier as it can be estimated on
appropriately-weighted collapsed data; it will become clear in the following
section that computational simplicity is an important consideration. Thus, in
the main results below, I will show results from these specialized specifications
as well.29
One additional decision needs to be made regarding when to start the
sample. To illustrate the role of this decision, and to provide a visual summary
of the results, I plot the average percent change in wages (i.e., average yist)
over time from 2004 through 2015 in Figure 3.1, separately for Kansas firms
and control firms. In the top panel, the set of control firms is all non-Kansas
firms. In the bottom panel, the set of control firms is all firms in the four
border states. In both panels, the Kansas and non-Kansas series are fairly
parallel between 2010 and 2012.30 However, the Great Recession appeared to
affect Kansas firms to a smaller degree than non-Kansas firms, leading to some
28I estimate this model using the Stata command “reghdfe” (Correia (2016)).
29One could also specialize by redefining the dependent variable as the change in the
wage-share of operating income and by again dropping the control for change in operating
income. This effectively imposes a linear, unit elasticity of wages to shareholders with
respect to operating income. As we have seen, this elasticity appears non-linear. And,
as we will see, the elasticity is substantially less than one, even in the range where it is
largest. Thus, this specialization would be more severe than the specialization of imposing
a coefficient of zero.
30Note, however, that the Kansas series is persistently lower than the non-Kansas series,
suggesting that a specification without state fixed effects would lead to misleading results.
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non-parallel trends prior to 2010.31 For that reason, I start the difference-in-
differences regressions in 2010. Furthermore, there does appear to be a modest
drop in the dependent variable in Kansas in the post-period (relative to non-
Kansas firms), previewing the modestly negative regression results.
3.4.2 Inference
As discussed by Abadie, et al. (2014), the standard errors of the regression
estimates in this paper are precisely zero if we think of them as purely descrip-
tive: abstracting from data imperfections, there is zero uncertainty regarding
what happened to the population-level parameters that are being estimated in
these regressions – among the population of “Type A” firms under consider-
ation – because my sample includes the entire population.32 However, under
a causal interpretation of the estimates, we must account for uncertainty re-
garding the counterfactual population aggregate wages to shareholders. Put
differently, we will know the path of wages to shareholders in Kansas relative
to control states in the aftermath of HB 2117. But we do not know what
aggregate Kansas wages to shareholders would have been in the absence of HB
2117. This missing information creates uncertainty.
The natural approach in this setting is to use a randomization inference
technique in the spirit of Fisher (1935) (see MacKinnon and Webb (2016)
31In results available upon request, an event study regression (omitting 2012) does not
reject (using standard errors clustered by firm) that the 2011 and 2010 differences are the
same as the 2012 difference. The regression does reject that 2009, 2010, and 2011 differences
are equal to the 2012 difference. Figure 3.9 plots the analogous series after controlling for
the change in operating income. These plots do show a slight break in trend in 2012,
suggesting a possible threat to the parallel trend assumption (or, perhaps, indicating a
small anticipation effect). However, this trend break is not statistically significant, using
standard errors clustered by firm: the event study regression does not reject that the 2011
and 2010 differences are the same as the 2012 difference.
32If one instead considers my sample of firms to be drawn from a hypothetical infinite
population, then some sampling uncertainty is created which is well-measured by traditional
standard erorrs.
201
and Conley and Taber (2011) for more recent treatments).33 In broad terms,
this procedure calculates the distribution of the pre-post change in counter-
factual aggregate wages in each other state.34 This distribution then serves
as the estimated distribution of the uncertain change in counterfactual wages
in Kansas. If the actual change in Kansas is large relative to this distribu-
tion (in particular, if the Kansas change is most positive or most negative),
then we reject the null hypothesis of no effect, with size 251 ≈ 0.04.
35 The
key assumption of randomization inference is that (under the null) the es-
timated effect for Kansas has the same distribution as the estimated effects
for all other states. One simple threat to this assumption is heterogeneity in
sampling error: e.g., the estimated effects for states with fewer observations
might be estimated more noisily. In results available upon request, I find that
correcting for such heterogeneity does not change the estimated precision of
the coefficient estimates.
This method can also be used to construct confidence intervals. Consider
the bottom of the confidence interval, over which we pay special attention. As
discussed above, the predominant source of uncertainty is over the counter-
factual – i.e., the population-level average wages to shareholders that would
have occurred in Kansas in the absence of HB 2117. The true effect would
be more negative than the estimated effect only if the Kansas counterfactual
were more positive than that of the rest of the country. Under the randomiza-
tion inference method, we use the distribution of effects in other (untreated)
33If more states were treated, one could instead use the cluster-robust variance estimator,
or CRVE (Cameron and Miller (2015)). However, the CRVE becomes degenerate in a
setting such as the present setting when exactly one cluster is treated (MacKinnon and
Webb (2016)).
34Specifically, I estimate Equation (3.3) a total of 51 times, with each estimate corre-
sponding to a difference state (including D.C.) being coded as treated.
35This procedure gives essentially the same results as the procedure described in Conley
and Taber (2011); the only difference is that Conley and Taber (2011) imposes the null
hypothesis when estimating the distribution of placebo effects, which has an (imperceptible)
effect on the estimates of the treat and time fixed effects.
202
states to place a bound (with 4951 ≈96% confidence) on how good the Kansas
counterfactual might have been. So long as the Kansas counterfactual is no
better than the most positive untreated state – an outcome to which we as-
sign a confidence 5051 ≈98% – then the true treatment effect is no more negative
than the estimated effect minus this “good counterfactual.”36 Thus, we calcu-
late the bottom of the confidence interval as the Kansas estimate minus the
largest non-Kansas estimate.37 The top of the confidence interval is computed
analogously.
The randomization inference procedure needs to be adjusted when the
set of control states is restricted to the four states bordering Kansas. Left
unchanged, the test would be close to uninformative, as the probability of the
Kansas coefficient being the most positive or most negative under the null
would be 0.4, far higher than conventional confidence levels. So, for such
specifications, I modify the procedure such that when state j is coded as
treated, the sample is restricted to state j and the states bordering that state.
In this manner, I can again construct a large number of estimates (49, in this
case, as Alaska and Hawaii must be dropped) and reject the null only when
the Kansas estimate is the largest or smallest. Confidence intervals can be
computed analogously.
36The confidence interval is a 4951 ≈96% confidence interval because there is a
1
51 probability
that the bounds are too low and 151 probability that the bounds are too high.
37More formally, the bottom of the confidence interval is the largest value of c such that
one can reject H0 : β̂ − c = 0 from above. We reject H0 from above when β̂ − c is the
largest coefficient estimate. Let β̂max denote the largest placebo estimate. This implies
that the bottom of the confidence interval is β̂− β̂max. The top of the confidence interval is
analogous. One undesirable feature of this approach is that the confidence interval bounds,
which are simple transformations of a first and last order statistic, are themselves estimated
with substantial noise. One could instead form confidence intervals parametrically, using the
sample variance of the estimated placebo effect as the variance estimator for the coefficient.
This reduces the noise in the estimation of the bounds of the confidence intervals at the cost
of imposing an assumption of normality. Reassuringly, in unreported results, the confidence
intervals estimated in this manner are broadly similar.
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3.4.3 Baseline Results
Table 3.2 presents the baseline difference-in-difference estimates. In column 1
and 2, all states are included as control states. In columns 3 and 4, only border
states serve as control states. In the first column, I impose the restriction that
δ = 0 by not including the control for the change in operating income. The
dependent variable, measured at the firm-year level, is the percent change at
the midpoint (also known as the DHS difference) in wages paid to shareholders.
The regression is estimated from 2010 (that is, using the first difference from
2009 to 2010) to 2015 on the set of “Type A” firms – all single shareholder
firms as well as those firms in which all shareholders are employees (as of t−1).
In particular, the top panel presents the individual coefficient estimates on
treat× 1(t = 2013), treat× 1(t = 2014), and treat× 1(t = 2015) from Equa-
tion (3.3). I estimate that wages to shareholders fell by 1.4 percent in Kansas
in 2013, an additional 0.7 percent in 2014, and an additional 1.1 percent in
2015. Using standard errors clustered by firm (in braces), one can reject the
null of no effect for treat × 1(t = 2013) and treat × 1(t = 2015) (but not
treat × 1(t = 2014)). This standard error represents the uncertainty associ-
ated with the fact that the population is finite rather than infinite. However,
as discussed above, the primary source of uncertainty is not this sampling
error, but rather uncertainty over counterfactual population mean outcomes.
Consistent with this hypothesis, the randomization inference confidence inter-
vals, in brackets, are substantially wider and include zero. Thus, using the
randomization inference method, we do not reject the null of no effect.
The bottom panel reports the sum of the coefficients on treat × 1(t =
2013), treat× 1(t = 2014), and treat× 1(t = 2015). This sum represents the
estimated persistent effect of HB 2117 on wages paid to shareholders. The
estimate of -0.032 implies that the total effect on wages paid to shareholders
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was -3.2 percent. As above, this total effect is significantly different than
zero using standard errors clustered by firm, but is insignificant using the
more conservative randomization inference procedure. The remainder of the
entries in each column describe the operation of this randomization inference
procedure with respect to the total effect. In particular, the Kansas total effect
(the sum of the coefficients) was the 12th most negative estimate out of the
51 total estimates. The most positive placebo estimate occurred when Idaho
was coded as treated; the corresponding estimate is 0.129. Similarly, the most
negative placebo estimate occurred when North Dakota was coded as treated,
with an estimate of -0.147. This implies that the bottom of the confidence
interval is −0.032 − 0.129 = −0.161, as indicated in confidence interval in
brackets.
The left panel of Figure 3.2 illustrates the operation of the randomization
inference method with respect to this specification. The dark line corresponds
to the mean dependent variable (percent change in wages to shareholders) in
Kansas in each year minus the mean dependent variable in control states in
that year, normalized such that the average difference prior to 2013 is zero.
The remaining lines correspond to the analogous series when each of the other
50 states are coded as treated. The dark dashed lines in particular correspond
to series that represent the most negative and most positive placebo estimates
for the total effect. This figure shows that Kansas was roughly following a
parallel trend with its control states prior to 2013, after which point there was
a small drop. Yet, this figure also confirms visually that the Kansas treatment
effect is well within the distribution of placebo treatment effects, and thus is
insignificantly different than zero.
The second column of Table 3.2 shows the same estimates when the sam-
ple is restricted to Kansas and the four states that border Kansas. The point
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estimates in this table are quite similar to those in the first two columns. The
total effect is estimated to be -0.029 in column 2 relative to -0.032.38 While the
choice of control states has little effect on the point estimates, the confidence
intervals do narrow somewhat when only border states are used as controls.
Consider the right panel of Figure 3.2. This plot is analogous to the left
panel in that it plots the Kansas series in dark black, and the analogous series
for other states in dashed lines. However, each series is relative to the that
state’s border states. For instance, the Alabama series is relative to Florida,
Mississippi, Tennessee, and Georgia.39 Comparing the two graphs shows that
more of the mass in the right (border) graph is concentrated near zero; fur-
thermore, the series corresponding to the most positive estimate – which plays
a large role in determining the top of the confidence interval – has also shrunk
noticeably toward zero. For this reason, the confidence intervals shrink: in
column 2, one can rule out effects more negative than 10.5 percent.
In the third and fourth columns, I include the change in operating income
– using the functional form described in the previous section – as a control
variable. This specification is strictly more general than the specification in the
previous column. This yields an estimated total effect of about -0.025 using all
states as controls and -0.026 using border states as controls. Furthermore, the
coefficient on the control variable is approximately one. However, recall that
this control variable enters after a logistic transformation ( 11+exp(−x)). This
function has a slope of 14 through the origin; thus, the coefficient of one means
that the elasticity of wages to shareholders with respect to operating income
is about 14 for small changes in operating income.
The results in this table show that controlling for the change in operating
income does not change the coefficient estimates substantially: in either case,
38Additionally, the results in columns 3 and 4, discussed below, are also similar.
39There is no Alaska series or Hawaii series in this graph.
206
the effect of HB 2117 appears to be small. This control variable is largely
irrelevant not because it has no effect on the dependent variable (indeed, one
can easily reject δ = 0), but rather because it is approximately orthogonal
to treatment. The first column of the top panel of Table 3.15 shows this
explicitly: operating income fell by a modest 4 percent in Kansas relative to
all other states, and one percent relative to the states that border Kansas.
In related specifications using a propensity-score reweighted sample and using
the synthetic control method (to be discussed later), this estimate is closer to
zero and sometimes switches sign.40
Even though the control for operating income does not affect the point
estimate, it could still affect the confidence intervals by absorbing residual
variation. E.g., it could be the case that the highly positive and negative
placebo estimates reflect a boom or bust for the fortunes of S corporations
in those placebo states more generally – which has an effect on wages to
shareholders as a byproduct. This does appear to be the case, to a modest
extent: the randomization confidence intervals (especially the upper bound)
in columns 2 and 4 shrink somewhat toward zero relative to those in columns
1 and 3.
3.5 Refinements
3.5.1 Propensity score reweighting
The difference-in-differences specification presented in Table 3.2 relies on a
strong parallel trend assumption. In particular, we must assume that the
difference in the dependent variable between Kansas and control states in
the pre-period would remain the same in the post-period, but for the causal
40The bottom panel of Table 3.15 shows that this orthogonality continues to hold after
the logistic transformation.
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effect of HB 2117 (perhaps conditional on operating income). The visual
evidence in Figure 3.1 indicates that the trends look fairly parallel between
2010 and 2012 suggesting that, perhaps, the trends could be expected to stay
parallel in in 2013 and beyond under the counterfactual. However, the figure
also shows that trends were markedly non-parallel prior to 2010, with Kansas
firms responding differently to the Great Recession than non-Kansas firms.
Additionally, summary statistics in Table 3.1 show substantial differences in
the size and profitability of firms in Kansas relative to other states, which
could affect counterfactual outcomes. Thus, it would be desirable to relax the
parallel trend assumption.
To make things concrete, suppose that the true data generating process
under the counterfactual is given by the following interactive effects model,
where κt and θs are each vectors of arbitrary length K and ηst and εist are
each mean-zero idiosyncratic error terms.41
ln(wist) = µi + κ′tθs + ηst + εist (3.4)
This model is a generalization of the error structure in Equation (3.1) in that
it allows a more general form of state-time specific shocks. After taking a
first difference and aggregating to the state-year level, this can be written as
follows, where κ̃t = κt− κt−1 and ust is ηst− ηs,t−1 plus the average within s, t
of εist − εis,t−1:
yst = κ̃′tθs + ust (3.5)
Thus, each time period has a set of factors common across all states, while
each state has a set of factor loadings constant over time. Under this model,
41More generally, one can heuristically interpret ln(wist) in this equation as having been
already residualized on operating income.
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it is possible that a national shock arrives after HB 2117 (κ̃t) to which Kansas
reacts differently than other states due to heterogeneity in θs. Two-way fixed
effects at the state and year level cannot absorb such time-varying effects, even
after taking a first difference.
One strategy for addressing this possibility is to “guess” what the key
factors θs are – call them θgs – and make the sample look as similar as possible
according to these θgs . I implement this by using propensity score reweighting.
In particular, I estimate one probit model per year, where the dependent
variable is one when the firm is a Kansas firm, and the independent variables
include year t − 1 values of the following variables: industry dummies (at
the two-digit NAICS level), dummies for the year in which the firm was first
observed in the data (as a proxy for age of the firm), dummies for number
of employees in six bins, a dummy for wages to shareholders being positive, a
dummy for being a single-shareholder firm, total income, total assets, ordinary
income, and wages to shareholders.42 Using the results of this probit regression,
I assign a weight to each firm in the year in question. The weights equal 1
p̂ist
for those firms in Kansas and 11−p̂ist for other firms. That is, firms in Kansas
receive a higher weight if their covariates make them look like non-Kansas
firms (i.e., if p̂ist is small), and vice versa.
Table 3.16 shows that this procedure is quite successful at creating a
sample that matches along the targeted covariates. The first two columns
show the unweighted means of the various covariates among observations in the
regression sample (i.e., t = 2010, . . . , 2015). Kansas firms are somewhat more
likely to be in the agriculture or finance industries, to have more employees,
and to be older. Furthermore, Kansas firms are noticeably larger in terms of
total income, ordinary income, assets, and wages to shareholders. Propensity
42Total income, total assets, ordinary income, and wages paid to shareholders enter using
a modified inverse hyperbolic sine function g(x; a) = ln(x+
√
x2 + exp(2a)), with a = 9.
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score reweighting reduces these disparities dramatically. For instance, in the
unweighted sample, average log wages to shareholders in Kansas are about
0.20 (that is, 20 log points) larger than in other states. In the reweighted
sample, this gap shrinks to about 0.004.43
The regression results are presented in Table 3.3.44 They are slightly less
negative than those presented in Table 3.2 for the unweighted sample. The
estimated total effects are between -0.019 and -0.020. All estimates remain
insignificantly different than zero under the randomization inference method.
Furthermore, the confidence interval is narrower; the lower bound of the con-
fidence interval shrinks from -0.161 to -0.084 in column 1 and from -0.105 to
-0.061 in column 3, suggesting that the inverse propensity score weighting is
able to better match (placebo) treated and control states.45 Furthermore, as
in the case in Table 3.2, adding the control for the change in operating in-
come does not affect the coefficient estimates, but does improve precision: the
bottom of the confidence interval shrinks from -0.084 in column 1 to -0.065 in
column 3, and from -0.061 in column 2 to -0.055 in column 4.
In sum, using inverse propensity score weights has very little effect on the
estimates, though it does improve the precision of the estimates substantially.
In the framework of the interactive effects model, the lack of an effect on the
point estimates would be consistent with two explanations. First, κ̃t could be
very similar in the post-period (i.e., 2013 through 2015) and the pre-period
43Table 3.17 presents similar results when the control states are limited to the four
border states.
44Figure 3.10 plots the mean dependent variable over time in the propensity-score-
reweighted sample, separately in Kansas and in all other states. The figure is qualitatively
similar to Figure 3.1. Furthermore, Figure 3.11 plots the Kansas series relative to placebo
series, in a manner analogous to Figure 3.2. This figure shows that the dispersion of placebo
estimates has reduced.
45To be clear, these randomization inference procedures involve repeating the entire es-
timation – including generating the weights – with each state s being coded as treated.
E.g., when Alabama is coded as treated, the probit regressions are re-estimated with the
dependent variable equal to one when the firm is an Alabama firm.
210
(2010 through 2012) – i.e., even if Kansas would react differently to shocks
than other states, there were no new shocks to react to. Second, it could be
the case that the covariates used in the propensity score estimation (θgs) are
poor proxies for θs. In any case, if the counterfactual outcome in Kansas were
not described well by the parallel trend assumption, it cannot be explained by
initial differences in these observed covariates.
3.5.2 Synthetic Control
The synthetic control method (Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010)) is
another strategy for estimating treatment effects when only one unit is treated.
One version of the method constructs a “synthetic” control unit to match
solely the evolution of the dependent variable prior to treatment. Specifically,
suppose there areN+1 units (states) indexed by s, with the first unit treated at
time T0 and the remainder untreated. With the data aggregated to the state-
year level, a set of weights vs is chosen for the control states (with
∑
vs = 1










Another version of the synthetic control method effectively adds a con-
straint to the selection of the weights vs. In particular, let zs denote a vector
of covariates for state s. In addition to the “adding up” (∑ vs = 1) and
non-negativity constraints (0 ≤ vs ≤ 1∀s), the weights are chosen in order to
minimize (3.6), subject to the constraint that the weights also minimize the
following expression for some diagonal, positive definite matrix Ω, where the
diagonal elements of Ω reflect the “penalty weight” given to each covariate in
46I.e., yst is the average of yist within state s in year t, where yist is the D.H.S. difference
in wages to shareholders. Because of the need to aggregate data to the state-year level, I do










Thus, the additional constraint requires that the weights not only match
the pre-treatment evolution of the dependent variable, but also some pre-
determined set of covariates chosen by the econometrician. In practice, I
include in z a full set of two-digit industry dummies, as well as the 2012
(i.e., T0 − 1) values of total income, ordinary income, assets, and wages to
shareholders.47
Under either version of the synthetic control method, the estimated treat-
ment effect in year t is equal to the difference between y1t and
∑N+1
s=2 ystvs in
the post-period. In practice, however, I estimate the treatment effect as a
difference-in-differences (i.e., using Equation (3.3) with δ imposed to be zero,
at the state-year level). As the number of pre-treatment periods approaches in-
finity, the difference in the pre-period will converge to zero, so these estimators
are asymptotically equivalent. In finite samples, the difference-in-differences
will control for any persistent level differences in the dependent variable that
have not been perfectly eliminated by the synthetic control method. To per-
form inference, I continue to use the RI-β procedure, which is standard in
the synthetic controls literature (Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010),
Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003)).
When the true data generating process is described by an interactive effects
model, Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010) show that, under standard
assumptions, this method consistently estimates the treatment effect as the
length of the pre-treatment period goes to infinity. Intuitively, in order for a
47Total income, ordinary income, assets, and wages to shareholders enter as transformed
by a modified inverse hyperbolic sine function, g(x; a) = ln(x+
√
x2 + exp(a)), with a = 9.
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synthetic unit to match the treated unit on the pre-treatment evolution of y,
it must also match on the factor loadings θ, as the idiosyncratic error terms
u average out. A key feature of this method is that one need not guess the
identity of covariates that affect the future path of the dependent variable.
On the other hand, the modest length of the pre-treatment period in the
present setting – nine years – may make the appeals to asymptotic theory
fairly heroic. In other words, the weights may be non-trivially affected by
idiosyncratic shocks u rather than the factor loadings θ.
Thus, the choice between propensity score reweighting and synthetic con-
trols is a classic mean/variance tradeoff. Propensity score reweighting makes
the implausible assumption that the true covariates are known, but the match-
ing is highly precise. The synthetic control method does not require the econo-
metrician to know the identity of the covariates – and further allows for these
covariates to be unobservable – but the matching might be somewhat noisier.
Table 3.4 presents the regression results using the synthetic controls method.
Column 1 does not impose the constraint in Equation (3.7) and Column 2
does so. The coefficient estimates are quite similar to the estimates using the
propensity score reweighted sample (which are themselves less negative than
the baseline difference-in-differences estimates). The total estimated effects are
-0.014 in column 1 and -0.027, indicating only a very slight reduction in wages
paid to shareholders in Kansas after HB 2117. The confidence intervals are
broadly similar to those in the propensity score reweighted sample. The most
positive placebo estimate in column 1 comes from California, with an estimate
of 0.052. The bottom of the confidence interval is thus−0.014−0.052 = −0.066
in this column. Column 2 is similar: the most positive placebo estimate comes
from Massachusetts, with an estimate of 0.051; the bottom of the confidence
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interval is -0.078.48
In sum, the synthetic control results echo the difference-in-differences re-
sults. They show a small negative effect after the implementation of HB 2117,
but this effect is modest when compared to the distribution of placebo treat-
ment effects in other states.
3.6 Discussion
The empirical methods so far have not uncovered a large negative effect of
HB 2117 on wages paid to shareholders: using the randomization inference
method, I can reject effects more negative than 6 to 8 percent in the most
precise specifications. This small response stands in contrast to the findings in
the literature that a substantial amount of income is shifted along this margin.
One explanation for these divergent results is that the set of taxpayers affected
by HB 2117 is less sophisticated than taxpayers studied in the literature. In
particular, evidence put forward by Auten, Splinter, & Nelson (2016) focused
on high-income S corporation owners, defined as having combined wages and S
corporation income in excess of $1 million (in early-1990s dollars). Similarly,
Smith, et al. (2017) examine firms that switch from C corporations to S
corporations, whose owners may be more sophisticated than S corporation
owners as a whole.49
However, I argue that there is a more fundamental potential explanation
to the modest results found in this paper. This explanation relates to the
sign of the counterfactual (i.e., pre-reform) tax wedge. In the literature on
48Figure 3.12 considers the visual evidence regarding the match quality produced by the
synthetic control method in this context. It finds that the match quality in the pre-period
is “reasonable” in Kansas; some states match much better and other states match much
worse. Furthermore, the figure shows that the Kansas estimate in the post-period is small
relative to the distribution of placebo estimates.
49On the other hand, the evidence in Bull and Burnham (2008) suggests that smaller
firms also engaged in such shifting.
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shifting by S corporation owners, the counterfactual is no tax incentive, or a tax
disincentive. For instance, the uncapping of the Medicare component of FICA
(Auten, Splinter, and Nelson (2016)) introduced the shifting incentive for the
first time for affected taxpayers. Similarly, in the case of firms switching from C
corporation to S corporation (Smith, et al. (2017)), the tax incentive switches
from being favorable to wages to disfavorable to wages.50 Additionally, in most
other shifting contexts, a reform introduces an incentive (e.g., in the case of
the NIIT coming into effect, applying to passive S corporation income but not
active) or changes the sign of the incentive (e.g., in the case of the reduction of
the individual rate below the corporate rate in the Tax Reform Act of 1986).
By contrast, in the present setting, the shifting incentive already existed prior
to HB 2117 and was made stronger by that legislation. In this section, I show
that standard models of tax evasion (e.g., Yitzhaki (1987), Slemrod & Yitzhaki
(2002)), as adapted to the present context, can easily explain why the shifting
effect may be decreasing in the size of the baseline wedge.
3.6.1 Model
I assume that firms earn some exogenous positive operating income z (before
paying wages to shareholders). This amount can be allocated as wages to
shareholders w ≥ 0 and profits π, subject to w + π = z. Wages face an addi-
tional tax t that profits do not. Let w∗ denote the wage that the shareholders
would receive in the absence of tax incentives. Define shifting s to be the
amount of wage underreporting relative to w∗; i.e., s ≡ w∗ − w.
As in the standard models of evasion, I model this decision as a gamble.
50In the context of Bull and Burnham (2008), who compare multi-shareholder firms
to single-shareholder firms, the relevant counterfactual is somewhat less obvious. Multi-
shareholder firms (in particular, those in which at least one shareholder is not an employee)
still face a shifting incentive, but this incentive is qualitatively different as it must overcome
a desire to hold pre-tax allocations fixed.
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In a “good” state of the world, the firm enjoys the monetary value of shifting
st. However, there are two potential “bad” states of the world. I assume that
the firm is audited with probability pA(s); in this state, the firm pays a fixed
cost of intrusion or embarrassment, equal to F . The shifting is reversed by the
IRS with unconditional probability pR(s) (or, equivalently, the probability of
reversal given audit is pR(s)
pA(s) , assuming that audit is a pre-requisite for reversal);
in this state, the firm additionally repays the amount of shifting, plus a fine
equal to θ times the amount shifted. I assume that pR(s) and pA(s) are each
weakly increasing and weakly convex for s ≥ 0.51 Thus, the firm’s problem is
to choose s in order to solve the following optimization problem.52
(1− pR(s))st+ pR(s)(−θst)− pA(s)F (3.8)
The first order expression can be written as follows (suppressing the arguments
of pR and pA for conciseness):
t(1− pR(1 + θ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
MB(s)
= st(1 + θ)p′R + p′AF︸ ︷︷ ︸
MC(s)
(3.9)
The expression to the left of the equals sign corresponds to the marginal ben-
efit (MB) of shifting an extra dollar. It is equal to the expected increase in
monetary payoff resulting from the marginal dollar of shifting, holding prob-
abilities fixed. The right-hand-side corresponds to the marginal cost (MC),
which comes from the increase in the probability of the “bad” states of the
world.
There are two forces potentially pushing the shifting effect (that is, ds
dt
)
to be decreasing in t. To see this, let us consider two extreme cases. First,
51I further assume that the taxpayer cannot reduce pR(s) or pA(s) by reporting w > w∗;
i.e., I assume that p′R(s) ≤ 0 for s < 0 and likewise for p′R(s).
52For simplicity, I assume risk neutrality, which is common in evasion models with en-
dogenous probabilities of detection.
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suppose we take the limit as F → 0. In this case, when t = 0, the amount of
shifting is zero.53 But so long as t > 0, the size of the tax wedge has no effect
on the amount shifted – any positive wedge will lead to the same amount of
shifting.
Intuitively, the MB curve is downward sloping in s, since the expected
monetary gain to shifting is decreasing in s (because the probability of reversal
is increasing in s). The MC curve is upward sloping: the increase in reversal
probability brought about by the marginal dollar of shifting is costlier when
the stock of shifting is larger. An increase in t increases the MB curve – which
makes sense, since each dollar of shifting has a higher monetary value so long
as pR < 11+θ . But, perhaps less obviously, an increase in t also increases the
marginal cost of shifting (pivoting the curve counter-clockwise around zero).
This occurs because any positive stock of shifting becomes more valuable when
t increases. This causes the increased probability of reversal (brought about
by the marginal dollar of shifting) to be costlier. In this extreme case, these
two effects precisely offset each other. This is illustrated in the linear case
in Figure 3.3; however, this result is more general, which can be seen by
observing that t cancels out from the first order condition when F = 0. When
F > 0, by contrast, shifting will generally increase as t increases (ds
dt
> 0),
since the associated component of the marginal cost (p′A(s)F ) curve does not
increase when t increases. But even when F > 0, the pivoting of the marginal




In the other extreme case, we set F > 0 but pR = 0. That is, the only cost of
audit is a fixed cost – i.e., in this extreme case, shifting attracts extra scrutiny
from the IRS, but the IRS is never successful at actually reversing the shifting.
53The amount of shifting at t = 0 and F = 0 is indeterminate. An amount ε > 0 of fixed
cost pins this down at zero.
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In this setup, the mechanism causing a diminishing shifting effect is perhaps
more intuitive. In particular, the first order condition reduces to t = Fp′A(s).
Thus, the solution in this case is heavily driven by the shape of p′A(s). In
Figure 3.4, I plot what the marginal cost curve (Fp′A(s)) would need to look
like in order to generate a diminishing shifting effect when pR(s) = 0. In
particular, the marginal cost curve must be convex – i.e., slowly increasing for
shifting near zero, and more steeply increasing for larger amounts of shifting.
This may be reasonable approximation of the truth. It reflects the case when
there is a wide range of w that taxpayers are very confident that the IRS
will deem “reasonable.” As wages decrease further (i.e., as shifting increases
further), taxpayers fear that the IRS will get suspicious at an increasingly fast
rate. As a concrete example, suppose that taxpayers believe that the IRS will
audit returns with s > s with a fixed positive probability, and will not audit
firms with s ≤ s. But taxpayers are uncertain about the value of s; they
believe it to be normally distributed with some mean to the that is further to
the right than the range of Figure 3.4. The resulting perceived probability of
audit function would generate a convex marginal cost curve over this region.54
Figure 3.4 shows that when the tax wedge is zero, taxpayers locate at
s = 0. When the tax wedge is increased from zero to some positive amount
(given in the lower dotted line), taxpayers shift rightward substantially, to the
intersection of the dotted lines at s1. However, when the tax wedge is increased
again, the response (from s1 to s2) is much smaller. This occurs because the
first change (from zero to t1) is enough to cause taxpayers to shift to the more
steeply increasing part of the marginal cost curve. The second change (from
t1 to t2) is enough only to cause taxpayers to shift upward along this steeply
54Additionally, individuals might face a psychic cost of dishonesty h(s), which would play
a similar role as pA(s)F . The shape of the marginal cost curve in Figure 3.4 might be a
realistic depiction of the derivative of this psychic cost function, h′(s).
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increasing part of curve.
Thus, there are multiple forces at play – which are not mutually exclusive
– causing the shifting effect to diminish with the tax wedge. Either force, or
both, could potentially explain the fairly small shifting response to HB 2117
uncovered in the empirical sections above.
3.7 Heterogeneous effects
The empirical methods so far have not uncovered a large negative effect of HB
2117 on wages paid by S corporations to their shareholders. One explanation
for this small effect is that the size of the existing incentive reduces the effect
of a subsequent increase. If this explanation is correct, then it may also be
the case that firms that faced a smaller initial wedge prior to HB 2117 may
have exhibited a larger response. In this section, I test this hypothesis. In
particular, the counterfactual tax wedge (i.e., FICA) is 15.3% if wages and
self-employment income from all sources (hereafter “earnings”) is less than the
Social Security Contribution and Benefit Base ($113,700 in 2013; hereafter,
the “Social Security cap”). Above this cap, it is 2.9%, plus an additional
0.9% for tax units with earnings in excess of $200,000 ($250,000 for joint
filers).55 Thus, the theory suggests that firms owned by shareholders with
counterfactual earnings in excess of the Social Security cap should exhibit a
stronger response. I proxy for this status at the firm level by defining a firm
to be a “high-wedge” firm in year t if less than half of its shareholders have
earnings greater than the Social Security cap in year t − 1.56 The remaining
55For joint filers, the 0.9% Additional Medicare Tax depends on joint earnings, while the
Social Security cap applies to individual earnings. Thus, it is possible that the lower-earning
spouse of a couple subject to the Additional Medicare Tax could face a marginal tax wedge
of 16.2%. As the additional wedge created by the Additional Medicare Tax is small relative
to the regular Social Security and Medicare taxes, I do not exploit this variation.
56From 2011 onward, the share of shareholders with earnings in excess of the Social Secu-
rity cap is weighted by ownership. In 2010 and earlier, ownership share was not available,
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firms are “low-wedge” firms. I then repeat the same three methods – baseline
difference-in-differences, propensity score reweighting, and synthetic control –
separately for “low-wedge” and “high-wedge” firms.
Table 3.5 presents summary statistics for firms in the pre-period (i.e.,
2010-2012), separately for low-wedge and high-wedge firms. Unsurprisingly,
low-wedge firms are substantially larger and more profitable. This suggests
that one should be cautious in interpreting any differential response as caused
solely by the initial tax wedge. In particular, as low-wedge firms are larger,
they may be more sophisticated, which may have a direct effect on the size of
the response to a change in tax incentives. Furthermore, the sample size of low-
wedge firms is relatively small – approximately 7,800 firm-year observations
in Kansas in the pre-period – which previews the relative imprecision of the
regression results presented below. Additionally, as in the summary stats
for the full sample presented in Table 3.1, Kansas firms in this sample are
somewhat larger and more profitable than non-Kansas firms, though these
differences are mitigated in the border sample.
Table 3.6 presents the baseline difference-in-differences results.57 For the
sake of conciseness, I report only the sum of the coefficient estimates on treat×
1(t = 2013), treat × 1(t = 2014), and treat × 1(t = 2015), which represents
the total estimated effect. In columns 1 and 3, firms in all states are included
in the regression. In columns 2 and 4, only firms from Kansas and its four
bordering states are included in the regression. In columns 3 and 4, I add the
control for the change in operating income (with a coefficient that is allowed
to be different between high- and low-wedge firms). Across each of the four
columns, the results are quite consistent. As presented in the first row, the
so all shareholders are equally weighted.
57Figures 3.13 plots the evolution of the mean dependent variable in Kansas and in
control states, using all states as control states. Figure 3.14 plots the analogous series
using only border states as control states.
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effect is estimated to be between -0.016 and -0.029 among high-wedge firms.
This is quite close to the estimates using the entire sample, as is to be expected
given that such firms make up approximately 85% of the full sample.
Of note, the estimates are somewhat more negative for low-wedge firms: be-
tween -0.038 and -0.084, with slightly more negative results after including the
control for the change in operating income. This result is consistent with the
theory discussed in the prior section. However, these estimate are somewhat
imprecise. In particular, one cannot reject equality between the coefficients
on high-wedge and low-wedge firms applying randomization inference to the
difference in coefficients. Furthermore, the randomization inference method
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient for either type of firm
is zero. On the other hand, the randomization inference confidence intervals
are sufficient to rule out very large effects among each subset of firms: using
the difference-in-differences confidence intervals in the border sample, one can
rule out an effect more negative than 14 percentage points for high-wedge firms
and 10 percentage points for low-wedge firms. These results become somewhat
more pronounced after propensity-score reweighting, as shown in Table 3.7.
Relative to Table 3.6, the estimates for high-wedge firms in Table 3.7 are
somewhat closer to zero, while the estimates for low-wedge firms are more neg-
ative, with the most negative result being -0.116 in column 3. Furthermore,
when including the control for the change in operating income, the random-
ization inference procedure does in fact reject that the effects for low-wedge
and high-wedge firms are the same.58
Results from the synthetic controls strategy, run separately for high- and
low-wedge firms, are broadly similar. Table 3.8 presents the regression results.
The top row reports results for high-wedge firms and the bottom row reports
58Of course, this procedure makes no correction for multiple inference.
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results for low-wedge firms; column 2 imposes covariate matching while column
1 does not. For the sake of conciseness, I report only the sum of the three
coefficient estimates. The results are slightly less negative for both types of
firms. Furthermore, the bottom of the confidence interval shrinks to -0.13
for low-wedge firms and -0.06 for high-wedge firms. Yet, the randomization
inference does not allow us to rule out equality between the two types of firms
at the 10% level.
In sum, I estimate modestly larger negative effects for low-wedge firms
(those with initial shareholder earnings greater than the Social Security cap)
than for high-wedge firms (those with initial shareholder earnings less than the
Social Security cap). This is consistent with the theory presented in Section
3.6, in that the firms facing a lower counterfactual tax wedge appeared to
exhibit a larger response. However, these estimates are noisy due to the modest
sample size. Furthermore, the point estimates could be explained by other
factors, such as differences in sophistication and salience. Thus, these results
are suggestive but far from conclusive.
3.8 Other outcomes and sensitivity analyses
3.8.1 Officer compensation
In the baseline results, the dependent variable is constructed by linking firms
to shareholders through Form 1120S, Schedule K-1, and additionally linking
firms to employees through Form W2. An alternative approach is to use a
line item from Form 1120S directly. In particular, firms are required to report
“Officer Compensation,” a deductible expense, on line 7 of Form 1120S. This
measure is not equal to wages paid to shareholders, in general: shareholders
need not be officers, and officers need not be shareholders. Nevertheless, the
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officer compensation line item has the advantage of not requiring any links –
and thus might be subject to less measurement error. The two measures are
quite closely related. Nelson (2016) has shown that the time series of officer
compensation matches fairly well the time series of wages paid to S corporation
shareholders over the set of years when both are available. Additionally, in
my data, the two amounts tend to match each other fairly closely within a
given firm. In Figure 3.16, I plot a histogram of the (log) difference between
wages to shareholders and officer compensation for each firm, conditional on
positive wages to shareholders. The leftmost bin includes only those firms for
which officer compensation equals wages to shareholders exactly – of note, this
bin contains just over half the sample. For an additional 22 percent of firms,
officer compensation and wages to shareholders are within 10 log points of
each other.
Table 3.9 presents regression results when the dependent variable is de-
fined as the percent change in officer compensation at the midpoint.59 The
estimates are slightly more positive than the analogous estimate using calcu-
lated wages to shareholders. For instance, the estimated total effect using all
states as a control variable under the baseline difference-in-differences speci-
fication (first column, first row) is 0.002, compared to -0.032 in Table 3.2.
The most negative estimate is -0.005 and all estimates are less than or equal
to 0.015 in magnitude. Furthermore, the precision improves somewhat. Thus,
the results using officer compensation are further evidence of a null effect, or
a small negative effect at best.60
59Throughout this section, I report only the estimated total effect for conciseness. I also
do not include the control for change in operating income.
60An additional reassuring observation is that (with only one exception) the same states
generate the most-negative and most-positive placebo estimates, compared to the specifica-
tions with wages paid to shareholders as the dependent variable.
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3.8.2 Alternative functional form
The dependent variable in the primary empirical specifications is the change
in a firm’s wages paid to shareholders, as measured by the percent change at
the midpoint, also known as the Davis-Haltiwanger-Schuh (D.H.S.) difference.
One disadvantage of this strategy is that a change from $0 to $1 causes the de-
pendent variable to take on the same value as a change from $0 to $100,000. In
this section, I consider the sensitivity of this specification choice to an alternate
functional form: the change in the inverse hyperbolic sine (and modifications
thereof) of wages paid to shareholders, which does not suffer from this problem
(Pence (2006)).
In particular, the inverse hyperbolic sine of w is equal to ln(w+
√
w2 + 1).
For values of w sufficiently greater than zero, this is approximately equal to
ln(w) + ln(2), but unlike the logarithm, the domain of the inverse hyperbolic
sine is the entire real line. In this section, I define the dependent variable as
the first difference of a small modification to the inverse hyperbolic sine, as
follows:61
yit = g(wit; a)− g(wi,t−1; a) (3.10)







If the shift parameter a were equal to zero, then g(wit; a) would be the
inverse hyperbolic sine of wit. When a increases, the value of g(0; a) increases
(to g(0; a) = a), while having only a small effect on g(w′; a)−g(w; a) for w,w′ >
$10, 000 or so. As a result, a lower a assigns a higher value (in magnitude) to
yit for moves to or from wit = 0, while having little effect on changes along the
61Note that this is the same functional form used to construct the change in operating
income z.
224
“intensive margin.” In this section, I will present results for 0 ≤ a ≤ 9.62 I will
also consider a dependent variable equal to the first difference of a dummy for
paying any positive wages to shareholders. Conceptually, this corresponds to
the limiting case when a→ −∞.
Table 3.10 presents the estimated total effect (that is, the sum of the
coefficients on treat×1(t = 2013), treat×1(t = 2014), and treat×1(t = 2015))
using these alternative functional forms. The estimate in the top panel column
1 (which uses all states as control states) implies that the share of firms paying
positive wages to shareholders decreased by 0.2 percentage points in Kansas
after HB 2117, from a base of about 72%. This estimate is insignificantly
different from zero even with standard errors clustered by firm, and remains
insignificant using RI-β. The coefficient in column 1 in bottom panel, using
only border states as control states, is quite similar. Thus, there is little
evidence that HB 2117 affected firms along the extensive margin of paying any
wages to shareholders at all. In the remainder of the columns, the dependent
variable is the first difference if g(w; a). Compared to the results presented
in Table 3.2, the coefficient estimates tend to be more negative, with the
largest estimate in magnitude being -0.059. However, all estimates (coefficients
and confidence intervals) shrink toward zero when a increases from 0 to 9,
moving rightward in the table. Given that column 1 found no effect along
the extensive margin, these differences in coefficients can be attributed to the
reduction of noise arising from changes along the extensive margin. With a =
9, which puts the least weight on extensive margin responses, the coefficients
and confidence intervals are quite close to the baseline estimates. Thus, these
alternate functional forms confirm the earlier results: HB 2117 appears not
62For a ≤ 9, such changes along the intensive margin (i.e., g(w′; a) − g(w; a)) can be
interpreted as a log change for values of w and w′ near the median. For a > 9, this
interpretation starts to break down.
225
to have caused a substantial reduction in wages paid to shareholders of S
corporations in Kansas.
3.8.3 Robustness to alternative samples
Table 3.11 presents the regression estimates using three alternative samples.63
In the baseline, firms are in the main sample if they are a single-shareholder
firm, or if all shareholders are employees (at time t − 1). The first row re-
stricts this further to the set of single-shareholder firms. Such firms could
plausibly respond more strongly to a change in the tax wedge, as there are no
coordination problems preventing adjustment. The estimates in this row are
slightly less negative than the baseline results, suggesting that the inclusion
of multi-shareholder firms is not causing me to miss a larger response among
single-shareholder firms.
The second row uses the sample of “Type B” firms. These are the firms
that face a more complicated wage-setting problem as they have at least one
shareholder that earns no wages (as of time t−1). In such firms, wages cannot
be reduced without changing pre-tax allocations; thus, one might expect a
smaller shifting response. The results presented in the second row confirm
that Type B firms did not exhibit a large response: all estimates are slightly
less negative than the main results for Type A firms. However, estimates for
neither type of firm are significantly different than zero and the estimates for
the two types of firms are not significantly different from each other; thus,
these results are consistent with other explanations, including a null effect for
all firms, as well.
Finally, the third row drops all firms that pay zero wages to shareholders
63For computational reasons, I do not present RI-β confidence intervals for the propensity-
score reweighted specification. Such confidence intervals would have required re-estimating
separate first-stage probit regressions for each state, for each sample.
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in the base-year (that is, t−1). These firms are likely to have a counterfactual
time-t wage of zero as well, meaning that it will typically be impossible for
these firms to shift in response to HB 2117. Thus, we might see a larger effect
after dropping these firms. The regression results in the first two columns
support this hypothesis, though the magnitude of the shifting effect remains
modest and insignificantly different than zero. In particular, the estimated
total effect increases to approximately 7 percent in column 1 and 5 percent in
column 2. Interestingly, the estimated total effect remains quite small using
the synthetic controls method (column 3). Thus, the choice to keep firms with
zero base-year wages does not qualitatively alter the results.
3.8.4 Adjusting for entry and exit
It is possible that HB 2117 increased or decreased the number of S corporations
in Kansas. On the one hand, HB 2117 reduced the overall tax burden on S
corporations, increasing the value of starting or continuing a marginal business,
potentially increasing the number of S corporations in Kansas in the post-
treatment period. On the other hand, HB 2117 made S corporations slightly
tax-disfavored relative to partnerships and sole proprietorships – potentially
reducing the number of S corporations in the post-treatment period.64 Such a
“sample selection” effect could bias the empirical estimates which are, at their
core, a comparison of means between different sets of firms that select into the
sample (Heckman (1979)).
Figure 3.15 plots the year-over-year change in the number of firms in the
main estimation sample (i.e., of Type A firms). The top panel of the figure
does in fact show a slight decrease in the growth rate of the number of S
64At its onset, HB 2117 effectively exempted the entirety of economic profits from part-
nerships and sole proprietorships from state income tax. By contrast, HB 2117 did not
exempt the wage portion of economic profits from S corporations from state income tax.
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corporations starting in 2013, when all states are used as control states. This
could, potentially, represent a causal effect of HB 2117, as the law was passed
in May of 2012. On the other hand, the effect is much smaller (and in fact of
the opposite sign) when using solely the four border states as control states,
as shown in the bottom panel of Figure 3.15.
Using the method of Lee (2009), one can place bounds on the estimated
intensive margin treatment effect to account for the estimated extensive margin
response. In particular, we first estimate the excess share of firms in control
states in 2013, 2014, and 2015, relative to the other years in the sample; denote
this year-specific share as pt, for t = 2013, 2014, 2015. To estimate the lower
bound of the treatment effect, we assume that these excess control firms have
the worst potential outcomes. Thus, we drop the p2013 firms in the control
states with the worst values of the dependent variable in 2013, and likewise
in 2014 and 2015.65 Such trimming increases the average dependent variable
in control states in the post-period, and thus reduces the estimated treatment
effect. To estimate the upper bound of the treatment effect, the procedure is
reversed; the p2013, p2014, and p2015 firms with the most positive values of the
dependent variable are dropped in control states. If instead there is an excess
share of Kansas firms, the procedure is reversed such that the most positive
and most negative Kansas firms are dropped, respectively.
Table 3.12 presents the upper bound, the baseline estimate, and the lower
bound of the coefficient estimate. Column 1 uses all states as control states,
while column 2 uses only border states. This table shows that the bounds on
the estimates are reasonably narrow. In the first column, the upper bound is
0.000, the baseline estimate is -0.032, and the lower bound is a modest -0.062.
The bounds in column 2 have a similar mean but are somewhat narrower.
65This ranking is computed after residualizing the dependent variable on state and year
fixed effects.
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Thus, it does not appear that the main results are substantially affected by
selection bias.
3.9 Conclusion
Federal tax law provides an incentive for owners of S corporations to classify
their operating income as “business income” rather than wages. To explore the
effect of increasing this incentive, I exploit variation created by a tax reform
in Kansas, known as HB 2117, which exempted the profits earned by S cor-
porations from state income tax, but not the wages received by S corporation
shareholders. Using the universe of S corporation links to shareholders and
employees between 2003 and 2015, I estimate several difference-in-differences
models and find that wages to shareholders fell by two to three percent in
Kansas in the years after HB 2117 became law. The first model assumes the
standard difference-in-differences counterfactual: that the dependent variable
would have followed parallel trends with control states in the absence of treat-
ment. The second model reweights the sample of firms according to an inverse
propensity score weight in order to compare similar firms in Kansas and in
control states. The third model reweights the sample of control states in order
to match the trajectory of the dependent variable prior to treatment. The
most precise specifications find the bottom of the 95% confidence interval to
be about -8 percent to -6 percent.
This small result is seemingly in conflict with evidence in the literature
(e.g., Auten, Splinter, and Nelson (2016) and Smith, et al. (2017)) that owners
of S corporations engage in a substantial amount of shifting along this margin.
Furthermore, as discussed above, shifting or reclassifying income is ubiquitous
in certain other contexts, such as in anticipation of tax rate changes, or in re-
sponse to a reordering of the individual and corporate top rate. I put forward
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several explanations for why owners of S corporations in Kansas appear not
to have responded as strongly to the change in incentives created by HB 2117.
One simple explanation is that the response will take time as business owners
learn about the tax change. Another explanation is that the typical S corpo-
ration owner may be less sophisticated than the typical taxpayer who realizes
capital gains, or than the typical taxpayer on the margin between starting a
C corporation or a pass-through entity.
I show that this result is not surprising in light of the standard models of
tax evasion, and simple extensions thereto. Under a broad set of assumptions,
these models predict that the effect of increasing a tax wedge will be diminish-
ing in the size of the baseline tax wedge. This occurs for two reasons. First, an
increase in the tax wedge means that existing shifting becomes more valuable,
and taxpayers are more cautious to protect that existing shifting. Second, the
shape of the marginal cost curve may be highly convex, reflecting the shape
of the probability of audit function. Consistent with either of these theories,
I find that firms facing a relatively small tax wedge prior to HB 2117 reduce
their wages by more than other firms. Unfortunately, the precision of these
estimates drops somewhat, meaning that one cannot reject the null hypothe-
sis that both types of firms responded to the same extent; furthermore, these
point estimates are consistent with other explanations (such as heterogeneous
salience of the tax change) as well.
Furthermore, this result suggests that Section 199A might not lead to a
large reduction in wages paid to S corporation shareholders. However, one
must be careful in generalizing the effect of HB 2117 to the effect of Section
199A as enacted in the recent tax bill. On the one hand, Section 199A has
additional limitations (or “guardrails”) that HB 2117 did not have: it denies
the deduction for service firms owned by high-income individuals, for instance.
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Perhaps, this implies that the effect of HB 2117 is an upper bound for the effect
of Section 199A. On the other hand, it is possible that Section 199A will be
more salient than HB 2117, which could potentially lead to a larger effect. The
ultimate effects of Section 199A on wages to S corporation shareholders will
therefore remain an active area for further research.
Lastly, one should note that there are many other potential margins for
shifting in response to HB 2117 or, more generally, a tax wedge between wage
income and business income. For instance, as found by DeBacker, Heim, Ram-
nath, and Ross (2017), individuals can shift from an employment relationship
to an independent contracting relationship. This study does not analyze the
effect of HB 2117 on margins such as these. Thus, the results in this paper
are not sufficient to understand the total effect of a change in the tax wedge
between wage and business income. Future research should continue to study
responses along these other margins as well in order to provide comprehensive
evidence on this total effect.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics
(1) (2) (3)
Kansas Border All non-Kansas
Number of firms (rounded) 51,400 413,300 6,962,300
Share single shareholder 0.773 0.807 0.830
[38]
Mean number of shareholders 1.295 1.243 1.216
[13]
Median total assets 61,100 39,900 42,200
[14]
Median total income 189,800 144,400 138,900
[12]
Median ordinary income 20,400 17,200 11,500
[8]
Median wages to shareholders 26,500 20,800 16,000
[12]
Share with positive wages to shs. 0.726 0.704 0.626
[14]
Median operating income 55,500 45,400 36,800
[6]
Share with positive operating income 0.814 0.802 0.758
[10]
Notes: This table presents summary statistics for “Type A” firms at t ∈ {2010, 2011, 2012}.
Type A firms are defined as having one of the following two characteristics at time t − 1:
(1) all shareholders are employees or (2) the firm has a single shareholder. Medians are
rounded to the nearest $100 in order to protect taxpayer privacy. “Border states” are
Colorado, Missouri, Nebraska, and Oklahoma. The number in brackets indicates Kansas’s
rank for the given statistic among the 51 states (including D.C.). Operating income is
defined as ordinary income plus wages paid to shareholders.
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Table 3.2: Main results: Baseline difference-in-differences
Including control for ∆z
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All states Border states All states Border states
treat× 2013 -0.014 -0.015 -0.013 -0.015
{0.005} {0.005} {0.005} {0.005}
[-0.060, 0.034] [-0.040, 0.028] [-0.054, 0.024] [-0.041, 0.019]
treat× 2014 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.005
{0.005} {0.005} {0.005} {0.005}
[-0.043, 0.038] [-0.028, 0.029] [-0.040, 0.019] [-0.026, 0.022]
treat× 2015 -0.011 -0.007 -0.005 -0.005
{0.005} {0.005} {0.005} {0.005}




Estimated total effect: -0.032 -0.029 -0.025 -0.026
{0.011} {0.011} {0.010} {0.011}
[-0.161, 0.115] [-0.105, 0.106] [-0.141, 0.051] [-0.100, 0.040]
Rank of KS. coef 12 10 10 5
Most positive est. ID: 0.129 ID: 0.076 ID: 0.116 ID: 0.074
Most negative est. ND: -0.147 ND: -0.134 DC: -0.076 DC: -0.066
Observations 14,247,300 941,700 14,247,300 941,700
Notes: This table presents baseline difference-in-difference results. The dependent variable
is the DHS difference (percent change at the midpoint) in wages paid to shareholders.
The top panel presents the coefficients on treat × 1(t = 2013), treat × 1(t = 2014), and
treat × 1(t = 2015). The bottom panel presents the sum of those three coefficients, which
represents the estimated total effect at the end of the sample period. No stars for significance
are displayed. The sample includes “Type A” firms from 2010 to 2015. “Type A” firms are
defined as having one of the following two characteristics at time t−1: (1) all shareholders are
employees, or (2) the firm has a single shareholder. See text for additional “data quality”
sample restrictions. In columns 1 and 3, all states (including D.C.) are used as control
states. In columns 2 and 4, the sample is restricted to Kansas and its four neighboring
states. In columns 3 and 4, I include a control variable, equal to the logistic transformation
of the IHS difference in operating income. Standard errors in curly braces are clustered by
firm. Confidence intervals in brackets are constructed using the random inference procedure.
In the second panel, I present the rank of the Kansas estimated total effect among the
distribution of true and placebo estimates, out of 51 in columns 1 and 3 and 49 in columns
2 and 4. I then present the most positive and most negative placebo treatment estimates.
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Table 3.3: Main results: Difference-in-differences after inverse propensity score
reweighting
Including control for ∆z
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All states Border states All states Border states
treat× 2013 -0.009 -0.011 -0.009 -0.011
{0.005} {0.006} {0.005} {0.006}
[-0.035, 0.027] [-0.028, 0.017] [-0.029, 0.018] [-0.029, 0.006]
treat× 2014 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005
{0.005} {0.006} {0.005} {0.005}
[-0.050, 0.029] [-0.044, 0.016] [-0.033, 0.014] [-0.018, 0.013]
treat× 2015 -0.005 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004
{0.005} {0.006} {0.005} {0.005}




Estimated total effect: -0.019 -0.020 -0.019 -0.020
{0.011} {0.012} {0.011} {0.011}
[-0.084, 0.083] [-0.061, 0.066] [-0.065, 0.027] [-0.055, 0.021]
Rank of KS. coef 16 7 8 3
Most positive est. ID: 0.065 DE: 0.041 NV: 0.045 DE: 0.035
Most negative est. ND: -0.102 ND: -0.086 ND: -0.046 WY: -0.042
Observations 14,247,100 941,700 14,247,100 941,700
Notes: This table presents difference-in-difference results after reweighting the sample by inverse propensity
score. The dependent variable in the “second stage” regression is the DHS difference (percent change at the
midpoint) in wages paid to shareholders. The top panel presents the coefficients on treat × 1(t = 2013),
treat× 1(t = 2014), and treat× 1(t = 2015). The bottom panel presents the sum of those three coefficients,
which represents the estimated total effect at the end of the sample period. No stars for significance are
displayed. The sample includes “Type A” firms from 2010 to 2015. “Type A” firms are defined as having
one of the following two characteristics at time t−1: (1) all shareholders are employees, or (2) the firm has a
single shareholder. See text for additional “data quality” sample restrictions. In columns 1 and 3, all states
(including D.C.) are used as control states. In columns 2 and 4, the sample is restricted to Kansas and its
four neighboring states. In columns 3 and 4, I include a control variable, equal to the logistic transformation
of the IHS difference in operating income. Standard errors in curly braces are clustered by firm. Confidence
intervals in brackets are constructed using the random inference procedure. In the second panel, I present
the rank of the Kansas estimated total effect among the distribution of true and placebo estimates, out of 51
in columns 1 and 3 and 49 in columns 2 and 4. I then present the most positive and most negative placebo
treatment estimates. In the first stage, propensity scores are computed by a probit regression of (separately
in each year) a dummy for being a Kansas firm on industry dummies (2-digit NAICS codes), employee size
dummies, firm age dummies, dummies for being single shareholder, dummies for paying positive wages to
shareholders, and modified inverse hyperbolic sine transformations of total income, ordinary income, assets,
and wages to shareholders.
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Table 3.4: Synthetic control regression results
(1) (2)
Match on past dep. var Match on covariates
treat× 2013 -0.009 -0.016
[-0.028, 0.019] [-0.031, 0.003]
treat× 2014 -0.002 -0.006
[-0.022, 0.016] [-0.028, 0.019]
treat× 2015 -0.004 -0.005
[-0.028, 0.021] [-0.024, 0.017]
Estimated total effect -0.014 -0.027
[-0.066, 0.052] [-0.078, 0.032]
Rank of KS. coef 9 6
Most positive est. CA: 0.052 MA: 0.051
Most negative est. NM: -0.066 WY: -0.059
Weights of top 5 states: SD: 0.579 NE: 0.243
KY: 0.147 OK: 0.226
WY: 0.141 CT: 0.164
ID: 0.077 NV: 0.108
MT: 0.055 MS: 0.101
Notes: This table presents synthetic control results. The dependent variable is the DHS
difference (percent change at the midpoint) in wages paid to shareholders, aggregated to the
state-year level after computing the DHS difference. The top panel presents the coefficients
on treat × 1(t = 2013), treat × 1(t = 2014), and treat × 1(t = 2015). The bottom panel
presents the sum of those three coefficients, which represents the estimated total effect at
the end of the sample period. No stars for significance are displayed. The underlying sample
includes “Type A” firms from 2004-2015. “Type A” firms are defined as having one of the
following two characteristics at time t − 1: (1) all shareholders are employees or (2) the
firm has a single shareholder. See text for additional “data quality” sample restrictions. In
column 1, the synthetic control weights are constructed solely to minimize squared error
between the dependent variable in Kansas and in the synthetic control state prior from
2004 to 2012. In column 2, matching on covariates (Equation (3.7)) is additionally imposed.
Confidence intervals are constructed using the random inference procedure. In the bottom
panel, I present the rank of the Kansas estimate for the total effect among the distribution
of true and placebo estimates, out of 51. I then present the most positive and most negative
placebo treatment estimates. Finally, I present the weight of the top 5 states making up
the synthetic control state.
235
Table 3.5: Heterogeneous effects: Summary statistics
High-wedge firms Low-wedge firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Kansas Border All non-Kansas Kansas Border All non-Kansas
Number of firms (rounded) 43,600 359,400 5,749,800 7,800 53,900 1,212,500
Share single shareholder 0.781 0.813 0.840 0.728 0.767 0.785
[38]
Mean number of shareholders 1.265 1.221 1.189 1.466 1.395 1.342
[13] [9]
Median total assets 49,900 32,700 32,700 195,200 151,400 145,800
[14] [22]
Median total income 164,600 128,100 117,900 666,400 587,700 553,400
[8] [22]
Median ordinary income 18,300 15,600 10,000 55,500 50,100 30,300
[7] [15]
Median wages to shareholders 24,000 18,000 12,100 126,800 125,700 123,200
[11] [31]
Share with positive wages to shs. 0.724 0.700 0.613 0.736 0.731 0.688
[14] [20]
Median operating income 48,300 40,300 30,700 217,400 208,400 182,700
[6] [18]
Share with positive operating income 0.815 0.803 0.757 0.809 0.799 0.765
[10] [16]
Notes: This table presents summary stats analogous to Table 3.1, separately for high-wedge and low-wedge Type A firms. High-wedge firms,
presented in columns 1-3, are firms for which fewer than half of shareholders have earnings (at time t− 1) greater than the Social Security cap. Such
firms faced an initially higher tax wedge between profits and wages. Low-wedge firms, presented in columns 4-6 are firms for which at least half of
shareholders meet that restriction. Such firms faced an initially lower tax wedge between profits and wages. See also the notes to Table 3.1.
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Table 3.6: Heterogeneous effects: Baseline difference-in-differences for firms below and above Social Security cap
Including control for ∆z
All states Border states All states Border states
High-wedge firms
Estimated total effect: -0.029 -0.027 -0.016 -0.016
{0.012} {0.012} {0.010} {0.011}
[-0.155, 0.104] [-0.098, 0.091] [-0.133, 0.028] [-0.090, 0.024]
Low-wedge firms
Estimated total effect -0.054 -0.038 -0.074 -0.084
{0.024} {0.025} {0.017} {0.018}
[-0.186, 0.178] [-0.141, 0.187] [-0.192, 0.087] [-0.157, 0.079]
P-values for tests of equality
Clustered by firm 0.350 0.707 0.001 0.000
Using RI-β 0.549 0.653 0.745 0.653
Observations 14,247,300 941,700 14,247,300 941,700
Notes: This table presents the total estimated effect (the sum of the coefficients on treat× 1(t = 2013), treat× 1(t = 2014), and treat× 1(t = 2015)),
analogous to the bottom panel Tables 3.2 and 3.3, separately for high-wedge and low-wedge Type A firms. High-wedge firms, presented in the top
panel, are firms for which fewer than half of shareholders have earnings (at time t − 1) greater than the Social Security cap. Such firms faced an
initially higher tax wedge between profits and wages. Low-wedge firms, presented in columns 2 and 4 are firms for which at least half of shareholders
meet that restriction. Such firms faced an initially lower tax wedge. In columns 3 and 4, I add a control for the change in operating income, whose
coefficient is allowed to be different for high- and low-wedge firms. In columns 1 and 3, all states are used as control states. In columns 2 and 4, only
border states are used as control states. No stars for significance are displayed. See also the notes to Tables 3.2 and 3.3.
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Table 3.7: Heterogeneous effects: Propensity-score reweighted result for firms below and above Social Security cap
Including control for ∆z
All states Border states All states Border states
High-wedge firms
Estimated total effect: -0.015 -0.019 -0.003 -0.009
{0.013} {0.013} {0.012} {0.012}
[-0.077, 0.073] [-0.060, 0.064] [-0.119, 0.074] [-0.080, 0.058]
Low-wedge firms
Estimated total effect -0.068 -0.045 -0.116 -0.105
{0.026} {0.027} {0.020} {0.020}
[-0.297, 0.099] [-0.183, 0.118] [-0.205, -0.010] [-0.175, 0.007]
P-values for tests of equality
Clustered by firm 0.070 0.398 0.000 0.000
Using RI-β 0.157 0.408 0.039 0.041
Observations 14,245,700 941,700 14,245,700 941,700
Notes: This table presents estimates analogous to Table 3.6, using a sample that is reweighted by inverse propensity scores, as in 3.3. The first-stage
probit models are estimated separately on the samples of high- and low-wedge firms. See also the notes to Tables 3.6 and 3.3.
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Table 3.8: Heterogeneous effects: Baseline synthetic control results for firms
facing low and high counterfactual tax wedges
(1) (2)
Match on past dep. var Match on covariates
High-wedge firms
Estimated total effect: -0.006 -0.002
[-0.058, 0.058] [-0.044, 0.065]
Weights of top 5 states: SD: 0.482 OK: 0.311
KY: 0.226 IA: 0.158
MT: 0.169 MS: 0.148
WY: 0.082 NE: 0.126
IA: 0.035 MO: 0.119
Low-wedge firms
Estimated total effect: -0.057 -0.057
[-0.129, 0.020] [-0.128, 0.038]
Weights of top 5 states: HI: 0.377 IA: 0.376
AR: 0.164 WV: 0.153
NE: 0.129 MD: 0.134
WV: 0.124 LA: 0.116
ND: 0.104 UT: 0.108
P-value for diff 0.118 0.120
using RI-β
Notes: This table presents estimates the total estimated effect (the sum of the coefficients on
treat×1(t = 2013), treat×1(t = 2014), and treat×1(t = 2015)), analogous to Tables 3.4,
separately for high-wedge and low-wedge. High-wedge firms, presented in the top panel, are
firms for which fewer than half of shareholders have earnings (at time t−1) greater than the
Social Security cap. Low-wedge firms, presented in the bottom panel are firms for which at
least half of shareholders meet that restriction. In column 1, the synthetic control weights
are calculated solely to minimize squared error between the dependent variable in Kansas
and in the synthetic control state from 2004 to 2012. In column 2, covariate matching
(Equation (3.7)) is additionally imposed. See also the notes to Table 3.4.
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Table 3.9: Robustness: Officer compensation instead of wages to shareholders
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline diff-in-diff Propensity score reweighted Synthetic control
All states as controls
Estimated total effect: 0.002 0.013 0.003
{0.012} {0.012}
[-0.140, 0.122] [-0.062, 0.104] [-0.062, 0.064]
Rank of KS. coef 28 34 17
Most positive est. ID: 0.142 ID: 0.076 CA: 0.065
Most negative est. ND: -0.120 ND: -0.091 NM: -0.061
Observations 14,247,300 14,247,100 24
Border states
Estimated total effect: -0.005 0.007
{0.012} {0.013}
[-0.101, 0.119] [-0.049, 0.096]
Rank of KS. coef 21 29
Most positive est. ID: 0.096 ID: 0.056
Most negative est. ND: -0.124 ND: -0.089
Observations 941,700 941,700
Notes: This table repeats the main analysis using a dependent variable constructed from
officer compensation as reported on Line 7 of Form 1120S, rather than wages to shareholders
constructed using Form W2 and Form 1120S, Schedule K-1. Specifically, the dependent
variable is the the DHS difference (percent change at the midpoint) in officer compensation.
In each panel, I report only the total estimated effect (the sum of the coefficients on treat×
1(t = 2013), treat × 1(t = 2014), and treat × 1(t = 2015)). In the top panel, all states
are used as control states. In the bottom panel, only the four states bordering Kansas
(Colorado, Missouri, Nebraska, and Oklahoma) are used as control states. I report the
baseline difference-in-differences result in column 1, the inverse propensity score reweighted
result in column 2, and the synthetic control result in column 3, except that I do not run
synthetic controls when the sample is restricted to Kansas and its four bordering states.
Standard errors in braces in columns 1-2 are clustered by firm. Confidence intervals in
brackets are calculated via random inference on the coefficient estimate. See also the notes
to 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4.
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Table 3.10: Functional form robustness: alternative definition of dependent variable
F.D. in dummy First difference in g(w)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
a = 0 a = 3 a = 6 a = 9
All states as controls
Estimated total effect: -0.0022 -0.059 -0.052 -0.045 -0.033
{0.0039} {0.042} {0.030} {0.020} {0.010}
[-0.0401, 0.0286] [-0.504, 0.387] [-0.384, 0.301] [-0.263, 0.216] [-0.136, 0.129]
Rank of KS. coef 26 20 17 13 11
Most positive est. ID: 0.0379 ID: 0.446 ID: 0.332 ID: 0.218 ID: 0.104
Most negative est. ND: -0.0308 ND: -0.446 ND: -0.353 ND: -0.261 ND: -0.161
Observations 14,247,300 14,247,300 14,247,300 14,247,300 14,247,300
Border states
Estimated total effect: -0.0031 -0.056 -0.047 -0.037 -0.025
{0.0042} {0.045} {0.032} {0.021} {0.010}
[-0.0303, 0.0241] [-0.356, 0.349] [-0.265, 0.277] [-0.175, 0.205] [-0.082, 0.128]
Rank of KS. coef 15 11 11 12 10
Most positive est. ID: 0.0272 ID: 0.300 ID: 0.218 ID: 0.137 ID: 0.057
Most negative est. ND: -0.0272 ND: -0.406 ND: -0.324 ND: -0.242 ND: -0.153
Observations 941,700 941,700 941,700 941,700 941,700
Notes: This table presents the total estimated effect (the sum of the coefficients on treat× 1(t = 2013), treat× 1(t = 2014), and treat× 1(t = 2015))
for alternative dependent variables. In column 1, the dependent variable is the first difference in a dummy for paying positive wages to shareholders.
In the remainder of the columns, the dependent variable is a first difference in g(w; a) = ln(w +
√
w2 + exp(2a)), where a = 0, 3, 6, 9 from columns
2-5, respectively. In the top panel, all states are used as control states. In the bottom panel, only Colorado, Missouri, Nebraska, and Oklahoma are
used as control states. See also the notes to Table 3.2.
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Table 3.11: Robustness to alternative samples
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline diff-in-diff Propensity score reweighted Synthetic control
Single-shareholder firms
Estimated total effect: All states -0.015 -0.015 -0.010
{0.012} {0.012}
[-0.134, 0.118] [-0.059, 0.038]




Estimated total effect: All states -0.016 0.007 -0.014
{0.016} {0.017}
[-0.203, 0.060] [-0.063, 0.036]




Estimated total effect: All states -0.068 -0.057 -0.011
{0.013} {0.016}
[-0.202, 0.117] [-0.081, 0.068]
Estimated total effect: Border states -0.057 -0.045
{0.014} {0.017}
[-0.138, 0.112]
Notes: This table repeats the main analysis on different samples. In each panel, I report only the total
estimated effect (the sum of the coefficients on treat× 1(t = 2013), treat× 1(t = 2014), and treat× 1(t =
2015)). In the top panel, I restrict the sample to single-shareholder firms, meaning that I drop firms that
have multiple shareholders that each receive a wage at time t−1. In the second panel, the sample is switched
from the set of Type A firms to the set of Type B firms. Type B firms have at least two shareholders (at
time t − 1), and at least one of those shareholders did not receive a Form W2 from the firm. In the third
panel, I drop all firms that pay zero wages to shareholders in the base year (time t − 1). I report the
baseline difference-in-differences result in column 1, the inverse propensity score reweighted result in column
2, and the synthetic control result in column 3. In all panels, the top row uses firms in all states, while the
bottom row restricts the sample to Kansas and the four border states. I do not estimate synthetic control
specifications when the sample is restricted to Kansas and the border states. Standard errors in braces in
columns 1-2 are clustered by firm. Confidence intervals in brackets are calculated via random inference on
the coefficient estimate. See also the notes to 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4.
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Table 3.12: Lee (2009) bounds on treatment effect
(1) (2)
All states as control Border states as control
Upper bound 0.000 -0.012
Baseline estimate -0.032 -0.029
Lower bound -0.062 -0.045
Excess KS firms (2013) -0.010 -0.003
Excess KS firms (2014) -0.004 0.004
Excess KS firms (2015) -0.002 -0.001
Notes: This table bounds the estimates in the bottom panel of Table 3.2 using the method
of Lee (2009). The excess mass of firms in 2013, 2014, and 2015 in Kansas is obtained
by estimating the following regression (at the state-year level), where fst is the number
of firms in the sample in state s at time t, treats is a dummy for Kansas and d2013t,
d2014t, and d2015t are dummies for 2013, 2014, and 2015 respectively: ln(fst)− ln(fs,t−1) =
αs+θt+ δ2013treats×d2013t+ δ2014treats×d2014t+ δ2015treats×d2015t+ust. A negative
estimate of excess Kansas firms indicates that the excess firms are in control states. When
the excess is positive, the lower bound is computed by trimming the top δ2013 firms in Kansas
in 2013, the top δ2013 + δ2014 firms in Kansas in 2014, and the top δ2013 + δ2014 + δ2015 firms
in Kansas in 2015, where the ranking is measured by the residualized dependent variable.
When the excess is negative, the lower bound is computed by trimming the bottom |δ2013|,
|δ2013+δ2014|, |δ2013+δ2014+δ2015| firms in control states in 2013, 2014, and 2015 respectively.
The upper bound is computed analogously.
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Figure 3.1: Evolution of baseline dependent variable (DHS difference in wages








































Border states as controls
Notes: This figure plots the evolution of the mean dependent variable yist, the DHS dif-
ference (percent change at the midpoint) of wages paid to shareholders, in Kansas and
in control states, controlling for the change in operating income. In particular, these are
the coefficients from a regression of yist on a full set of control-by-year and treat-by-year
dummies. The sample includes “Type A” firms, defined as having one of the following two
characteristics at time t− 1: (1) all shareholders are employees, or (2) the firm has a single
shareholder. In the top panel, all states are used as control states. In the bottom panel, only
border states (Colorado, Missouri, Nebraska, and Oklahoma) are used as control states. See
text for additional “data quality” sample restrictions.
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Kansas minus control
Series for most positive and most negative placebo
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Border states as controls
Notes: This figure plots the Kansas treatment effect relative to placebo treatment effects.
The thick black line plots the mean dependent variable (the percent change at the midpoint
of wages paid to shareholders) in Kansas relative to the mean dependent variable in control
states, normalized such that this difference equals zero, on average, in the pre-period (2010-
2012). The remaining series plot the mean dependent variable in each state j relative to
the mean dependent variable in all other states, again normalized to equal zero in the pre-
period. The darkest dashed lines represent the series corresponding to the most negative and
most positive placebo treatment estimates. The top panel uses all states as control states.
The bottom panel uses only border states (i.e., the set of states bordering placebo-treated
state j) as control states. The sample includes Type A firms, defined as having one of the
following two characteristics at time t − 1: (1) all shareholders are employees, or (2) the
firm has a single shareholder. See text for additional “data quality” sample restrictions.
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Notes: This figure illustrates two potential solutions to the model presented in section 3.6.
It plots two sets of marginal cost and marginal benefit curves. The solid lines correspond
to the curves when the tax wedge is t1. The dotted lines correspond to the curves when the
tax wedge is t2 > t1. The solution is given by the intersection of the two curves, which is
given by s∗ in both cases. See the text for further discussion.
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Notes: This figure illustrates three potential solutions to the model presented in section
3.6. It plots a possible marginal cost curve against three candidate marginal benefit curves,
MB0,MB1, and MB2. With no tax wedge (t = MB0 = 0), the optimal amount of shifting
is zero. When the tax wedge increases to t1 = MB1, optimal shifting is s1. When the tax
wedge increases further to t2 = MB2, optimal shifting increases, but only slightly, to s2.
See the text for further discussion.
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3.10 Appendix
3.10.1 Construction of Data
I construct the data as follows. First, I retrieve from the Business Return
Transaction File (BRTF) all Forms 1120S filed for tax years 2003 through 2015,
except for (1) those that are marked as “Amended, Corrected, Supplemental,
Tentative or Revised” according to the computer condition code or (2) those
with tax identification numbers (TINs) coded as “unmatchable.”66 Second, I
retrieve from the Information Returns Master File (IRMF) all Forms 1120S,
Schedule K-1 associated with these (payer) TINs and tax years. If multiple
Schedules K-1 are found for the same combination of payer TIN (typically
EIN), shareholder TIN (typically SSN), and tax year, I keep the one which
was entered into the database most recently. Additionally, I use Form 1041,
Schedule K-1 to identify the TINs of owners of trusts that are themselves
shareholders of S corporations (indicated on Form 1120S, Schedule K-1).67 Let
LSSN denote the set of shareholder, tax-year combinations identified by Form
1120S, Schedule K-1, supplemented by Form 1041, Schedule K-1. Let LSSN,EIN
denote the set of recipient TIN, payer TIN, tax-year combinations identified
by Form 1120S, Schedule K-1, supplemented by by Form 1041, Schedule K-1.
I also retrieve certain Forms W2 from the IRMF. In particular, I retrieve
all Forms W2 for the shareholder TIN, tax year combinations in LSSN . As
with Form 1120S, Schedule K-1, I only keep the most recently entered Form
W2 in cases in which there are multiple Forms W2 for a given payer TIN, re-
cipient TIN, tax year combination.68 I identify the wages paid to shareholders
66All data was retrieved in August 2017.
67I do not attempt to find the beneficial owners of trusts identified as having a SSN as
their Tax Identification Number type.
68Note that the payer TIN for the Form W2 need not correspond to the 1120S payer TIN,
in general.
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by restricting these Forms W2 to those payer TIN, recipient TIN, tax year
combinations in LSSN,EIN .
Additionally, for the sake of calculating shareholders’ earnings relative to
the Social Security cap, I retrieve from the Individual Return Transaction File
(IRTF) all Forms 1040, Schedule SE for shareholder TIN, tax year combina-
tions identified by Form 1120S, Schedule K-1. As before, in the (unusual)
case of duplicates, I keep the most recently-entered form.69 Total earnings are
calculated by summing up self-employment income (which I define as line 4a
of Part I of Section B of Form 1040, Schedule SE) and W2 wages. Lastly, I
retrieve industry from the BRTF entity file and the number of employees from
Form 941.70
I perform several additional data cleaning steps. These steps are: (1)
dropping firm-year observations with missing Form 1120S, Schedule K-1, (2)
dropping firm-year observations in which there are no shareholders from the
same state (as identified by Schedule K-1) as the firm (as identified by Form
1120S), (3) dropping firm-year observations whose income does not match
between Form 1120S and its Schedule K-1, (4) dropping firm-year observations
in which the number of shareholders from Form 1120S does not match the
number of associated Schedules K-1, (5) dropping firm-year observations in
which wage expenses or officer compensation is reported on Form 1120S, but
no Forms W2 are found, and (6) dropping firm-year observations in which one
shareholder receives positive income and another receives negative income.71
69For Form 1040, Schedule SE, this corresponds to the cycle posting date.
70Form 941 must be filed quarterly, in general. I define employment as the average of the
four quarters within a given tax year. To deal with a common data entry error in which
firms mistakenly write the compensation amount on the employment line, I drop firms (i.e.,
treat employment as zero) when total compensation averages less than $500 per employee.
71For step (3), I allow a mismatch of up to 5% of income. Additionally, while the tax
year on the Form 1120S should correspond to the tax year on the Schedule K-1, I allow
for misreporting in this respect – i.e., I do not drop firms if the income from Form 1120S
in year t to match the income from Schedule K-1 for year t + 1. For step (6), I drop such
firms because income must be allocated on a pro-rata basis; thus, a situation in which one
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Figure 3.17 plots the share of raw observations dropped in each year at
each step. The upper-left panel shows step (1); the upper-right panel shows
the effect of step (2) on the subset of firms remaining after step (1); and so
forth. Each panel of the figure shows that the trends in Kansas mostly mirror
the trends in other states, which is reassuring for the difference-in-differences
empirical strategies. Additionally, there are visible spikes in the share dropped
due to missing Schedules K-1 in 2005 and (to a lesser extent) 2010. Income
matching improves dramatically after 2005, perhaps because the coding of
duplicate Forms 1120S improved starting in 2005. The share dropped due
to a mismatch in the number of shareholders also improves over time, falling
from about 6% in the beginning of the sample to less than 1% by the end. The
share dropped due to the presence of a wage or officer compensation deduction
without the accompanying Forms W2 is fairly stable between 4% and 6%.
In Table 3.19, I report summary statistics for the set of firms that are
dropped due to data quality, relative to the firms that are not, using observa-
tions from 2010-2015.72 By construction, we generally must restrict ourselves
to variables that are found on the 1120S. The table shows that dropped firms
tend to be smaller, in terms of total income, ordinary income, assets, and offi-
cer compensation. However, these differences are relatively modest. Of course,
we must interpret statistics for the dropped firms with caution, as the data
from these firms may be less reliable.
An alternative approach to linking S corporation to their shareholders
would be to use the so-called Document Locator Number (DLN), as Cooper,
et al. (2016) do. The DLN is an identifier that uniquely links a tax filing;
shareholder receives positive income and another receives negative should never occur. The
one exception is in the shareholder’s final year of ownership, in which a “closing-of-the-
books” election could produce such a result. Thus, I do not apply step (6) to firm-year
observations which comprise a shareholder’s final year of ownership of a given firm.
72In this table, I do not require firms to be “Type A” firms, nor do I require firms to be
present at time t− 1 in order to remain in the sample at time t.
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in principle, this should link Form 1120S to its Schedule K-1, as they are
required to be included in the same filing. Unfortunately, the DLN match per-
forms quite poorly prior to 2007. In particular, the number of Schedules K-1
matched to Form 1120S using the DLN more than doubles between 2006 and
2007; the number of Schedules K-1 matched according to payer TIN and tax
year exhibits no such break. For this reason, I use the payer TIN and tax year
match throughout the paper, subject to the data quality selection described
above.
3.10.2 Health insurance included in Box 1 wages
As a general rule, individuals who are 2% owners (or more) of an S corpo-
ration must include in Box 1 W2 wages the health insurance premiums paid
(or reimbursed) by the firm. These premiums are not subject to FICA and,
in general, the shareholder will be entitled to an above-the-line deduction for
these amounts (the self-employed health insurance deduction). Thus, in gen-
eral, the shareholder will arrive at the same outcome as the usual rule for
employer health insurance premiums: exclusion from income for income tax
purposes and FICA purposes.
Interestingly, HB 2117 repealed the self-employed health insurance deduc-
tion for the purpose of calculating Kansas income. This meant that, after HB
2117, owners of S corporations were effectively required to include health in-
surance premiums in their Kansas income. Thus, the tax favorability of health
insurance premiums fell between the pre-period (when they were not taxed in
Kansas) and the post-period (when they were taxed in Kansas). Conceivably,
this change could lead to a response: shifting away from health insurance
premiums (e.g., by reducing its actuarial value) toward true wages or toward
profits. This decision is likely fairly inelastic, perhaps due to behavioral fric-
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tions (e.g., Handel (2013)). But, since shifting from health insurance toward
profits would be observationally equivalent to shifting from wages toward prof-
its, this mechanism would tend to bias my estimates downward: I would be
capturing shifting along a separate margin beyond the margin under study.
Given that I estimate a small negative effect to begin with, this downward
bias does not threaten the interpretation of the results – that the effect of HB
2117 on wages to shareholders was small at best.
Nevertheless, it would be ideal to construct a definition of wages that does
not include health insurance premiums. There are two candidate strategies for
doing so. However, both have substantial drawbacks, and thus I do not use
either of these strategies. First, one could make use of the fact that the health
insurance premiums are not included in Medicare wages as recorded on the
W2. Thus, one could define “wages” as equal to Medicare wages less retirement
contributions (such as to 401(k) accounts).73 However, the Medicare wages
field in the source data appears to be substantially less clean than the (Box 1)
wages field. In the underlying data, I performed an auxiliary analysis on the
subset of W2s where Medicare wages are not equal to Box 1 wages (and which
do not receive a Form 1065, Schedule K-1 or Form 1120S, Schedule K-1). I
find that this difference is not equal to retirement contributions for 27 percent
of firms – which is implausibly high, given the relatively narrow circumstances
(other than retirement contributions) which would make Medicare wages not
equal wages.74
Second, one could make use of the self-employed health insurance deduction
field on the 1040. However, taxpayers do not report which business the health
73We would want to subtract retirement contributions – which are included in Medicare
wages – because the correct concept of “wages” is the amount of true wages that is included
in Kansas taxable income.
74Such circumstances include W2s received by nonresident aliens and by students em-
ployed by their school.
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insurance deduction is attributable to. E.g., if a shareholder (and/or his or
her spouse) owns more than one business (S corporation or otherwise), then I
would not know to which firm to attribute the health insurance deduction. In
the data, I find that about 60 percent of the shareholders in the main sample
that claim a self-employed health insurance deduction have this problem: they
(or their spouse) have some other source of business income. For both of these
reasons, I use Box 1 wages as my definition of wages despite the imperfection
of doing so.
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Table 3.13: Functional form approxmation: Log difference, DHS difference,
and I.H.S. difference, starting from xt−1 = 30, 000
(1) (2) (3)
Log difference D.H.S. difference I.H.S. difference (a=9)
$-30000 . . -4.040
$-1 . . -2.020
$1 -10.309 -2.000 -2.020
$1000 -3.401 -1.871 -1.897
$15000 -0.693 -0.667 -0.645
$25000 -0.182 -0.182 -0.175
$30000 0.000 0.000 0.000
$37500 0.223 0.222 0.217
$45000 0.405 0.400 0.396
$60000 0.693 0.667 0.680
$90000 1.099 1.000 1.083
Notes: This table shows values of the difference f(xt, xt−1) for three types of differences,
holding xt−1 fixed at $30,000, and varying xt. In the first column, f(xt, xt−1) = ln(xt) −
ln(xt−1). In the second column, f(xt, xt−1) is given by the Davis, Haltiwanger, Schuh
(DHS) difference, f(xt, xt−1) = xt−xt−10.5∗(xt+xt−1) . In the third column, f(xt, xt−1) is given by
the difference in the modified inverse hyperbolic sine: f(xt, xt−1) = g(xt; a) − g(xt−1; a),
where g(x, a) = ln(x+
√
x2 + exp(2a)), and a = 9. I do not allow the DHS difference to be
defined when xt or xt−1 is less than zero.
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Table 3.14: Statistics of firms that do not pay a wage to shareholders
(1) (2)
Zero wage firms Positive wage firms
Claims officer comp. deduction 0.084 0.927
Median assets 12,600 77,700
Has a non-shareholder employee 0.343 0.653
Has positive operating income 0.530 0.942
Has zero operating income 0.051 0.000
Has positive total income (line 6) 0.842 0.992
Has zero total income (line 6) 0.130 0.005
Notes: This table presents summary statistics for firms Type A firms, 2010-2015, that pay
zero wages to shareholders (column 1) and firms that pay positive wages to shareholders
(Column 2). Type A firms are defined as having one of the following two characteristics
at time t − 1: (1) all shareholders are employees or (2) the firm has a single shareholder.
See text for additional “data quality” restrictions. “Claims officer comp. deduction” is a
dummy indicating whether the firm reports a positive amount of officer compensation on
Form 1120S. Operating income is defined as ordinary income plus wages to shareholders.
Median assets is rounded to the nearest hundred in order to protect taxpayer confidentiality.
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Table 3.15: Effect of HB 2117 on operating income
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline diff-in-diff Propensity score reweighted Synthetic control
Linear: ∆z
Estimated total effect: All states -0.042 0.010 -0.005
{0.023} {0.025}
[-0.148, 0.485] [-0.170, 0.383] [-0.122, 0.095]
Estimated total effect: Border states -0.010 0.015
{0.024} {0.023}
[-0.121, 0.460] [-0.071, 0.391]
Logistic: 11+exp(∆z)
Estimated total effect: All states -0.007 0.000 0.005
{0.003} {0.003}
[-0.030, 0.082] [-0.025, 0.064] [-0.012, 0.031]
Estimated total effect: Border states -0.003 0.001
{0.003} {0.003}
[-0.020, 0.079] [-0.016, 0.067]
Notes: This table repeats the main analysis for the change in operating income (ordinary income plus wages
to shareholders). In the top panel, the dependent variable is ∆z, the IHS difference in operating income
(the first difference of ln(z+
√
z2 + exp(2× 9))). In the second panel, the dependent variable is the logistic
transformation of ∆z, i.e., 11+exp(∆z) ; this functional form is used in the main specifications as a control
variable. The three columns report the baseline difference-in-differences estimate for the total effect (the
sum of the coefficients on treat × 1(t = 2013), treat × 1(t = 2014), and treat × 1(t = 2015)), the inverse
propensity score reweighted result, and the synthetic control result. In all panels, all states are used as
control states in the top row, and only border states are used as control states in the bottom row. I do not
estimate synthetic control specifications using only border states as controls. Standard errors in braces in
columns 1-2 are clustered by firm. Confidence intervals in brackets are calculated via random inference on
the coefficient estimate. See also the notes to 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4.
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Table 3.16: Balance of covariates after propensity score reweighting (all states)
Unweighted means Propensity score reweighted
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Kansas Other states Kansas Other states
Industries
Agriculture, etc. 0.044 0.017 0.017 0.017
Mining, Oil & Gas 0.021 0.005 0.005 0.005
Utilities 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Construction 0.140 0.138 0.131 0.132
Manufacturing 0.038 0.037 0.037 0.036
Wholesale Trade 0.036 0.046 0.045 0.045
Retail Trade 0.102 0.103 0.103 0.101
Transp. & Warehousing 0.032 0.032 0.033 0.033
Information 0.012 0.016 0.015 0.016
Finance 0.060 0.041 0.040 0.041
Real Estate 0.082 0.091 0.092 0.093
Professional Svcs 0.169 0.180 0.182 0.183
Mgmt of Companies 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Admin & Support 0.035 0.037 0.038 0.038
Education 0.004 0.007 0.007 0.007
Health Care 0.095 0.095 0.100 0.101
Arts & Entertainment 0.011 0.021 0.022 0.022
Accom. & Food 0.036 0.043 0.045 0.044
Other Services 0.073 0.079 0.080 0.080
Public Admin. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Employee Bins
No employees 0.273 0.332 0.328 0.335
Empl. bin 1 (+) 0.165 0.175 0.179 0.176
Empl. bin 2 (+) 0.104 0.101 0.100 0.099
Empl. bin 3 (+) 0.156 0.137 0.136 0.136
Empl. bin 4 (+) 0.155 0.132 0.133 0.131
Empl. bin 5 (+) 0.147 0.123 0.125 0.123
Date of Entry Dummies
First observed in 2003 0.627 0.595 0.483 0.477
First observed in 2004 0.061 0.067 0.059 0.058
First observed in 2005 0.059 0.062 0.059 0.058
First observed in 2006 0.051 0.055 0.059 0.059
First observed in 2007 0.049 0.051 0.062 0.063
First observed in 2008 0.038 0.042 0.060 0.061
First observed in 2009 0.030 0.033 0.057 0.058
First observed in 2010 0.025 0.029 0.050 0.050
First observed in 2011 0.023 0.025 0.042 0.043
First observed in 2012 0.017 0.020 0.034 0.035
First observed in 2013 0.014 0.014 0.024 0.025
First observed in 2014 0.006 0.008 0.013 0.014
Other variables
Log total income 12.581 12.326 12.285 12.294
Log ordinary income 10.413 10.112 10.104 10.137
Log assets 11.701 11.465 11.427 11.427
Log wages to shareholders 10.731 10.536 10.518 10.526
Single shareholder 0.769 0.823 0.832 0.831
Dummy for pos. wages to shs. 0.732 0.638 0.626 0.629
Notes: This table presents mean values of covariates in Kansas and all other states among
Type A firms from 2010 to 2015. Type A firms are defined as having one of the following
two characteristics at time t − 1: (1) all shareholders are employees or (2) the firm has a
single shareholder. All covariates are measured at time t− 1. The first two columns report
the means for the unweighted sample. Columns 3 and 4 report the means for the inverse-
propensity-score-weighted sample. The propensity scores are estimated via year-specific
probit regressions that include the displayed covariates as regressors (excluding redundant
covariates). In the table, “log” is a shorthand for ln(y +
√
y2 + exp(2× 9). See text for
additional sample restrictions.
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Table 3.17: Balance of covariates after propensity score reweighting (border
states)
Unweighted means Propensity score reweighted
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Kansas Other states Kansas Other states
Industries
Agriculture, etc. 0.044 0.024 0.027 0.027
Mining, Oil & Gas 0.021 0.015 0.017 0.017
Utilities 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Construction 0.140 0.153 0.145 0.146
Manufacturing 0.038 0.034 0.033 0.033
Wholesale Trade 0.036 0.033 0.033 0.033
Retail Trade 0.102 0.094 0.093 0.092
Transp. & Warehousing 0.032 0.028 0.029 0.029
Information 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.013
Finance 0.060 0.051 0.052 0.052
Real Estate 0.082 0.085 0.086 0.086
Professional Svcs 0.169 0.186 0.187 0.188
Mgmt of Companies 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002
Admin & Support 0.035 0.038 0.038 0.038
Education 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.005
Health Care 0.095 0.096 0.101 0.101
Arts & Entertainment 0.011 0.014 0.014 0.014
Accom. & Food 0.036 0.040 0.040 0.040
Other Services 0.073 0.078 0.079 0.079
Public Admin. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Employee Bins
No employees 0.273 0.282 0.279 0.281
Empl. bin 1 (+) 0.165 0.212 0.209 0.209
Empl. bin 2 (+) 0.104 0.109 0.107 0.107
Empl. bin 3 (+) 0.156 0.143 0.143 0.143
Empl. bin 4 (+) 0.155 0.136 0.138 0.138
Empl. bin 5 (+) 0.147 0.119 0.123 0.123
Date of Entry Dummies
First observed in 2003 0.627 0.604 0.491 0.490
First observed in 2004 0.061 0.065 0.057 0.057
First observed in 2005 0.059 0.061 0.058 0.058
First observed in 2006 0.051 0.054 0.058 0.058
First observed in 2007 0.049 0.050 0.062 0.063
First observed in 2008 0.038 0.042 0.060 0.060
First observed in 2009 0.030 0.033 0.057 0.057
First observed in 2010 0.025 0.028 0.048 0.048
First observed in 2011 0.023 0.023 0.040 0.040
First observed in 2012 0.017 0.019 0.033 0.033
First observed in 2013 0.014 0.013 0.023 0.024
First observed in 2014 0.006 0.008 0.013 0.013
Other variables
Log total income 12.581 12.386 12.403 12.403
Log ordinary income 10.413 10.309 10.350 10.358
Log assets 11.701 11.404 11.422 11.420
Log wages to shareholders 10.731 10.604 10.636 10.634
Single shareholder 0.769 0.800 0.804 0.804
Dummy for pos. wages to shs. 0.732 0.714 0.709 0.710
Notes: This table presents mean values of covariates in Kansas and its four bordering states
(Colorado, Missouri, Nebraska, and Oklahoma) among Type A firms from 2010 to 2015.
Type A firms are defined as having one of the following two characteristics at time t−1: (1)
all shareholders are employees or (2) the firm has a single shareholder. All covariates are
measured at time t− 1. The first two columns report the means for the unweighted sample.
Columns 3 and 4 report the means for the inverse-propensity-score-weighted sample. The
propensity scores are estimated via year-specific probit regressions that include the displayed
covariates as regressors (excluding redundant covariates). In the table, “log” is a shorthand
for ln(y +
√
y2 + exp(2× 9). See text for additional sample restrictions.
258
Table 3.18: Functional form robustness: alternative definition of dependent variable after propensity score reweighting
F.D. in dummy First difference in g(w)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
a = 0 a = 3 a = 6 a = 9
All states as controls
Estimated total effect: 0.0019 -0.016 -0.021 -0.027 -0.025
{0.0044} {0.047} {0.034} {0.021} {0.010}
[-0.0200, 0.0198] [-0.263, 0.254] [-0.203, 0.195] [-0.143, 0.136] [-0.079, 0.081]
Rank of KS. coef 32 25 23 15 10
Most positive est. ID: 0.0219 ID: 0.248 ID: 0.182 ID: 0.116 NV: 0.054
Most negative est. ND: -0.0179 ND: -0.270 ND: -0.216 ND: -0.163 ND: -0.106
Observations 14,247,100 14,247,100 14,247,100 14,247,100 14,247,100
Border states
Estimated total effect: 0.0001 -0.025 -0.025 -0.026 -0.021
{0.0046} {0.049} {0.035} {0.022} {0.011}
[-0.0165, 0.0152] [-0.199, 0.196] [-0.150, 0.156] [-0.112, 0.117] [-0.072, 0.079]
Rank of KS. coef 25 15 14 10 7
Most positive est. ID: 0.0166 ID: 0.174 ID: 0.124 DE: 0.087 DE: 0.052
Most negative est. DC: -0.0151 ND: -0.221 ND: -0.182 ND: -0.143 ND: -0.099
Observations 941,700 941,700 941,700 941,700 941,700
Notes: This table presents the total estimated effect (the sum of the coefficients on treat× 1(t = 2013), treat× 1(t = 2014), and treat× 1(t = 2015))
for alternative dependent variables, after reweighting the sample by inverse propensity scores. In column 1, the dependent variable is the first
difference in a dummy for paying positive wages to shareholders. In the remainder of the columns, the dependent variable is a first difference in
g(w; a) = ln(w +
√
w2 + exp(2a)), where a = 0, 3, 6, 9 from columns 2-5, respectively. In the top panel, all states are used as control states. In the
bottom panel, only Colorado, Missouri, Nebraska, and Oklahoma are used as control states. See also the notes to Table 3.3.
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25th percentile 1,500 0
50th percentile 39,700 23,000
75th percentile 202,700 195,600
Ordinary income
25th percentile -1,200 -1,400
50th percentile 7,700 5,600
75th percentile 48,400 43,000
Total income
25th percentile 16,400 18,500
50th percentile 113,300 101,100
75th percentile 358,300 333,000
Officer compensation
25th percentile 0 0
50th percentile 2,000 1,500
75th percentile 48,000 32,900
Notes: This table shows characteristics of firms that are dropped due to data quality (second
column) relative to firms that are not dropped due to data quality. Restrictions related to
balance (i.e., requiring firms to be present at time t−1 and t) and shareholder-employees (i.e.,
requiring firms to be “Type A” firms) are not imposed here. This data includes observations
from 2010-2015. See text for a discussion of data quality sample restrictions.
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Figure 3.5: Evolution of choice of business entity in the United States: C



















1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
C Corporations S Corporations
Partnerships Sole proprietorships
Notes: This figure plots the number of active returns of four different entity types from
1978 through 2014, as reported by Joint Committee on Taxation (2017). Each series is
normalized such that the value is set to one in 1985, the year prior to the passage of the
Tax Reform Act of 1986.
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Notes: This figure plots the share of observations that are dropped from the raw data in
each year for one of the following two reasons. Firms are dropped if (1) they are not present,
or have a data problem described in the Data Appendix, at times t− 1 or t or (2) they have
at least one shareholder that is not an employee at time t− 1.
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Type A firm restriction
Kansas Other states
Notes: This figure plots the share of observations dropped in each of three steps. The
upper-left panel plots the share of firms that are dropped because they are not present in
the raw data at time t − 1. The upper-right panel plots the share of remaining firms that
are dropped because they have a data problem described in in the Data Appendix, at times
t−1 or t. The lower panel plots the share of remaining firms that are dropped because they
have at least one shareholder that is not an employee at time t− 1 (i.e., they are not Type
A firms).
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Figure 3.8: Relationship between DHS difference in wages to shareholders and
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IHS change in operating income
Notes: This figure plots a binned scatter plot of the DHS (Davis, Haltiwanger, Schuh)
difference in wages to shareholders as a function of the modified inverse hyperbolic sine
(IHS) difference in operating income. See text for a definition of both of these functional
forms. The sample includes all observations from 2010-2015.
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Figure 3.9: Evolution of baseline dependent variable (DHS difference in wages
paid to shareholders) in Kansas and control states, 2004-2015, controlling for






















































Border states as controls
Notes: This figure plots the evolution of the mean dependent variable yist, the DHS dif-
ference (percent change at the midpoint) of wages paid to shareholders, in Kansas and in
control states, controlling for the change in operating income. In particular, these are the
coefficients from a regression of yist on a full set of control-by-year and treat-by-year dum-
mies, with the change in operating income included as a control variable. Thus, the points
on the graph can be interpreted as the average growth rate when the change in (nominal)
operating income is zero. The sample includes “Type A” firms, defined as having one of
the following two characteristics at time t− 1: (1) all shareholders are employees, or (2) the
firm has a single shareholder. In the top panel, all states are used as control states. In the
bottom panel, only border states (Colorado, Missouri, Nebraska, and Oklahoma) are used
as control states. See text for additional “data quality” sample restrictions.
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Figure 3.10: Evolution of baseline dependent variable (DHS difference in wages









































Border states as controls
Notes: This figure plots the evolution of the dependent variable yist, the percent change
at the midpoint of wages paid to shareholders, after reweighting the sample according to
inverse propensity score weights (as described in the notes to Table 3.3). The sample
includes “Type A” firms, defined as having one of the following two characteristics at time
t− 1: (1) all shareholders are employees, or (2) the firm has a single shareholder. See text
for additional “data quality” sample restrictions.
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Figure 3.11: True treatment effect relative to distribution of placebo treatment
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All other placebo series
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Year
Kansas minus control
Series for most positive and most negative placebo
All other placebo series
Border states as controls
Notes: This figure plots the Kansas treatment effect relative to placebo treatment effects after reweighting
the sample according to inverse propensity score weights (as described in the notes to Table 3.3). The
thick black line plots the mean dependent variable (the percent change at the midpoint of wages paid
to shareholders) in Kansas relative to the mean dependent variable in control states, normalized such
that this difference equals zero, on average, in the pre-period (2010-2012). The remaining series plot the
mean dependent variable in each state j relative to the mean dependent variable in all other states, again
normalized to equal zero in the pre-period. The darkest dashed lines represent the series corresponding to
the most negative and most positive placebo treatment estimates. The top panel uses all states as control
states. The bottom panel uses only border states (i.e., the set of states bordering placebo-treated state j) as
control states. The sample includes Type A firms, defined as having one of the following two characteristics
at time t − 1: (1) all shareholders are employees, or (2) the firm has a single shareholder. See text for
additional “data quality” sample restrictions.
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Series for most positive and most
negative placebo
All other placebo series
Matching on covariates
Notes: This figure plots the Kansas treatment effect relative to placebo treatment effects under the synthetic
control method. The thick black line plots the mean dependent variable (the percent change at the midpoint
of wages paid to shareholders) in Kansas relative to the mean dependent variable in the synthetic control
state, normalized such that this difference equals zero, on average, in the pre-period (2005-2012). The
remaining series plot the mean dependent variable in each state j relative to the mean dependent variable
in their synthetic control state, again normalized to equal zero in the pre-period. The darkest dashed lines
represent the series corresponding to the most negative and most positive placebo treatment estimates. The
top panel constructs the synthetic control weights in order to match the path of the dependent variable
in the pre-period. The bottom panel additionally imposes covariate matching (Equation 3.7). The sample
includes Type A firms, defined as having one of the following two characteristics at time t − 1: (1) all
shareholders are employees, or (2) the firm has a single shareholder. See text for additional “data quality”
sample restrictions.
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Figure 3.13: Heterogeneous effects: Evolution of baseline dependent variable
(DHS difference in wages paid to shareholders) in Kansas and control states,









































Notes: This figure plots the evolution of the dependent variable yist, the percent change
at the midpoint of wages paid to shareholders, separately for high-wedge and low-wedge
firms. High-wedge firms, presented in the top panel, are firms for which fewer than half of
shareholders have earnings (at time t− 1) greater than the Social Security cap. Such firms
faced an initially higher tax wedge between profits and wages. Low-wedge firms, presented
in the bottom panel, are firms for which at least half of shareholders meet that restriction.
Such firms faced an initially lower tax wedge. The sample includes “Type A” firms, defined
as having one of the following two characteristics at time t − 1: (1) all shareholders are
employees, or (2) the firm has a single shareholder. See text for additional “data quality”
sample restrictions.
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Figure 3.14: Heterogeneous effects: Evolution of baseline dependent variable
(DHS difference in wages paid to shareholders) in Kansas and control states,
2004-2015, separately for high-wedge and low-wedge firms, using only border












































Notes: This figure plots the evolution of the dependent variable yist, the percent change at
the midpoint of wages paid to shareholders, separately for high-wedge and low-wedge firms.
Only the four states bordering Kansas (Colorado, Missouri, Nebraska, and Oklahoma) are
included as control states. High-wedge firms, presented in the top panel, are firms for which
fewer than half of shareholders have earnings (at time t−1) greater than the Social Security
cap. Such firms faced an initially higher tax wedge between profits and wages. Low-wedge
firms, presented in the bottom panel are firms for which at least half of shareholders meet
that restriction. Such firms faced an initially lower tax wedge. The sample includes “Type
A” firms, defined as having one of the following two characteristics at time t − 1: (1) all
shareholders are employees, or (2) the firm has a single shareholder. See text for additional
“data quality” sample restrictions.
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Kansas All other states
Border states as control states
Notes: This figure plots the first difference in the log number of firms in Kansas and in all
other states among Type A firms. “Type A” firms, defined as having one of the following
two characteristics at time t − 1: (1) all shareholders are employees, or (2) the firm has a
single shareholder. See text for additional “data quality” sample restrictions.
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Figure 3.16: Histogram of relative difference between wages to shareholders











0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5
% difference in wages & officer compensation
Notes: This figure plots a histogram of the share of firm-year observations, based on the
absolute (log) difference between wages to shareholders and officer compensation. The
sample includes Type A firms from 2010-2015, conditional on paying positive wages to
shareholders. “Type A” firms are defined as having one of the following two characteristics
at time t − 1: (1) all shareholders are employees, or (2) the firm has a single shareholder.
The leftmost bin includes only firms where officer compensation equals wages to shareholders
exactly. The rightmost bin includes firms where the log difference is greater than 0.5; this bin
also includes firms where officer compensation is reported to be zero. See text for additional
“data quality” sample restrictions.
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Figure 3.17: Share of firms dropped due to data quality in each year: separately






































































































Shs. with opp.−signed income
All other states Kansas
Notes: This figure plots the share of firms dropped in each year, for each of the following
four reasons sequentially: (1) there is no Schedule K-1 found, (2) there are no shareholders
(as listed on the Schedule K-1) from the same state as the firm (as indicated by Form
1120S), (3) the sum of income from Schedule K-1 does not match Form 1120S, (4) the
number of shareholders from Form 1120S does not match the number of Schedules K-1,
(5) the firm reports a deduction for wages or officer compensation paid, but no Forms W2
issued by the firm are found, or (6) at least one shareholder reports positive ordinary income
while another reports negative ordinary income from the firm. Step (1) is presented in the
upper-left corner, step (2) in the upper-middle, step (3) in the upper-right, step (4) in the
lower-left, step (5) in the lower-middle, and step (6) in the lower-right. The reported shares
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